

The Geography of Talent: Development Implications and Long-Run Prospects

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Abstract

This paper characterizes the recent evolution of the geographic distribution of talent, and studies its implications for development inequality. Assuming the continuation of recent educational and immigration policies, it produces integrated projections of income, population, urbanization and human capital for the 21st century. To do so, we develop and parameterize a two-sector, two-class, world economy model that endogenizes education decisions, population growth, labor mobility, and income disparities across countries and across regions/sectors (agriculture vs. nonagriculture). We find that the geography of talent matters for global inequality, whatever the size of technological externalities. Low access to education and the sectoral allocation of talent have substantial impacts on inequality, while the effect of international migration is small. We conclude that policies targeting access to all levels of education and sustainable urban development are vital to reduce demographic pressures and global inequality in the long term.

Keywords: Human capital, migration, urbanization, growth, inequality.

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1 Introduction


What explains the worldwide distribution of talent? How is it affected by international migration and by internal mobility frictions? How does human capital inequality affect development disparities between countries and regions? What are the prospects for the 21st century? These are the questions addressed in this paper.

It is commonly accepted that human capital acts as a proximate cause of development. The recent literature has shown that the most educated workers are those with the highest levels of productivity, generate positive labor market complementarities with the less educated, and are instrumental to facilitating innovation and technology diffusion when knowledge becomes *economically useful*. This was the case during the industrial revolution (Mokyr, 2005; Squicciarini and Voigtländer, 2015) and it is still relevant in the modern world (Castelló-Climent and Mukhopadhyay, 2013; Jones, 2014; Kerr et al., 2016).

In this paper, we define talents as workers with completed tertiary/college education.¹ In many countries, college graduates form a minority. Although the worldwide average proportion of college graduates increased from only 2.4% in 1970 to 8.8% in 2010, this share is currently smaller than 1% in fifteen developing countries such as Niger, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania (Barro and Lee, 2013). Using our human capital estimates (see Section 3.1), Figure 1(a) shows the evolution of human capital inequality from 1970 to 2010 in ten-year intervals. We use the Theil index of inequality and distinguish between its between-country component (capturing differences in the country average proportion of college graduates) and the within-country component (capturing differences between rural and urban regions). Inequality in talent is almost totally explained by the between-country component. This means that cross-country disparities are much greater than domestic disparities between regions. Since 1970, the number of talented workers has grown faster in poor countries. Hence, the Theil index has decreased substantially, reflecting unconditional convergence in the share of college graduates (the speed of convergence is around 0.7% per year). Average levels of schooling have grown less rapidly in the richest countries. However, large differences persist between the tails of the distribution, and between regions. This is illustrated in Figure 1(b), which depicts the density of the shares of college-educated workers in the year 2010 for a sample of 179 country, and for a sample of 358 regions (i.e., rural and urban regions of the 179 countries). The share of college graduates is smaller than 5% in a large fraction of countries in general, and in many rural regions in particular.

The accumulation of talent is clearly endogenous as higher-education investments are costly, returns to schooling are endogenous, and college-educated workers are highly mobile across nations and regions. To study interdependencies between the accumulation of talent, demographic pressures and global inequality, we build a model that endogenizes human capital, population growth and income

¹Castelló-Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013) use the same definition. In addition, this is in line with Meisenzahl and Mokyr (2012), who argue that the British Industrial Revolution is not so much due to the few dozens of "great inventors" (scientists, PhD holders) nor to the mass of literate factory workers. Instead, they highlight the role of the top 3-5% of the labor force in terms of skills, including artisans, entrepreneurs and employees.



(a) Theil indices of inequality in the share of college graduates 1970-2010 (b) Kernel density of the share of college graduates in 2010

Figure 1: Worldwide distribution of talent

disparities within and between countries; we then confront it with the data. In our framework, each country has two sectors/regions (urban and rural or equivalently, nonagriculture and agriculture), which are populated by two types of adult workers (those with completed college education and the less educated) and by their offspring. Distinguishing between urban and rural regions allows us modelling the differential in the access to education across regions (in line with Lucas, 2009), as well as sectoral misallocation of workers (in line with Rodrik, 2013). Adults decide how much to consume, what fraction of their children to provide with higher education, and where to live. Internal and international migration decisions depend on geographic disparities in income and on moving costs. Though, the model is stylized and omits several features of the real world, it does account for long-run interactions between human capital accumulation, migration and growth.² We believe such a quantitative theory is an appropriate tool to investigate how the geography of talent affects current inequality, and to identify the key factors governing the future disparities in human capital across countries and regions as well as their implications for future demographic pressures and global inequality. Our strategy consists of parameterizing a world economy model with 145 developing countries and 34 OECD countries so as to match the evolution of population, human capital, urbanization, productivity and income between the years 1980 and 2010. Then, we simulate the trajectory of these variables over the 21st century.

Related literature. - Although the role of human capital as a determinant of productivity growth has been debated, its importance as a proximate cause of development is much less disputed (Glaeser et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2014; Jones, 2014). Our technological specification distinguishes between college and non-college educated workers. This is consistent with Goldin and Katz (2008), Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) who find high substitutability between workers with no schooling and high school degree, but small substitutability between those and workers with college education. In the context, increasing the share of college-educated workers not only affects their average levels of skill and cognitive ability, but also generates positive labor market complementarities

²The model does not account for all demographic variables (such as mortality or ageing) and economic variables (such as trade, unemployment, or redistribution).

for the less educated. Jones (2014) builds a generalized development accounting framework that includes such complementarities; he shows that for a reasonable level of the elasticity of substitution (e.g., a level of 2), human capital explains around 50% of the ratio of income per worker between the richest and poorest countries.³ Although such a success rate is still limited, it is much greater than what was found in earlier studies assuming perfect substitution between all categories of workers.

Furthermore, greater contributions of human capital to growth can be obtained by assuming technological externalities. These externalities have been the focus of many recent articles and have generated a certain level of debate. Using data from US cities (Moretti, 2004) or US states (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Iranzo and Peri, 2009), some instrumental-variable approaches give substantial externalities (Moretti, 2004) while others do not (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001). In the cross-country literature, there is evidence of a positive effect of schooling on innovation and technology diffusion (see Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009). Other studies identify skill-biased technical changes: when the supply of human capital increases, firms invest in skill-intensive technologies (Acemoglu, 2002; Autor et al., 2003; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013). Finally, another set of contributions highlights the effect of human capital on the quality of institutions (Castelló-Climente, 2008; Bobba and Coviello, 2007; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014). Comparative development studies suggest that focusing on talented workers is more appropriate to account for such externalities. Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2015) show that upper-tail human capital was instrumental in explaining the process of technology diffusion during the French Industrial Revolution. On the contrary, mass education (proxied by the average level of literacy) is positively associated with development at the onset of the Industrial Revolution, but does not explain growth. Confirming Mokyr's findings for the British Revolution, they conclude that the effect of "the educated elite" on local development becomes stronger when the aggregate technology frontier expands more rapidly. It can be argued that this situation also characterizes the modern globalized world, in which most rich countries use advanced technologies and poor countries struggle to adopt them. The contemporaneous contributions of talent in poor countries are evidenced in Castelló-Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013). They use data on Indian states over the period 1961-2001, and show that a one percent change in the proportion of tertiary-educated workers has the same effect on growth as a 13% decrease in illiteracy rates (equivalently, a one standard deviation in the share of college graduates has the same effect as a three standard deviations in literacy). Aggregate and skill-biased externalities cannot be ignored when dealing with long-run growth and inequality. However, given the uncertainty about their levels, our analyses and projections cover several plausible scenarios.

As far as the source of human capital disparities is concerned, we treat the geography of talent as endogenous. Investments in higher education depend on access to education – which varies across income groups (e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993; Mookherjee and Ray, 2003) and regions (e.g., Lucas, 2009) – as well as

³Assuming income per worker equals \$100,000 in the richest countries, and \$5,000 in the poorest countries, a success rate of 50% means that income per capita would reach \$10,000 in poor countries after transferring the human capital level of the richest countries to the poorest countries (i.e., the income ratio would decrease from 20 to 10).

on the quality of education (e.g., Castelló-Climent and Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2012). Human capital disparities are also affected by international and internal labor mobility. International migration affects knowledge accumulation, as well-educated people exhibit much greater propensity to emigrate than the less educated and tend to agglomerate in countries/regions with high rewards to skill (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Belot and Hatton, 2012; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Kerr et al., 2016). Positive selection is due to migrants' self-selection (high-skilled people being more responsive to economic opportunities and political conditions abroad, having more transferable skills, having greater ability to gather information or finance emigration costs, etc.), and to the skill-selective immigration policies conducted in the major destination countries (Docquier et al., 2009). Internal mobility frictions can also be responsible for development inequality. Rodrik (2013) demonstrates that manufacturing industries exhibit unconditional convergence in productivity, while the whole-economy income per worker does not converge across countries. The reason is that a fraction of workers gets stuck in the wrong sectors, and that these sectoral and/or regional misallocation is likely to be important in poor countries. Our model will be used to approximate the effect of international migration on global inequality, and the fraction of income disparities explained by internal mobility frictions. We will also shed light on the implications of labor mobility for future development.

