

Empowering Africa's future: Remarks on the digital transformation

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Takeaways

- DIGITECH and supportive policies for national data management and Services are necessary for successful digitalization
- Offshoring/onshoring balance driven by ongoing DIGITECH transformation (IOT, 3D, etc). Mauritius less remote
- Economies of scope (diversification) /economies of scale (to drive down unit costs) balance to tilt towards economies of scope
- Indices of Network Readiness (NRI) show average performance for Mauritius

AFCFTA

- Inter-REC trade very low (<1% of GDP on average); Applied tariffs are high
- Phase I tariff offers are generally above minimum compatible with modalities
- ...but Product-specific ROO are complicated in sectors with high preference margins (ROO should be business-friendly not business-owned)

Digitalization and structural transformation under an 'end of globalisation' era

DIGITECH

- Industrial robots
- Computer aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM)
- Additive manufacturing (3D printing)
- Machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI)
- Big data and cloud computing
- Internet of Things (IOT) → sensors in objects create data

DIGITALISATION

DIGITECH + digitization → continental digital transformation

OFFSHORING/RESHORING

- Lower coordination costs →offshoring/FDI
- Better information technology (3D, IOT) →onshoring

Mauritius: From remoteness to closeness

STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

• From economies of scale to economies of scope

National data and Trade Services Policies

• Digitization (conversion of physical objects to digital format)

• Digital trade (ICT enabled cross-border services)-Mauritius is

• Helps towards setting up Africa's Single Digital Market (SDM)

• Servitization (product + aftersales, subscription model)

second top exporter of business services in Africa

• Data infrastructure policy

• Manufacturing-led development harder/ Services-led development easier


Favorable for Mauritius (but big push on education is prerequisite)

AFCFTA

- Applied tariffs are high, tariff offers are significant
- African countries are upstream in supply chains with parnters outside region
- Beware that negotiated ROO are very restrictive in sectors with high preference margins

Successful AfCFTA will contribute modestly towards 'made in Africa'

Figure 1 NRI scores and GDP per capita in PPP\$ NRI 2024 (bubble size: population)



Network readiness index for 133 countries

Mauritius rank: 60/133. Score: simple average of 4 pillars (see next slide)


NRI and its 4 components

Seychelles underperforms, Rwanda overperforms, Mauritius & South Africa perform average

Notes:

Shaded areas delimit averages for each pillar for respective income groups: HI (Seychelles), UMI (Mauritius and South Africa), LI (Rwanda)

Report identifies strengths and weakness for each subcomponent in each pillar for each country (e.g. Patents)



- Mauritius scores high on impact pillar because of above average engagement of women in network readiness
- ...but overall Mauritius would perform below average in the HI category

Table 1: Services Dashboard metrics: Mauritius and Selected African countries

Economy	Services trade restrictiveness index (STRI) (0-100)	Percentage of firms using email	Percentage of individuals using the internet		Magnitude of forward linkages for global innovator services (%)	kages for global innovator linkages for low-skill	
Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mauritius	16.9	68.4	64.0	55.7	2.6	1.8	60
South Africa	34.5	54.2	56.2	37.9	_	-	72
Kenya	29.5	69.5	22.6	59.1	-	-	73
Morocco	21.0	98.4	74.4	48.0	-	-	76
Egypt	51	68.5	57.3	61.0	1.2	1.8	85
Ghana	18.4	64.7	37.9	53.5	1.7	13.7	87
Tunisia	44.5	95	66.7	53.9	0.5	10.7	96
Senegal	19.0	67.0	29.6	53.4	0.9	10	101
Nigeria	27.1	24.1	7.5	40.4	-	_	112
Cameroon	26.4	52.0	25	48.3	0.7	7.0	113
Botswana	41.7	82.4	41.4	44.9	-	_	114
Zambia	21.0	55.8	17	41.7	_	_	115
Namibia	37.0	76.5	36.8	43.9	7	5.9	117
Uganda	34.5	39.2	23.7	40.4	0.5	4.4	118
Malawi	34.2	78.3	13.8	30.7	-	_	119
Ethiopia	88.2	78.6	18.6	45.8	0.9	4.6	122
Lesotho	27.3	46	29.8	41.5	_	_	123
Madagascar	18.7	59.6	4.7	39	0.3	1	125
Mozambique	18.6	50.8	20.8	29.0	0.3	6	126

Mauritius

Source : Nayyar et al. (2021, table A1 for cols. 1-6) NRI for col. 7. Selection of countries from Nayyar et al. Table A1. Mauritius has highest rank among African, notably thanks to lowest STRI value

Notes Countries ranked in descending rank of NRI in col. 7

'Made in Africa' is still a long way down the road

30	Year	Share P.Back	Share P. Forw	(NRVC) Share Non-Regional	(RVC) Share Regional
Column		1	2	3	4
Africa	1995	.15	.21	.36	.05
	2022	.12	.27	.40	.05
Asia	1995	.16	.16	.20	.16
	2022	.17	.22	.20	.26


