In Search of Market Access: Why the Doha “Plan B” for December 2011 is likely to fail Effective Market Access (Part I)

Résumé

Once again the Doha Round negotiators are struggling to reach an agreement, this time by mid-December on a “plan B” package that would give increased market access to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the form of duty-free-quota free (DFQF) access accompanied by simplified rules of origin. Estimating ‘effective market access’ to the two largest ‘preference-givers’, the US and EU preferences, this note shows that remaining market access left for the LDCs is negligible at around 3 percent in the EU but negative in the US (because textiles are excluded from the Generalized System of Preferences). An accompanying note assesses that the administrative costs that have to be borne to meet the origin requirements to obtain preferential status in OECD markets is likely to wipe out any remaining effective market access computed here, implying negligible market access to be obtained under “plan B”.
Citer

Carrère, C. et J. de Melo "In Search of Market Access: Why the Doha “Plan B” for December 2011 is likely to fail Effective Market Access" Ferdi, Note brève B24.1, juillet 2011