Main findings. - First, we use the model to quantify the fraction of contemporaneous inequality that is explained by differences in the share of talented workers. We show that the geography of talent matters for development, whatever the size of technological externalities. In the absence of technological externality, transposing the US full educational structure (i.e., the US national share of college graduates and its allocation by sector/region) to all countries reduces the Theil index by 33%, and reduces the income ratio between the US and countries in the lowest quartile of the income distribution by about 60%. This success rate is very much in line with Jones (2014); we obtain slightly greater success rates because in our two-sector model, transposing the US educational structure implies increasing the share of the labor force employed in the urban sector. Our baseline scenario is even more optimistic; it assumes that half the correlation between productivity (aggregate or skill bias) and the share of college-educated workers is due to technological externalities. In this context, disparities in talent explain 50% of the Theil index and more than 80% of the income ratio.⁴ In a maximalist scenario where the sizes of externality are proxied by the correlations, human capital almost becomes the single determining factor for global inequality. Coming back to the baseline scenario, we show that keeping the share of college-educated workers constant but transposing the US skill-specific urban shares reduces the income ratio by 40% (i.e., about one half of the total effect of human capital). This suggests that internal mobility frictions (such as liquidity constraints, imperfect information, or congestion effects) generate sectoral misallocation of workers in poor countries, and shows the relevance of a two-sector approach (see Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bryan et al., 2014). On the contrary, the effect of international migration on

⁴Assuming income per worker equals \$100,000 in the richest countries, and \$5,000 in the poorest countries, a success rate of 80% means that income per capita would reach \$25,000 in poor countries after transferring the human capital level of the richest countries to the poorest countries (i.e., the income ratio would decrease from 20 to 4).

economic development is small.

Second, we use the model to predict the evolution of population, human capital, urbanization and income over the 21st century. Accounting for interdependencies between these variables has rarely been done in projection exercises.⁵ In the baseline scenario, the model predictions are fairly in line with official socio-demographic projections. This is a proof of concept that our stylized model does a good job in generating realistic projections of population, human capital, and urbanization. Furthermore, its microfounded structure enables to identify the key factors that will govern the future of demographic pressures and global inequality.

We show that population, urbanization and human capital prospects are highly robust to the size of technological externalities. However, changing the size of these externalities affects the long-run level of income per worker and its distribution. Socio-demographic prospects are also highly robust to future international migration scenarios. Given demographic imbalances, the migration pressure to the OECD will intensify. Immigration policy responses (as drastic as totally cutting future migration flows) have limited impact on socio-demographic variables. Reinforcing migration barriers induces negative effects on the world GDP (as it prevents individuals to move from high-productivity to low-productivity countries), and beneficial effects on global inequality. The latter result is rather mechanical and linked to the construction of the Theil index: cutting migration decreases the demographic share of industrialized countries. In line with our static numerical experiments, cutting migration has little effect on income per capita in developing countries. On the contrary, our socio-demographic and economic projections are highly sensitive to future education policies, and to future internal mobility frictions. Our baseline assumes a continuation of the convergence process in access to education observed during the last decades (as a possible consequence of the Millennium Development Goals). Attenuating or eliminating this convergence in education costs induces dramatic effects on population growth, urbanization and the world distribution of income. In the same vein, obstructing internal mobility generates huge misallocation costs. In line with the Sustainable Development Agenda, our analysis clearly suggests that policies targeting access to all levels of education (what is needed to promote higher education), education quality and sustainable urban development are vital to reduce demographic pressures and global inequality.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our two-sector, two-class model of human capital accumulation and income inequality. In Section 3, we parameterize this model to match historical data over the period 1980-2010 and the socio-demographic prospects for 2040. Section 4 discusses our

⁵For example, the demographic projections of the United Nations do not anticipate the economic forces and policy reforms that shape demography (see Mountford and Rapoport, 2016). The recent IASA projections include the educational dimension (see Samir et al., 2010), predicting the population of 120 countries by level of educational attainment, and accounting for differentials in fertility, mortality and migration by education. However, assumptions about future educational development (e.g., partial convergence in enrolment rates) are also deterministic and seemingly disconnected from changes in the economic environment. Given the high correlation between economic and socio-demographic variables, assuming cross-country convergence in demographic indicators implicitly suggests that economic variables should also converge in the long-run. This is not what historical data reveal (see Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002, or Sala-i-Martin, 2006).

simulation results, distinguishing between the contemporaneous implications of human capital inequality, the projections for the 21st century, and a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 Model

Our model depicts a set of economies with two sectors/regions $r = (a, n)$, denoting agriculture (a) and nonagriculture (n), and two types of workers, $s = (h, l)$, denoting college-educated workers (h) and the less educated (l). We assume two-period lived agents (children and adults). The number of adults of type s living in region r at time t is denoted by $L_{r,s,t}$. Time is discrete and one period is meant to represent the active life of one generation (30 years). The retirement period is ignored. Goods produced in the two sectors are perfect substitutes from the point of view of consumers, and their price is normalized to unity. Considering goods as heterogeneous in a small open economy context with exogenous relative prices would lead to similar results. Adults are the only decision makers. They maximize their well-being and decide where to live, how much to consume, and how much to invest in the quantity and quality of their children. The latter decisions are governed by a warm-glow motive; adults directly value the quality and quantity of children, but they do not anticipate the future income and utility of their children (as in Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2011; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003 and 2004). The dynamic structure of the model is thus totally recursive. The model endogenizes the levels of productivity of both sectors/regions (and the resulting productivity gap), human capital accumulation, fertility decisions, internal and international labor mobility. This section describes our assumptions and defines the intertemporal equilibrium.

2.1 Technology

We assume that output is proportional to labor in efficiency units. Such a model without physical capital features a globalized economy with a common international interest rate. This hypothesis is in line with Kennan (2013) or Klein and Ventura (2009) who assume that capital "chases" labor. In line with Gollin et al. (2014) or Vollrath (2009), each country is characterized by a pair of production functions with two types of labor, college-educated and low-skilled labor ($\ell_{r,s,t} \forall r, s$). We generalize their work by assuming CES (constant elasticity of substitution) specifications with sector-specific elasticities of substitution.⁶ The supply of labor, $\ell_{r,s,t}$, differs from the adult population size, $L_{r,s,t}$, because participation rates are smaller than one: as explained below, raising children induces a time cost and decreases the labor market participation rate. Output levels at time t are given by:

$$Y_{r,t} = A_{r,t} \left(\sum_s \varpi_{r,s,t} \ell_{r,s,t}^{\frac{\sigma_r-1}{\sigma_r}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_r}{\sigma_r-1}} \quad \forall r, t, \quad (1)$$

where $A_{r,t}$ denotes the productivity scale in sector r at time t , $\varpi_{r,s,t}$ is a sector-specific variable governing the relative productivity of workers of type s (such

⁶This elasticity plays a key role in development accounting and is shown to vary across sectors (Jones, 2014; Caselli and Ciccone, 2014; Lucas, 2009).

that $\varpi_{r,h,t} + \varpi_{r,l,t} = 1$), and $\sigma_r \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the sector-specific elasticity of substitution between the two types of worker employed in sector r .

The CES specification is flexible enough to account for substitutability differences across sectors. In particular, we consider a greater elasticity of substitution in the agricultural sector ($\sigma_a > \sigma_n$). Wage rates are determined by the marginal productivity of labor and there is no unemployment. This yields:

$$w_{r,s,t} = A_{r,t} \left(\sum_s \varpi_{r,s,t} \ell_{r,s,t}^{\frac{\sigma_r-1}{\sigma_r}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_r-1}} \varpi_{r,s,t} \ell_{r,s,t}^{\frac{-1}{\sigma_r}} \quad \forall r, s, t. \quad (2)$$

It follows that the wage ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in region r is given by:

$$R_{r,t}^w \equiv \frac{w_{r,h,t}}{w_{r,l,t}} = R_{r,t}^\varpi (R_{r,t}^\ell)^{\frac{-1}{\sigma_r}} \quad \forall r, t, \quad (3)$$

where $R_{r,t}^\ell \equiv \frac{\ell_{r,h,t}}{\ell_{r,l,t}}$ is the skill ratio in the labor force of region r at time t , and $R_{r,t}^\varpi \equiv \frac{\varpi_{r,h,t}}{\varpi_{r,l,t}}$ measures the skill bias in relative productivity. Although human capital is used in agriculture, the literature has emphasized that the marginal product of human capital is greater in the nonagricultural sector (see Lucas, 2009; Vollrath, 2009; Gollin et al., 2014).

Two types of technological externality are factored in. First, we consider a simple Lucas-type, aggregate externality (see Lucas, 1988) and assume that the scale of the total productivity factor (TFP) in each sector is a concave function of the skill-ratio in the resident labor force. This externality captures the fact that college-educated workers facilitate innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies. We have:

$$A_{r,t} = \gamma^t \bar{A}_{r,t} (R_{r,t}^\ell)^{\epsilon_r} \quad \forall r, t, \quad (4)$$

where γ^t is a time trend in productivity which is common to all countries ($\gamma > 1$), $\bar{A}_{r,t}$ is the exogenous component of TFP in region r (reflecting exogenous factors such as the proportion of arable land, climatic factors, geography, soil fertility, etc.), and $\epsilon_r \in (0, 1)$ is a pair of elasticities of TFP to the skill-ratio in the sector. The productivity gap between the two sectors is thus given by:

$$\Gamma_t \equiv \frac{A_{n,t}}{A_{a,t}} = \frac{\bar{A}_{n,t} (R_{n,t}^\ell)^{\epsilon_n}}{\bar{A}_{a,t} (R_{a,t}^\ell)^{\epsilon_a}}. \quad (5)$$

In Gollin et al. (2014), the "nonagriculture/agriculture" ratio of value added per worker decreases with development. It amounts to 5.6 in poor countries (bottom 25%), and 2.0 in rich countries (top 25%). After adjusting for hours worked and human capital, the ratio falls to 3.0 in poor countries, and 1.7 in rich countries. In our model, these findings can be driven by the correlation between the productivity gap with exogenous characteristics affecting development, $\bar{A}_{n,t} \neq \bar{A}_{a,t}$, by the effect of development on disparities in human capital across sectors, $R_{n,t}^\ell \neq R_{a,t}^\ell$, or by differences in the elasticity of TFP to human capital, $\epsilon_n \neq \epsilon_a$.