(N)RVC: (non) regional value share in GVC share in gross exports

Source: Melo and Solleder (2025)

- "Made in the world" is coming to an end. Can AfCFTA help towards a "made in Africa"? For this to happen supply chains will have to develop with partners within the region (i.e. African trade partners)
- Over 1995-2022, Asia region (here excluding China and India) turned towards regional supply chains but Africa's supply chains grew faster with countries outside the region.
- To reverse trend and move to 'made in Africa', reductions in trade barriers to intra-African trade will have to go beyond reducing tariffs to include reduction in NTBs
- and less restrictive Rules of Origin (see <u>link to AU assembly summary</u> of Feb. 2024) and Gourdon et al. (2021)

Inter-REC trade less than 1% of GDP (except CEMAC and ECOWAS

Intra-Africa trade costs are huge! Heatmap of REC exports: Intra-and between-REC as percentage of GDP (Average 2010-2022)



Notes: REC (Regional Economic Community). RECs are defined to exclude multiple membership. EAC countries export on average 2.3% of GDP to other EAC members and 6.8% to Rest-of-the-world (ROW) and less than 1% to other RECs!.

Source: Krantz and D. Beltekian (2025, figure 4)

Average applied bilateral tariffs between RECs are still high (and close to MFN rates)

	Export	South		East		Central		West	North	EU	USA	China	MFN
Import		SACU	Non-SACU	EAC	Non-EAC	CEMAC	Non-CEMAC	ECOWAS					
South	SACU	0	1	6	8	8	4	8	8	3	8	8	8
	Non-SACU	2	2	3	4	10	6	10	8	7	10	10	10
East	EAC	6	1	0	3	13	8	13	10	13	13	13	13
	Non-EAC	15	8	7	10	16	14	16	13	16	16	16	16
Central	CEMAC	17	17	17	17	1	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
	Non-CEMAC	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
West	ECOWAS	12	12	12	12	12	12	4	12	11	12	12	12
North		13	9	9	6	13	13	13	2	8	12	13	13
EU		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	5	5	5
USA		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	4	_	4	4
China		9	5	4	1	6	6	5	9	11	11	-	11
		Customs Union				FTA between all countries				FTA between selected countries			

Note: The figure shows bilateral (unweighted) average tariffs between African regions and with individual selected trading partners. Tariff data describe the year 2017, trade agreements include all those notified to the WTO (as of date: September 9, 2021).

w/n ECOWAS 4% but 12% for all other partners. w/n SACU 0% and 8% for other African and MFN

ACFTA tariff offers beyond minimum required in most cases

Gov't revenue from tariffs ranges from 1.% to 16% and AcFTA tariff revenue is less than 4.9% = .117x.419

Repaired offers complete schedules, harmonize offers to common HS6 -2017 revision.

LS=1. A tariff offer of t=0% is full tariff liberalization under modalities (e.g. Mauritius).

LS = 0.8 Algeria (DZA) offers a tariff of 0.6% from current 8.3% tariff. Modalities would allow DZA to offer 3.%

- Tariff engagements in phase I bode well for the long road towards progress at integration.
- •Expansion of <u>ONA in EAC</u> to Burundi. ONA members apply unique roaming charges among members. To be emulated and progressively expanded to the Continental level under SDM to reduce the costs of cross-border communications

Tariff offers submitted to AcFTA secretariat (2024)

Importer	Tariff share in tax		ge Import Repaired d	Liberalization stance (LS)		
	(AU share in tariff revenue)	Pre- AfCFTA	Offer toff	Maximum Revenue trmax	LS=1-(toff/trmax)	
Column (1)	2	3	4	5	6=1- (4/5)	
(7) CEMAC	12.5(13.1)	11.1	1.8	2.4	0.6	
(6) EAC[656]	8.0(4.0)	5.9	2.6	2.6	0.0	
(15) ECOWAS	14.3(4.1)	9.7	2.2	2.1	0.0*	
(5) SACU[494]	6.2(1.3)	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.8	
COD	11.7(41.9)	10.9	1.8	2.0	0.1	
DZA	(2.9)	8.3	0.6	3.0	0.8	
EGY	5.7(0.7)	1.4	0.2	0.6	0.8	
MAR[461]	1.6(0.1)	1.3	0.2	0.7	0.7	
MDG	16.6(7.2)	4.3	1.0	1.6	0.3	
MUS[1]	1.4(1.1)	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.0	
SYC[2]	4.3(7.1)	2.0	1.9	2.0	0.1	
TUN	4.7(1.7)	1.0	0.3	0.9	0.7	
ZMB[564]	7.1(1.1)	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	

Source: Boysen (2024, table 5)

stance

cFTA liberalization (Boysen 2024)

Column 1:(number of countries); [number of missing HS6 Tariff lines of total 5387] Column 2 (AU share in tariff revenue)

Cols. 3,4,5 average tariff (import-weighted) offered to other AcFTA members from repaired offers

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