Second, we assume a skill-biased technical change. As the technology improves, the relative productivity of college-educated workers increases, and this is particularly the case in the nonagricultural sector (Acemoglu, 2002; Restuccia and

Vandenbroucke, 2013). For example, Autor et al. (2003) show that computerization is associated with declining relative industry demand for routine manual and cognitive tasks, and increased relative demand for nonroutine cognitive tasks. The observed relative demand shift favors college versus non-college labor. We write:

$$R_{r,t}^{\omega} = \overline{R}_r^{\omega} (R_{r,t}^{\ell})^{\kappa_r} \quad \forall r, t, \quad (6)$$

where \overline{R}_r^{ω} is an exogenous term, and $\kappa_r \in (0, 1)$ is a pair of elasticities of skill-bias to the skill-ratio in the sector.

2.2 Preferences

Individual decisions to emigrate result from the comparison of discrete alternatives, staying in the region of birth, emigrating to the other region, or to a foreign country. To model these decisions, we use a logarithmic *outer utility function* with a deterministic and a random component. The utility of an adult of type s , born in region r^* , moving to region/country r is given by:

$$U_{r^*r,s,t} = \ln v_{r,s,t} + \ln(1 - x_{r^*r,s,t}) + \xi_{r^*r,s,t} \quad \forall r^*, r, s, t, \quad (7)$$

where $v_{r,s,t} \in \mathbb{R}$ is the deterministic level of utility that can be reached in the location r at period t (governed by the inner utility function described below), $x_{r^*r,s,t} \leq 1$ captures the effort required to migrate from region r^* to location r (such that $x_{r^*r^*,s,t} = 0$). Migration costs are exogenous; they vary across location pairs, across education levels, and over time. The individual-specific random taste shock for moving from country r^* to r is denoted by $\xi_{r^*r,s,t} \in \mathbb{R}$ and follows an iid Type-I Extreme Value distribution, also known as Gumbel distribution:

$$F(\xi) = \exp \left[- \exp \left(- \frac{\xi}{\mu} - \vartheta \right) \right],$$

where $\mu > 0$ is a common scale parameter governing the responsiveness of migration decisions to change in $v_{r,s,t}$ and $x_{r^*r,s,t}$, and $\vartheta \approx 0.577$ is the Euler's constant. Although $\xi_{r^*r,s,t}$ is individual-specific, we omit individual subscripts for notational convenience.

In line with Galor and Weil (2000), Galor (2011), de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004), the *inner utility* $\ln v_{r,s,t}$ is a function of consumption ($c_{r,s,t}$), fertility ($n_{r,s,t}$) and the probability that each child becomes highly skilled ($p_{r,s,t}$):

$$\ln v_{r,s,t} = \ln c_{r,s,t} + \theta \ln (n_{r,s,t} p_{r,s,t}) \quad \forall r, s, \quad (8)$$

where $\theta \in (0, 1)$ is a preference parameter for the quantity and quality of children.

The probability that a child becomes high-skilled increases with the share of time that is spent in education ($q_{r,s,t}$):

$$p_{r,s,t} = (\pi_r + q_{r,s,t})^{\lambda} \quad \forall r, s, \quad (9)$$

where π_r is an exogenous parameter that is region-specific and λ governs the elasticity of knowledge acquisition to education investment.

A type- s adult in region r receives a wage rate $w_{r,s,t}$ per unit of time worked. Raising a child requires a time cost ϕ (thereby reducing the labor market participation rate), and each unit of time spent by a child in education incurs a cost equal to $E_{r,t}$. The budget constraint writes as:

$$c_{r,s,t} = w_{r,s,t}(1 - \phi n_{r,s,t}) - n_{r,s,t}q_{r,s,t}E_{r,t}. \quad (10)$$

It follows that the labor supply of type- s adults in region r at time t is given by:

$$\ell_{r,s,t} = L_{r,s,t}(1 - \phi n_{r,s,t}). \quad (11)$$

In the following sub-sections, we solve the optimization problem backward. We first determine the optimal fertility rate and investment in education in a given location r , which characterizes the optimal level of utility, $v_{r,s,t}$, that can be reached in any location. We then characterize the choice of the optimal location.

2.2.1 Education and fertility

Each adult in region r maximizes her utility (8) subject to the constraints (9) and (10). The first-order conditions for an interior solution are:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\phi w_{r,s,t} + q_{r,s,t}E_{r,t}}{w_{r,s,t}(1 - \phi n_{r,s,t}) - n_{r,s,t}q_{r,s,t}E_{r,t}} &= \frac{\theta}{n_{r,s,t}}, \\ \frac{n_{r,s,t}E_{r,t}}{w_{r,s,t}(1 - \phi n_{r,s,t}) - n_{r,s,t}q_{r,s,t}E_{r,t}} &= \frac{\theta\lambda}{\pi_r + q_{r,s,t}}. \end{aligned}$$

Solving this system gives

$$\begin{cases} q_{r,s,t} = \frac{\lambda\phi w_{r,s,t} - \pi_r E_{r,t}}{(1-\lambda)E_{r,t}} \\ n_{r,s,t} = \frac{\theta(1-\lambda)}{1+\theta} \cdot \frac{w_{r,s,t}}{\phi w_{r,s,t} - \pi_r E_{r,t}} \end{cases} \quad \forall r, s.$$

The cost of education is assumed to be proportional to the wage of high-skilled workers in the region, multiplied by a fixed, region-specific factor $\psi_{r,t}$ (capturing education policy/quality, population density, average distance to schools, etc.):

$$E_{r,t} = \psi_{r,t}w_{r,h,t} \quad \forall r, s. \quad (12)$$

Plugging (12) into the first-order conditions gives:

$$\begin{cases} q_{r,h,t} = \frac{\lambda\phi}{(1-\lambda)\psi_{r,t}} - \frac{\pi_r}{1-\lambda} \\ q_{r,l,t} = \frac{\lambda\phi}{(1-\lambda)\psi_r R_{r,t}^w} - \frac{\pi_r}{1-\lambda} \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{cases} n_{r,h,t} = \frac{\theta(1-\lambda)}{1+\theta} \frac{1}{\phi - \pi_r \psi_r} \\ n_{r,l,t} = \frac{\theta(1-\lambda)}{1+\theta} \frac{1}{\phi - \pi_r \psi_r R_{r,t}^w} \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

Note that $R_{r,t}^w > 1$ implies that college-educated workers have fewer and more educated children in all regions ($q_{r,h,t} > q_{r,l,t}$ and $n_{r,h,t} < n_{r,l,t}$). The model also predicts that investments in education vary across regions, and are likely to be greater in the nonagriculture region. Under the plausible condition $\psi_{a,t}/\psi_{n,t} > 1$, college-educated workers living in urban areas have fewer and more educated children ($q_{n,h,t} > q_{a,h,t}$ and $n_{n,h,t} < n_{a,h,t}$). Finally, when $(\psi_{a,t}R_{a,t}^w)/(\psi_{n,t}R_{n,t}^w) > 1$, this is also the case for the low skilled ($q_{n,l,t} > q_{a,l,t}$ and $n_{n,l,t} < n_{a,l,t}$). These results are in line with Lucas (2009), who assumes that human capital accumulation

increases with the fraction of people living in cities (seen as *centers of intellectual interchange and recipients of technological inflows*).

The deterministic indirect utility function can be obtained by substituting (13) into (8):

$$\begin{cases} \ln v_{r,h,t} = \chi + \ln(w_{r,h,t}) + \theta\lambda \ln\left(\frac{1}{\psi_{r,t}}\right) - \theta(1-\lambda) \ln(\phi - \pi_r \psi_{r,t}) \\ \ln v_{r,l,t} = \chi + \ln(w_{r,l,t}) + \theta\lambda \ln\left(\frac{1}{\psi_{r,t}}\right) - \theta(1-\lambda) \ln(\phi - \pi_r \psi_{r,t} R_{r,t}^w) \\ \quad + \ln\left(\frac{\phi(1+\theta\lambda(1-1/R_{r,t}^w)) - \pi_r \psi_{r,t} R_{r,t}(1+\theta(1-1/R_{r,t}^w))}{\phi - \pi_r \psi_{r,t} R_{r,t}^w}\right) \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

where $\chi = \theta \ln\left(\frac{\theta}{1+\theta}(1-\lambda)^{1-\lambda}\lambda^\lambda\right) - \ln(1+\theta)$ is a constant.

Together with the number and structure of the resident population at time t ($L_{r,s,t} \forall r, s$), fertility and education decisions ($n_{r,s,t}, q_{r,s,t} \forall r, s$) determine the size and structure of the native population before migration ($N_{r,s,t+1} \forall r, s$) at time $t+1$. We have:

$$\begin{cases} N_{r,h,t+1} = L_{r,h,t} n_{r,h,t} p_{r,h,t} + L_{r,l,t} n_{r,l,t} p_{r,l,t} \\ N_{r,l,t+1} = L_{r,h,t} n_{r,h,t} [1 - p_{r,h,t}] + L_{r,l,t} n_{r,l,t} [1 - p_{r,l,t}] \end{cases} \quad \forall r, t. \quad (15)$$

2.2.2 Migration and population dynamics

Given their taste characteristics (captured by ξ), each individual chooses the location that maximizes her/his utility, defined in Eq. (7). Under the Type I Extreme Value distribution for ξ , McFadden (1974) shows that the emigration rate from region r^* to a particular destination r is governed by a logit expression. The emigration rate is given by:

$$\frac{M_{r^*r,s,t}}{N_{r^*,s,t}} = \frac{\exp\left(\frac{\ln v_{r,s,t} + \ln(1-x_{r^*r,s,t})}{\mu}\right)}{\sum_k \exp\left(\frac{\ln v_{k,s,t} + \ln(1-x_{r^*k,s,t})}{\mu}\right)} = \frac{(v_{r,s,t})^{1/\mu} (1-x_{r^*r,s,t})^{1/\mu}}{\sum_k (v_{k,s,t})^{1/\mu} (1-x_{r^*k,s,t})^{1/\mu}}.$$

Skill-specific emigration rates are endogenous and comprised between 0 and 1. Staying rates ($M_{r^*r^*,s,t}/N_{r^*,s,t}$) are governed by the same logit model. It follows that the emigrant-to-stayer ratio ($m_{r^*r,s,t}$) is governed by the following expression:

$$m_{r^*r,s,t} \equiv \frac{M_{r^*r,s,t}}{M_{r^*r^*,s,t}} = \left(\frac{v_{r,s,t}}{v_{r^*,s,t}}\right)^{1/\mu} (1-x_{r^*r,s,t})^{1/\mu}. \quad (16)$$

Equation (16) is a gravity-like migration equation, which states that the ratio of emigrants from region r^* to location r to stayers in region r^* (i.e., individuals born in r^* who remain in r^*), is an increasing function of the utility achievable in the destination location r and a decreasing function of the utility attainable in r^* . The proportion of migrants from r^* to r also decreases with the bilateral migration cost $x_{r^*r,s,t}$. Heterogeneity in migration tastes implies that emigrants select all destinations for which $x_{r^*r,s,t} < 1$ (if $x_{r^*r,s,t}=1$, the corridor is empty).

Individuals born in region n (resp. a) have the choice between staying in their region of origin n (resp. a), moving to the other region a (resp. n), or emigrating to a foreign country f . Contrary to Hansen and Prescott (2002) or Lucas (2009), labor is not perfectly mobile across sectors/regions; internal migration costs ($x_{an,s,t}$

and $x_{na,s,t}$) capture all private costs that migrants must incur to move between regions. In line with Young (2013), internal mobility is driven by self-selection, i.e., skill-specific disparities in utility across regions as well as heterogeneity in individual unobserved characteristics (ξ). Overall, if $v_{n,s,t} > v_{a,s,t}$, net migration is in favor of urban areas but migration is limited by the existence of migration costs, whose sizes govern the sectoral misallocations of workers (Rodrik, 2013). Similarly, international migration costs ($x_{af,s,t}$ and $x_{nf,s,t}$) capture private costs and the legal/visa costs imposed by the destination countries. They are also assumed to be exogenous.

Using (16), we can characterize the equilibrium structure of the resident population at time t :

$$\begin{cases} L_{n,s,t} = \frac{N_{n,s,t}}{1+m_{na,s,t}+m_{nf,s,t}} + \frac{m_{an,s,t}N_{a,s,t}}{1+m_{an,s,t}+m_{af,s,t}} + I_{n,s,t} \\ L_{a,s,t} = \frac{N_{a,s,t}}{1+m_{an,s,t}+m_{af,s,t}} + \frac{m_{na,s,t}N_{n,s,t}}{1+m_{na,s,t}+m_{nf,s,t}} + I_{a,s,t} \end{cases} \quad \forall s, \quad (17)$$

where $I_{r,s,t}$ stands for the inflow of immigrants (which only applies to migration from developing to OECD member states, treated as a single entity). We assume that the distribution of immigrants by destination is time-invariant, calibrated on the year 2010. Eq. (16) also determines the outflow of international migrants by education level ($O_{s,t}$):

$$\begin{aligned} O_{s,t} &= M_{nf,s,t} + M_{af,s,t} \\ &= \frac{m_{nf,s,t}N_{n,s,t}}{1+m_{na,s,t}+m_{nf,s,t}} + \frac{m_{af,s,t}N_{a,s,t}}{1+m_{an,s,t}+m_{af,s,t}} \quad \forall s, \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

where $N_{r,s,t}$ is a predetermined variable given by (15).

2.3 Intertemporal equilibrium

An intertemporal equilibrium for the world economy can be defined as following:

Definition 1 For a set $\{\gamma, \theta, \lambda, \phi, \mu\}$ of common parameters, a set $\{\sigma_r, \epsilon_r, \kappa_r\}$ of sector-specific elasticities, a set $\{\bar{A}_{r,t}, \bar{R}_{r,t}, \bar{x}_{r^*r,s,t}, \psi_r, \pi_r\}$ of country- and region-specific exogenous characteristics, and a set $\{N_{r,s,0}\}$ of predetermined variables, an intertemporal equilibrium is a reduced set of endogenous variables $\{A_{r,t}, \varpi_{r,h,t}, w_{r,s,t}, n_{r,s,t}, q_{r,s,t}, v_{r,s,t}, E_{r,t}, m_{r^*r,s,t}, N_{r,s,t+1}, L_{r,s,t}\}$, which simultaneously satisfies technological constraints (4), (6) and (12), profit maximization conditions (2), utility maximization conditions (13), (14) and (16) in all countries and regions of the world, and such that the equilibrium structure and dynamics of population satisfy (15) and (17).

The equilibrium level of the other variables described above (in particular, $\ell_{r,s,t}$, $R_{r,t}^\ell$, $R_{r,t}^\varpi$, $R_{r,t}^w$, Γ_t as well as urbanization rates and international migration outflows) can be computed as a by-product of the reduced set of endogenous variables. Note that equilibrium wage rates are obtained by substituting the labor force variables into the wage equation (2), thereby assuming full employment. By the Walras law, the market for goods is automatically balanced.

3 Parameterization

In this section, we describe our parameterization strategy for 145 developing countries and for the entire set of 34 OECD countries modelled as a single entity.⁷ We use socio-demographic and economic data for 1980 and 2010, as well as socio-demographic prospects for the year 2040. For each country, our baseline trajectory matches the recent trends in human capital accumulation, income disparities, and population movements (including internal and international migrations). We start describing how the geographic distribution of talent is estimated in Section 3.1. We then calibrate the technological and preference parameters in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Finally, Section 3.4 explains the general hypotheses governing our baseline projections for the 21st century.

3.1 Estimating the geography of talent

To construct labor force data by education level and by sector ($L_{r,s,t}$), we follow the four steps described below.

In the *first step*, we extract population data by age group from the United Nations Population Division, and combine them with the database on educational attainment described in Barro and Lee (2013). For the years 1980 and 2010, we proxy the working age population with the number of residents aged 25 to 60. To proxy the number of talented workers in each country, we multiply the working age population by Barro and Lee's estimates of the proportion of individuals aged 25 and over with tertiary education completed (denoted by H_t). The rest of the working age population is treated as a homogeneous group of less educated workers. Barro and Lee's data are available for 143 countries. For the other countries, we make use of estimated data from Artuc et al. (2015). Note that Barro and Lee (2013) also document the average years of schooling of the working age population (YoS_t), a variable that we use in the third step of our estimation strategy. Without imputation, we are able to characterize the total number of workers ($\sum_{r,s} L_{r,s,t}$), and the total number of college-educated and less educated workers ($\sum_r L_{r,h,t}$ and $\sum_r L_{r,l,t}$) by country. The same strategy has been applied to all decades between 1970 and 2010 to compute the between-country index of inequality depicted in Figure 1.

In the *second step*, we split the total population data by region/sector. When it is possible, we use the share of employment in agriculture, available from the World Development Indicators. This variable is available for 134 countries in 2010, and for 61 in 1980. However, the same database also provides information on the share of people living in rural areas. The latter variable is available in all countries and is highly correlated with the share of employment in agriculture (correlation of 0.71 in 2010, and 0.75 in 1980). When the share of employment in agriculture is not available, we predict it using estimates from year-specific regressions, as a function of the share of people living in rural areas. This determines the total number of workers ($\sum_s L_{r,s,t}$) in both sectors.

The major problem is that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no database documenting the share of college graduates by region or by sector ($H_{r,t}$). To im-

⁷With the exceptions of Macao, North-Korea, Somalia and Taiwan, all countries that are not covered by our sample have less than 100,000 inhabitants.

pute these shares, we use data on years of schooling by sector ($YoS_{r,t}$), and predict the sector-specific shares of college graduates as a function of $YoS_{r,t}$. Our *third step* consists of collecting data on $YoS_{r,t}$ and imputing the missing values. Gollin et al. (2014) and Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2007) provide incomplete data on the average years of schooling and the average years of schooling in agriculture and nonagriculture for different years.⁸ We have data for 20 countries in 1980 and 65 countries in 2010. We match these data to the closest year that marks the beginning of the 1980 and 2010 decades. For the missing countries, we take advantage of the high correlation between the gap in years of schooling, $YoS_{n,t}/YoS_{a,t}$, and the average years of schooling in the country, YoS_t . We predict the schooling gap using estimates from year-specific regressions of this gap on YoS_t .⁹

Finally, in the *fourth step*, we take advantage of the high correlation between the average years of schooling and the proportion of college graduates in the labor force at the national level. We estimate the relationship between these variables, $H_t = f(YoS_t)$, using Barro and Lee's data, and then use the estimated coefficients to predict the share of college graduates in the urban sector, $H_{r,t} = f(YoS_{r,t})$.¹⁰ We then fit the average share of college graduates from Barro and Lee by adjusting the share of college graduates in the rural sector.

To validate our calibration strategy, we compute the correlation between the sector-specific imputed shares of college graduates and the shares obtained from household survey. Using the Gallup data (available for about 145 countries), we can estimate the skill-ratio ($R_{r,t}^\ell$) in the number of respondents by country and region (corrected by sample weights); on average the correlation between the Gallup sample and our estimates is equal to 0.70 in the urban region, and to 0.73 in the rural region. The same imputation strategy can be used to identify the sector-specific shares of college graduates in total employment for all decades between 1970 and 2010. We use it to compute the within-country index of inequality depicted in Figure 1.


Figure 2 characterizes the geography of talent in the year 2010, and describes the worldwide evolution of urbanization and human capital between 1970 and 2010. Figure 2(a) shows that the urban share of college graduates is larger than the rural share in all countries. This is particularly true in poor countries. In line with Gollin et al. (2014), Figure 2(b) shows that the gap between regions decreases with the economy-wide proportion of college graduates. Figure 2(c) shows that the college-educated minority is predominantly and increasingly employed in the nonagricultural sector. As far as less educated workers are concerned (i.e., the large majority of people in the world), the fraction of them employed in the nonagricultural sector increased from 37.8% in 1970 to 50.5% in 2010. Figure 2(d) is the mirror image of Figure 2(c): it depicts the evolution of the share of the college graduates in the labor force of each sector. On average, the world average proportion of college graduates increased from 2.4% to 8.8% between 1970 and 2010. In relative terms, the rise is greater in agriculture (from 1.1% to 3.9%) than

⁸In Gollin et al. (2014) and Vollrath (2009), the nonagriculture/agriculture ratio of years of schooling varies between 2.0 or 1.5 in poor countries, and is close to 1.0 in rich countries.


⁹Simple OLS regressions give $\log \frac{YoS_n}{YoS_a} = 1.944 - 0.744 \log YoS$ ($R^2=0.809$) in 2010, and $\log \frac{YoS_n}{YoS_a} = 1.464 - 0.550 \log YoS$ ($R^2=0.905$) in 1980.

¹⁰Simple OLS regressions give $\log H = -4.804 + 0.279 \log YoS$ ($R^2 = 0.496$) in 2010, and $\log H = -5.133 + 0.306 \log YoS$ ($R^2 = 0.575$) in 1980.

in nonagriculture (from 4.6% to 13.1%). In absolute terms, the magnitude of the change is reversed; the small share of college-educated professionals and technicians in agriculture limits the capacity for innovation in poor countries (as argued in World Bank, 2007).



(a) Share of college graduates in agriculture ($H_{a,t}$) and nonagriculture ($H_{n,t}$) in 2010 (b) Regional ratio of talent ($H_{n,t}/H_{a,t}$) and national share of college graduates (H_t) in 2010



(c) World population share in nonagriculture by skill group (d) World share of college graduates in population by sector

Figure 2: Geography of talent

Note: In Figure 2(a) and 2(b), bubble size is proportional to the population of the country.

3.2 Technology parameters

Output in each sector depends on the size and skill structure of employment. In the next section, we explain how fertility rates are calibrated for each skill group and for each region/sector. Combining labor force data ($L_{r,s,t}$) with fertility rates ($n_{r,s,t}$) allows us quantifying the employment levels ($\ell_{r,s,t}$) and the total employment in efficiency unit.


To calibrate the set technological parameters $\{\sigma_r, \epsilon_r, \kappa_r, \bar{R}_r^\omega, \bar{A}_{r,t}\}$, we proceed in two steps. First, we calibrate the parameters affecting the private returns to higher education. For each sector, we combine our estimates for $\ell_{r,s,t}$ with cross-country data on the income gap between college graduates and the less educated.

This enables us parameterizing the elasticities of substitution between workers (σ_r), the relative productivity of college graduates (R_r^ϖ), the magnitude of the skill-biased externalities (κ_r), and the scale factors of the skill-bias technology (\overline{R}_r^ϖ). In the second step, we focus on the social return to education. We use output data by sector and identify the level of total factor productivity. We then investigate the relationship between TFP and the skill ratio, which enables us defining an upper-bound for the aggregate TFP externalities (ϵ_r) and the TFP scale factors ($\overline{A}_{r,t}$). Figure 3 summarizes our main findings.


In the *first step*, we calibrate the elasticity of substitution between college graduates and less educated workers relying on existing studies. As for the non-agricultural sector, there is a large number of influential papers that propose specific estimates for industrialized countries (i.e., countries where the employment share of agriculture is small). Johnson (1970) and Murphy et al. (1998) obtain values for σ_n around 1.3. Ciccone and Peri (2005) and Krusell et al. (2000) find values around 1.6, and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) suggest setting σ_n close to 2.0. Angrist (1995) recommends a value above 2 to explain the trends in the college premium on the Palestinian labor market. As for the agricultural sector, it is usually assumed that the elasticity of substitution is much larger. For example, Vollrath (2009) or Lucas (2009) consider that labor productivity is determined by the average level of human capital of workers (thus assuming perfect substitution between skill groups). In line with the existing literature, we assume $\sigma_n = 2$ and $\sigma_a = \infty$; as explained below, these levels are consistent with the microdata (see Figure 3).

Once the elasticities are chosen, we use sector-specific data on returns to schooling to calibrate the relative productivity of college-educated workers. In the agricultural sector, we use the Gallup World Polls and compute the average household income per adult member as a function of the education level of the household head. As a proxy for the wage ratio in rural regions ($R_{a,t}^w$), we divide the average income of households with a college-educated household head by the average income of households with a less educated household head. Combining (3) and (6), the elasticity of R_a^w to R_a^ℓ is equal to $\kappa_a - 1/\sigma_a$. Assuming $\sigma_a = \infty$, this elasticity boils down to κ_a . Figure 3(a) shows that the correlation between R_a^ϖ and R_a^ℓ is virtually nil. We thus rule out the possibility of skill-biased technical change in agriculture ($\kappa_a = 0$), and assume a linear technology with a constant R_a^ϖ for all countries and all periods. The value of R_a^ϖ is given by the population-weighted average of R_a^w , leading to $\varpi_a = 0.57$. We use this value for all countries and assume it is time-invariant. As for the nonagricultural sector, we use data on the wage ratio from Biavaschi et al. (2016) for 143 countries.¹¹ We calibrate R_n^ϖ using (3). Regressing R_n^ϖ on R_n^ℓ yields a correlation of 0.38. Given the bidirectional causation relationship between the skill bias and education decisions, we consider this estimate as an upper bound for the skill-bias externality. In our baseline projections, we assume that half the correlation is due to the skill-bias externality (i.e., $\kappa_n = 0.19$). Alternative scenarios are also considered in the simulation section. We calibrate \overline{R}_n^ϖ as a residual from (6). Again, from (3) and (6), the elasticity of the R_n^w to R_n^ℓ is equal to $\kappa_n - 1/\sigma_n$, which is equal to -0.37. Figure 3(b) shows that this elasticity is in line with the Gallup data on income per adult member.


¹¹For the missing countries we predict the wage ratio using the estimated relationship between the log wage ratio on the log skill ratio.




(a) Correlation between skill ratio (R_a^ℓ) and wage ratio (R_a^w) in agriculture




(b) Correlation between skill ratio (R_n^ℓ) and wage ratio (R_n^w) in nonagriculture




(c) Correlation between skill ratio ($\log(R_a^\ell)$) and TFP ($\log(A_a)$)



(d) Correlation between skill ratio ($\log(R_n^\ell)$) and TFP ($\log(A_n)$)



(e) Kernel density of TFP (A_a) and its scale factor (\bar{A}_a) in agriculture



(f) Kernel density of TFP (A_n) and its scale factor (\bar{A}_n) in nonagriculture

Figure 3: Calibration of the technological parameters in 2010

Notes: In Figure 3(a)-3(d), bubble size is proportional to the population of the country. Figures 3(e) and 3(f) assume that the elasticity of TFP or skill bias to the skill ratio is equal to 50% of the correlation between these variables.

In the *second step*, we use data on national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for all countries from the Economic Research Service of the United States Depart-

ment of Agriculture (USDA).¹² Data on the agriculture share in the value added are taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAOSTAT).¹³ We construct data on output by sector in the year 2010, and identify the TFP levels ($A_{r,t}$) by dividing the sector-specific output by the quantity of labor in efficiency unit using (1). There is a clear positive relationship between TFP and the share of college-educated workers in both sectors. Indeed, regressing the log of $A_{r,t}$ on the log of $R_{r,t}^\ell$ gives a coefficient of 0.57 in the nonagricultural sector, and 0.66 in agriculture, as shown in Figures 3(c) and 3(d). Given the reverse causation relationship between productivity and education decision, we consider these estimates as upper bounds for the aggregate TFP externality. In our baseline scenario, we assume that half the correlation between TFP and the share of college-educated workers is due to the schooling externality (i.e., $\epsilon_n = 0.28$ and $\epsilon_a = 0.33$). Alternative scenarios are also considered in the simulation section. We calibrate \bar{A}_n as a residual from (4).

Let us make two remarks on the calibration of the technology. First, Figure 3(e) and 3(f) show the distribution of A_r and \bar{A}_r in the agricultural and nonagricultural sector and for the year 2010. These distributions are relatively similar, meaning that a large fraction of TFP differences is explained by exogenous determinants. Remember that we assume a TFP externality equal to half of the correlation between TFP and the skill ratio. Second, the methodology used to calibrate the TFP parameters can be also used for the year 1980. Comparing the calibrated scale factors (\bar{A}_n) in 1980 and 2010, we obtain a high correlation of 0.78 and no sign of convergence or divergence (i.e., log changes in \bar{A}_n are not significantly correlated with their initial level). It follows that we can reasonably consider these scale factors as time-invariant in our numerical experiments.

3.3 Preference parameters

The literature indicates some common values of several preference parameters. We assign the following values to the parameters that are time-invariant and equal for all countries: $\theta = 0.25$, $\lambda = 0.5$ and $\phi = 0.14$.¹⁴ From (14) and (16), the scale parameter of the distribution of migration tastes (μ) is the inverse of the elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage rate. Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) find a value between 0.6 and 0.7 for this elasticity. Hence, we use $\mu = 1.4$.

Let us now explain how we calibrate the values of π_r and $\psi_{r,t}$. These two parameters are country- and sector-specific, and affect the fertility and education decisions. We calibrate them to match the population dynamics between the years 1980 and 2010, i.e., the transition from the resident population in 1980 and the native population in 2010. We begin by estimating the size of the *before-migration* population in 2010 by skill group ($\sum_r N_{r,s,2010}$). We do this by adding the number of international migrants by region and skill level to the respective number of high-

¹²For a few missing observations we impute values by making use of the Maddison data base and data from the World Bank.

¹³For a few missing observations we impute values by making use of data from the World Bank. Since data is volatile for several countries, the average of five data points around the data point of interest is used.

¹⁴Given the expression in (10), this assumptions reflects setting the bound of the maximal number of children equal to 7 (i.e., 14 children per couple). See Docquier et al. (2016) for a brief review of studies using similar parameter values.

skilled and low-skilled workers by region of our basic data set, the after-migration population ($L_{r,s,2010}$). For simplicity, we focus on international migration to OECD countries only. From the Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD countries (DIOC), we extract the number of emigrants by education level to OECD countries for all countries in our sample and for the year 2010. The DIOC does not identify the region of origin of migrants (urban vs. rural). However, for the majority of countries in our sample, skill- and region-specific information on the desire to emigrate can be extracted from the Gallup World Polls. Assuming the structure of migration aspirations is reflected in actual emigration stocks, we split the number of emigrants to OECD countries by region of origin and by education level.¹⁵ The average fertility rate (\bar{n}_{1980}) is thus obtained by dividing the total native population of adults in 2010 ($\sum_{r,s} N_{r,s,2010}$) by the total resident population of adults in 1980 ($\sum_{r,s} L_{r,s,1980}$).¹⁶ Moreover, our calibration requires data on the skill- and region-specific fertility for each country. By construction, we have $\bar{n}_t \equiv \sum_{r,s} L_{r,s,t} n_{r,s,t} / \sum_{r,s} L_{r,s,t}$. We use the Gallup World Polls and extract the Gallup-based average number of children per household by region and skill level for 2010.¹⁷ We compute the fertility of the college educated workers by fitting the sector-specific low/high-skilled fertility differentials from the Gallup database. In this way, we obtain the fertility rates for each country for the year 1980. From 2010 onwards, the number of children is endogenous.

The last moment to fit in the procedure is the number of internal migrants between the years 1980 and 2010. Two factors may determine the difference in the evolution of talent in both sectors. First, this evolution may be brought about by the differences in educational prospects (given the already computed fertility differential). Second, it might be caused by the selectivity of rural-to-urban migrants. We decided to pin down the first of the two factors. This draws on the different probabilities to become high-skilled in urban and rural areas. These probabilities are calibrated by assuming a log-normal distribution of years of schooling in both sectors. The location parameters simply match the mean years of schooling in rural/urban areas, while the dispersion parameter is identical across sectors and is set to fit the country-specific share of high-skilled individuals (defined as the percentage of population with more than 17 years of schooling). Finally, the quested ratio of probabilities is the quotient of two respective probabilities of obtaining more than 17 years of schooling, derived from region-specific distributions. We set the ratio of the probabilities so that net internal migration is computed as a residual in the model. We arbitrary impose that the process of urbanization is the dominant one (which is the case in almost all countries). The matched number represents the net migration from rural to urban region. The net internal migration is then the difference between the "before-migration" population ($N_{r,s,2010}$) in 2010 and the sum of the resident population and the international migrants ($\sum_{r,s} (L_{r,s,2010} + M_{r,f,s,2010})$) in 2010. In this way, the model perfectly matches the skill and regional distribution of workers in 1980 and 2010.

¹⁵Bertoli and Ruyssen (2016) show that aspirations to emigrate are correlated with emigration flows within five years.

¹⁶There is no mortality in the model. The average fertility rate at time t , \bar{n}_t , should be seen as a net population growth rate. Note that the average fertility rate is not affected by internal migration, so that we need to only account for international migration at this stage.

¹⁷We only include countries with at least ten respondents. When data are missing, crude birth rates from the World Health Organization are used.

From Eq. (13), the fertility rate in the model depends on the product of $\pi_r \psi_{r,t}$. Once fertility rates are matched we are able to identify the product $\pi_r \psi_{r,t}$. We then calibrate π_r and $\psi_{r,t}$ in order to match the educational structure of the native population in 2010, imposing the given value to the ratio of probabilities of becoming high-skilled across regions. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the distributions of π_r , $\psi_{r,t}$ for the two regions. Figure 4(a) depicts the distributions for two periods (1980 and 2010). The distribution of π_r is stable over time. As far as $\psi_{r,t}$ is concerned, the mean levels decreased between 1980 and 2010, reflecting expansive education policies that can be related to the Millennium Development Goals. As for internal migration costs, we assume there is only migration from rural to urban regions (i.e., $x_{an,s,t} < 1$ and $x_{na,s,t} = 1$). We obtain internal migration costs for rural-urban migration from Eq. (16). Figure 4(c) shows that moving costs are usually smaller for highly educated workers than for the less educated.




Figure 4: Calibration of the preference parameters in 1980 and 2010

In order to determine the international migration costs ($x_{af,s,t}$ and $x_{nf,s,t}$), we begin by retrieving the utilities achievable abroad. We set these utilities equal to the skill-specific weighted average utilities of the OECD countries. The weights consist in the respective population sizes of the OECD countries. We then obtain the international migration costs from equation (16). In line with Figure 4(c), Figure 4(d) shows that international migration costs are smaller for college-educated workers.

3.4 Definition of the baseline scenario

Our parameter set is such that the model matches the geographic disparities in income, population and human capital in the year 2010, and their evolution between 1980 and 2010. Our baseline also includes technological externalities, assuming that half the correlation between TFP (and skill bias) and the share of college-educated workers is due to the schooling externality; alternative technological scenarios are considered in Section 4.4. The philosophy of our baseline projection exercise is to predict the future trends in income, population and human capital if all parameters remain constant, with the exception of the parameters governing access to education. More precisely, we constrain our baseline trajectory to be compatible with medium-term official demographic projections, as reflected by the UN projections of the national adult population and proportion of college graduates for the year 2040. Hence, we allow for country-specific proportional adjustments in $\psi_{r,t}$ ($r = a, n$) (i.e., the same relative change in both sectors) that minimizes the sum of squared differences in population and human capital between the baseline simulations and the UN projections for the year 2040. Remember $\psi_{r,t}$ determines the cost of education in the region. Comparing the new levels of $\psi_{r,2010}$ with those obtained in 1980 (i.e., $\psi_{r,1980}$), we identify a conditional convergence process in the access to education. We see it as a likely consequence of the Millennium Development policy. We estimate two quadratic, region-specific convergence equations considering the US as the benchmark frontier: $\ln(\psi_{r,t+1}/\psi_{r,t}) = \alpha_r + \beta_r \ln(\psi_{r,t}^{USA}/\psi_{r,t}) + \gamma_r (\ln(\psi_{r,t}^{USA}/\psi_{r,t}))^2$. We obtain $\gamma_a = 0.032$, $\gamma_n = 0.046$, $\beta_a = -0.195$ and $\beta_n = -0.223$, where all parameters are highly significant. For subsequent years, our baseline scenario assumes a continuation of this quadratic convergence process, in line with the new Sustainable Development Agenda. Alternative (i.e., more and less optimistic) educational scenarios will also be considered in Section 4.5.

4 Results

In this section, we investigate how disparities in human capital affect current and future development levels and global inequality. In line with the development accounting literature, Section 4.1 uses a set of counterfactual experiments to quantify the fraction of contemporaneous development inequality that is explained by differences in the proportion of talented workers, by international migration, and by internal mobility frictions. Then, Section 4.2 compares our baseline projections of worldwide population, urbanization, human capital and income per capita, with official projections for the 21st century. Section 4.3 examines the main geopolitical implications of our baseline projections. The sensitivity of our projections to the size of technological externalities, to future educational policies, and to future mobility frictions is then assessed in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.

4.1 Geography of talent and development in 2010

In this section, we use the parameterized model and proceed with a set of static counterfactual experiments to identify the role of the geography of talent. Results are depicted in Figure 5. For each country, we proceed as in the development

accounting literature, and simulate the counterfactual (CF) level of national income per worker (y) obtained after transposing the US shares of college-educated workers in each sector. We then compare it with the observed level (obs). Building on Jones (2014), we compute the success rate (SR) as the share of the income ratio explained by the counterfactual (i.e., one minus the counterfactual-to-observed ratio of income differential with the US). Equivalently, the success rate measures the national income loss due to the lower level of human capital and/or to the sectoral allocation of workers when compared to the US:


$$SR = 1 - \frac{(y_{US}/y)_{CF}}{(y_{US}/y)_{obs}} = \frac{y_{CF} - y_{obs}}{y_{CF}}.$$

Figures (5a) and (5b) give the counterfactual levels of income per capita and the success rates obtained under three technological scenarios after transposing the US shares of college-educated workers.¹⁸ Under these scenarios, all countries have the same national fraction of college graduates as in the US and the same regional shares by educational level as in the US. In Figure 5(a), the bold line shows the observed income levels; countries are ranked by ascending order with respect to the observed level of income per worker. The baseline scenario (solid blue line) assumes that externality sizes are equal to 50% of the correlations between human capital and technological characteristics (i.e., $\kappa_n = 0.19$, $\kappa_a = 0$, $\epsilon_n = 0.28$ and $\epsilon_a = 0.33$). The variants (red and green line) assume no externality, or externalities equal to 100% of the correlations (i.e., $\kappa_n = 0.38$, $\kappa_a = 0$, $\epsilon_n = 0.56$ and $\epsilon_a = 0.66$).


We show that the geography of talent matters for development, whatever the size of technological externalities. In the absence of any externality, transposing the US educational structure reduces the income ratio between the US (i.e., \$100,000 per year) and countries in the lowest quartile of the income distribution by about 60% (i.e., income per worker increases from \$5,000 to \$12,500). The effect decreases with development, as the distance to the frontier gets smaller. Our success rate is in line with Jones (2014), who finds a success rate around 50% for poor countries with the same elasticity of substitution. As in Jones, the effect is mainly driven by the fact that talented workers are more productive, and by the complementarity between them and less educated workers. In addition, our model accounts for the role of urbanization. Transposing the US skill shares and the US sectoral allocation of workers not only increases the level of education, it also increases the size of the urban (more productive) sector. This is equivalent to raising the average TFP level in a one-sector model, and explains our greater success rate. In our baseline scenario with conservative externalities, human capital disparities generate a success rate of about 80% in the poorest countries (i.e., income per worker in poor countries increases from \$5,000 to \$25,000 after transposing the US educational structure). In the full-externality scenario, human capital almost becomes the single determining factor for global inequality.

Figures (5c) and (5d) use the baseline externality scenario (50% of correlations) and include each externality at a time. They show that the results are highly sensitive to the aggregate TFP externality (almost equivalent to the baseline with both externalities). On the contrary, the skill-biased externality affects wage disparities


¹⁸Most studies in development accounting disregard technological externalities (see Jones, 2015), or consider that externalities are small (Caselli and Ciccone, 2014).




(a) Distribution of GDP per capita: Transposing US skill shares with baseline, zero and full externalities




(b) Smoothed success rates: Transposing US skill shares with baseline, zero and full externalities




(c) Distribution of GDP per capita: Transposing US skill shares with baseline, aggregate externality only, and skill-biased externality only



(d) Smoothed success rates: Transposing US skill shares with baseline, aggregate externality only, and skill-biased externality only



(e) Distribution of GDP per capita: baseline, transposing US urban shares, no migration



(f) Smoothed success rates: Transposing US urban shares, no migration

Figure 5: Income per worker and success rate in static counterfactuals

Note: On the horizontal axis, countries are ranked by ascending order with respect to the observed level of GDP per capita and the respective scenario.

(not reported here) but plays a negligible role in explaining the growth potential (almost equivalent to the no-externality scenario), though it slightly exacerbates income disparities across countries (poorest countries are better off in the absence of skill-biased technical changes, unlike richest countries).


Then, Figures (5e) and (5f) illustrate the role of the geographic mobility of talent. Using the baseline externality levels, we simulate the effect of transposing the US skill-specific urban shares (keeping the countrywide size of the college graduates at the observed levels) and of returning all expatriates to their home country (no migration scenario). With the exception of Small Island Developing States, the effect of international migration on global inequality is very small. On average, international migration explains an income loss of 15% to 18% with externalities. This is because average emigration rates to the OECD are small in developing countries (around 5% for college graduates and less than 1% for the low-skilled). On the contrary, transposing the US urban shares for each category of worker reduces the income ratio between the US and countries in the lowest quartile of the income distribution by 40% (i.e., about one half of the total effect of transposing the US skill shares in each sector).¹⁹ Transposing the US shares in employment means increasing the urban share of developing countries from 20% to 95%. Although this shock drastically increases the mean levels of productivity and income, individuals have no incentives to move due to liquidity constraints, imperfect information, or congestion effects (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bryan et al., 2014). In line with Rodrik (2013), this suggests that internal mobility frictions might be responsible for large misallocation of workers in poor countries, and shows the relevance of a two-sector approach.

4.2 Baseline socio-demographic projections


We now turn our attention to the prospective analysis. This section compares our baseline simulations with official projections (medium variant of the UN). Results are described in Figure 6. The simulated and official trajectories of worldwide population, share of college graduates, and share of urban population are depicted in Figures 6(a), 6(c) and 6(e), respectively. The cross-country correlations between our simulations and official projections for the year 2100 are described in Figures 6(b), 6(d) and 6(f), respectively.

On the one hand, the UN projections assume long-term, convergence in fertility, mortality and education attainment. On the other hand, our stylized model assumes conditional convergence in access to education (i.e., in $\psi_{r,t}$), a constant growth rate of the scale TFP factor, and keeps all other parameters constant; it also assumes conservative technological externalities. Figure 6 shows that our baseline trajectory is very much in line with official socio-demographic projections. The long-run level of the adult population is almost equal to official projections; furthermore, the cross-country correlation between simulated and UN population sizes in the year 2100 equals 0.99.


¹⁹Table A 1 and Table A 2 in the appendix give a more detailed description of the effect of the different static counterfactual experiments for the US and for the 15th (Cambodia), 25th (Ghana), 50th (Tunisia), 75th (Mexico) and 85th (Greece) percentiles of the income distribution. The presentation is organized as in Jones (2014). Table A 1 focuses on the average level of income per worker, while Table A 2 distinguishes between the two production sectors.




(a) World population (in million of people)




(b) World Population in 2100 by countries




(c) Worldwide share of college-educated workers



(d) Share of college-educated in 2100 by countries



(e) Worldwide urban share



(f) Urban share in 2100 by countries

Figure 6: Comparison of the baseline trajectory with official projections

As far as education is concerned, the worldwide share of college graduates in the labor force is slightly lower than in official projections. This share increases from 8.8% in 2010 to 19.4% in 2100 in our model, against 21.4% in the UN medium scenario. The cross-country correlation between simulated and UN shares of college graduates in the year 2100 is equal to 0.87 (regressing simulated levels on official projections gives an R-squared of 0.75).

Finally, the share of the population living in urban areas is lower than the

UN projections. The worldwide urban share increases slightly from 53.0% in 2010 to 58.3% in 2100. These trends are the outcomes of two opposing forces, i.e., rural/urban fertility differential and the net internal mobility towards cities (driven by the rising educational attainment). The former strongly dominates. The cross-country correlation between simulated and UN urban shares in the year 2100 is equal to 0.79 (regressing simulated levels on official projections gives an R-squared of 0.63).

Overall, these comparisons give suggestive evidence that, albeit small in scale, our stylized model does a good job in generating realistic projections of population, human capital, and urbanization for the coming decades. Importantly, as it is micro-founded, the model enables to identify the key factors that will govern the future of the world population and global inequality. In particular, our goal is to assess whether the evolution of population and global inequality is sensitive to technological externalities, future educational policies and geographic mobility costs.

4.3 World economy implications

Before delving into the sensitivity analysis, this section analyzes the geopolitical implications of our baseline projections. The model does not predict convergence in income per worker and in the share of college graduates across countries. The Theil index of human capital inequality remains almost stable over the 21st century. It ranges from 0.63 in 1980 to 0.56 in 2100 as illustrated in Figure 7(b). This implies that income per capita also does not converge. The Theil index of income inequality varies from 0.81 in 1980 to 1.14 in 2100 as depicted in Figure 7(a).

Figure 7(c) depicts the evolution of the region/continent shares in the worldwide working-age population. The share of sub-Saharan Africa increases from 7.2% in 1980 to 38% in 2100. The share of OECD countries decreases from 25.8% to 12.7% over the same period of time. In addition, the OECD share in the college-educated population shrinks markedly, as illustrated in Figure 7(d). This is caused by the progress in higher education in the other regions, in particular in Asia, and by the rise of the demographic share of the developing world. Figure 7(e) shows that the speed of urbanization is faster in Africa than in the other regions. Finally, Figure 7(f) depicts the evolution of income shares. The OECD income share decreases by almost 9 percentage points (from 77.4% in 1980 to 68.7% in 2100) whereas the Asian share increases from 9.1% to 14.4% over the same period.

Table 1 describes the international migration implications of our baseline projections. Assuming constant migration policies, we predict slight decreases in future emigration rates from the OECD member states. On the contrary, emigration rates from Latin America, from the Middle East and North Africa, from sub-Saharan Africa and from Asia increase. This is due to the rising share of college-educated workers (the most mobile individuals) in the population. Given its rising share in the world population, sub-Saharan Africa is responsible for drastic changes in worldwide migration pressures. As a result, the proportion of foreigners increases in European countries. In particular, the average immigration rate to the EU15 is expected to rise from 13.6% in 2010 to 24.0% in 2100. This is explained by four factors: (i) Europe is the main destination for African emigrants; (ii) the demographic ratio between Africa and Europe increases sharply;




Figure 7: Global inequality and regional shares (1980-2100)

Notes: This figure reports the Theil index of income inequality, the Theil index of inequality in the share of talented workers, the regional shares of global labor force, high-skilled workers, urban workers and GDP. In Figure 7(c)-7(f) countries are exclusively and completely assigned to one of six groups: OECD, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia and Others

(iii) college-educated workers are more mobile than the less educated and the rise

in African human capital has limited effects on income disparities between Africa and Europe; (iv) urbanization increases and international migration costs are lower for urban citizens than for villagers. Reinforcement of immigration restrictions are likely to be observed in European countries to curb the migration pressure; their implications are investigated in Section 4.6. Note that the share of immigrants increases less drastically in the US (from 16.0% to 22.6%), Australia (from 24.9% to 27.7%) and Canada (from 18.7% to 27.7%).

Table 1: Projections of immigration and emigration rates

	Baseline scenario				No Ext	Lin	Half	No Urb
	2010	2040	2070	2100	2100	2100	2100	2100
Emigration rates (as percent of native population)								
OECD	4.3%	4.7%	4.3%	3.8%	3.9%	4.1%	3.8%	4.4%
LAC	3.9%	5.1%	6.0%	6.6%	6.4%	6.2%	6.9%	8.0%
SSA	1.4%	1.7%	2.0%	2.1%	1.7%	2.8%	2.0%	1.8%
MENA	2.9%	3.8%	4.3%	4.5%	4.6%	3.9%	4.6%	5.5%
Asia	1.1%	1.7%	2.3%	2.8%	2.6%	2.9%	2.7%	2.3%
Others	13.9%	16.4%	17.7%	17.8%	17.0%	18.7%	18.4%	19.5%
Immigration rates (as percent of resident population)								
EU	12.1%	17.8%	21.3%	23.0%	24.4%	22.2%	25.2%	24.1%
EU 15	13.6%	19.5%	22.7%	24.0%	23.5%	23.3%	26.2%	25.1%
<i>GER</i>	<i>15.0%</i>	<i>21.6%</i>	<i>24.8%</i>	<i>25.9%</i>	<i>25.7%</i>	<i>25.2%</i>	<i>28.5%</i>	<i>27.1%</i>
<i>FRA</i>	<i>12.2%</i>	<i>17.0%</i>	<i>19.9%</i>	<i>21.5%</i>	<i>20.7%</i>	<i>20.6%</i>	<i>23.4%</i>	<i>22.6%</i>
<i>GBR</i>	<i>14.6%</i>	<i>21.4%</i>	<i>24.9%</i>	<i>26.1%</i>	<i>25.5%</i>	<i>25.3%</i>	<i>27.3%</i>	<i>26.9%</i>
<i>ITA</i>	<i>10.9%</i>	<i>16.4%</i>	<i>19.9%</i>	<i>21.9%</i>	<i>21.4%</i>	<i>21.2%</i>	<i>24.9%</i>	<i>22.9%</i>
<i>ESP</i>	<i>14.0%</i>	<i>19.8%</i>	<i>22.7%</i>	<i>23.7%</i>	<i>23.2%</i>	<i>23.1%</i>	<i>26.2%</i>	<i>24.6%</i>
USA	16.0%	20.6%	22.4%	22.6%	22.1%	22.0%	24.8%	23.4%
CAN	18.7%	25.5%	27.7%	27.7%	27.3%	27.0%	28.8%	28.3%
AUS	24.9%	28.5%	28.7%	27.7%	27.3%	27.0%	29.4%	28.4%

Notes: The upper part of the table gives the share of emigrants in the total native population for the OECD, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia, and Others. The bottom part of the table gives the share of immigrants in the working-age population for the European Union (EU), the 15 countries of the European Union (EU 15), Germany (GER), France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), Italy (ITA), Spain (ESP), the United States (USA), Canada (CAN), and Australia (AUS). The first to fourth columns give the respective values for the baseline scenario for the years 2010-2100. Column "No Ext" gives the respective values for the counterfactual scenario with no technological externalities for the year 2100. Column "Lin" gives the respective values for the counterfactual scenario with linear convergence in education costs for the year 2100. Column "Half" gives the respective values for the counterfactual scenario where the coefficients of the (baseline) quadratic convergence equation are divided by two for the year 2100. Column "No urb" gives the respective values for the counterfactual scenario with no internal mobility for the year 2100.

4.4 Technological variants

Let us now get back to the global projections and assess their sensitivity to modelling assumptions. The static counterfactual experiments conducted in Section 4.1 show that the effect of human capital on global inequality quantitatively depends on the level of technological externalities. In this section, we assess whether these externalities also affect our socio-demographic and income projections. Figure 8 compares the baseline trajectories of population, education, urbanization, income per capita and inequality with those obtained without or with full externalities.


Given the gradual increase in the proportion of college graduates, long-run projections of income per capita are sensitive to the technological scenario (Figure 8(d)). However, the evolution of socio-demographic variables is highly robust to the technological environment (Figures 8(a) to 8(c)). The fifth column of Table 1 also shows the migration projections are robust to the technological variants, although long-term migration pressures are greater in the absence of externality. More importantly, externalities have a rather pronounced impact on the Theil index of income inequality (Figure 8(e)). Compared to the baseline, a visible decrease in inequality is obtained in the no-externality scenario; this is due to the fact that the skill-biased externality increases returns to schooling and the within-country inequality component of the Theil index. In addition, the skill-biased externality makes education less accessible for the poor, as the cost of higher education is proportional to the high-skilled wage. Furthermore, the growth process is slowed by eliminating the Lucas externality to TFP, which significantly affects productivity growth in the developed regions. Symmetrically, a long-run increase in inequality is obtained in the full-externality scenario; this is driven by the stronger change in the TFP in rich countries, followed by greater rewards to talent due to a more skill-biased technical change. As for the worldwide distribution of talents, Figure 8(f) shows slight variations of the Theil index. Overall, technological externalities have a negligible effect on future demographic pressures, but drastically influence the evolution of global income inequality.

4.5 Educational variants


We now assess whether our socio-demographic and income projections are sensitive to policies affecting future access to education. In line with the recent Sustainable Development Agenda, the baseline scenario assumes a continuation of the quadratic convergence process in education costs observed between 1980 and 2010; this implies that middle-income countries catch up more rapidly than low-income countries. Figure 9 compares the baseline trajectories of population, education, urbanization, income per capita and inequality with those obtained with a smaller magnitude of the quadratic convergence, or when there is an unconditional, linear convergence process.

Under the linear convergence scenario, the poorest countries are the most prone to converge.²⁰ We investigate this possibility by estimating a linear convergence equation for education cost (instead of a second-order polynomial in the baseline): $\ln(\psi_{r,t+1}/\psi_{r,t}) = \alpha_r + \beta_r \ln(\psi_{r,t}^{USA}/\psi_{r,t})$. We obtain the following estimates: $\beta_a =$

²⁰Compared to the baseline, Figure A 1 in the Appendix shows that GDP per capita grows much more rapidly in Africa under the linear convergence scenario.




(a) Worldwide population (in million of people) (b) Worldwide share of college educated workers



(c) Worldwide share of urban population

(d) Worldwide GDP per capita



(e) Theil index of income inequality

(f) Theil index of inequality in talent

Figure 8: Sensitivity to technological externalities

Notes: This figure reports the worldwide projected population size, the share of college educated workers, the share of urban population, GDP per capita, Theil index of income inequality, and Theil index of inequality in the share of college-educated workers for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. The scenario "no externalities" refers to the scenario with no technological externalities. The scenario "full externalities" refers to the scenario with full technological externalities.


-0.056 for rural regions, and $\beta_n = -0.074$ for urban regions. Compared to the baseline, this scenario predicts faster convergence in the poorest countries of the world, which implies a significantly smaller worldwide population size in the long-run, and a substantially faster development process (as reflected by the worldwide GDP per capita, by the global urbanization rate, and by the worldwide share of college-educated workers). Moreover, long-run income and education inequality measures are significantly smaller when we assume linear convergence in the access to education. Contrary to the linear scenario, lowering the magnitude of the estimated parameters of the (baseline) quadratic convergence equation by 50% (i.e., dividing the coefficients of the quadratic convergence equation by two) gives more pessimistic outcomes. This scenario is characterized by a larger demographic pressure and a lower level for the worldwide average income.

The results of the educational variants show that the evolution of the size and structure of population, as well as of the world distribution of income are highly sensitive to future educational policies. In the case of slower convergence in access to education, population is almost 50% higher than in the baseline, the proportion of college graduates stagnates after 2040, and urbanization grows much less rapidly. Income growth is also affected (by the year 2100, income per capita is markedly smaller than in the baseline), and the Theil index of income inequality increases noticeably. The latter effect is mainly driven by the increasing share of developing countries in the world population, and has drastic implications in terms of immigration and emigration. Hence, the number of international migrants increases by 22% compared to the the baseline. Under the linear scenario, the seventh column of Table 1 shows that destination countries exhibit higher immigration rates (due to the larger population in developing countries). In line with the Sustainable Development Agenda, our results suggest that policies targeting access to all levels of education and education quality are vital to reduce the demographic pressure and global inequality.


4.6 Mobility variants

Finally, this section investigates whether our socio-demographic and income projections are sensitive to future migration costs. The baseline scenario assumes constant international and internal migration costs in the future. It shows that the international migration pressure drastically intensifies in the OECD countries. We consider here an extreme no-international migration scenario for the future ($x_{rf,s,t} = 1$ after 2010). In the same vein, our static experiments suggest that internal mobility frictions drastically affect the (mis-)allocation of workers between sectors. We consider a no-internal migration scenario with maximal frictions ($x_{an,s,t} = 1$ after 2010). Figure 10 compares the baseline trajectories of population, education, urbanization, income per capita and inequality with those obtained without international or internal mobility.

In line with the static development accounting exercise, we find that international migration has a negligible impact on aggregated socio-demographic prospects. However, this scenario predicts a substantial decrease in the size of population in Western Economies, which is completely balanced out by an increase in developing countries. On the contrary, it markedly reduces the world GDP (as it prevents individuals to move from low-productivity to high-productivity countries), and re-




(a) Worldwide population (in million of people) (b) Worldwide share of college educated workers



(c) Worldwide share of urban population

(d) Worldwide GDP per capita




(e) Theil index of income inequality


(f) Theil index of inequality in talent

Figure 9: Sensitivity to educational policies

Notes: This figure reports the worldwide projected population size, the share of college educated workers, the share of urban population, GDP per capita, Theil index of income inequality, and Theil index of inequality in the share of college-educated workers for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. The "linear convergence" scenario assumes a monotonic convergence in $\psi_{r,t}$. The "50% convergence" scenario assumes a slower conditional convergence process.




(a) Worldwide population (in million of people) (b) Worldwide share of college educated workers



(c) Worldwide share of urban population

(d) Worldwide GDP per capita



(e) Theil index of income inequality

(f) Theil index of inequality in talent

Figure 10: Sensitivity to future mobility

Notes: This figure reports the worldwide projected population size, the share of college educated workers, the share of urban population, GDP per capita, Theil index of income inequality, and Theil index of inequality in the share of college-educated workers for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. The scenario "no internal" refers to the scenario with prohibitively high internal migration costs ($x_{rf,s,t} = 1$) after 2010. The scenario "no international" refers to the scenario with prohibitively high international migration costs ($x_{an,s,t} = 1$) after 2010.

duces global income inequality. However, the latter effect is rather mechanical and linked to the construction of the Theil index: cutting migration decreases the demographic share of industrialized countries, and increases the share of developing countries. However, in line with our static numerical experiments, cutting migration has little effect on income per capita in developing countries; this suggests that development prospects are robust to future migration policies (see Figure A 1 in the Appendix). We are aware that the real contribution of international migration to development might be underestimated here as the model disregards diaspora externalities (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) and the link between education decisions and migration prospects.²¹

On the contrary, internal mobility plays a key role in global economic prospects. Preventing a movement of people from rural to urban areas has drastic implications for human capital accumulation (access to education is better in cities), the continuation of the urbanization process, and for increasing future income inequality. In line with Figure 5, this confirms that internal mobility frictions might be responsible for large misallocation of workers in poor countries (Rodrik, 2013), and that policies targeting sustainable urban development are vital to reduce the demographic pressure and global inequality.

5 Conclusion

This paper analyzes the effect of the geographic distribution of talent on current and future development disparities. We use a multi-country, two-sector, two-class, dynamic model of the world economy that endogenizes population growth, human capital formation and income in all countries and regions. We consider various sizes for technological externalities, various scenarios of access to education, internal and international mobility. Overall, we argue that the geography of talent explains a non-negligible fraction of development disparities between countries and regions. Transposing the US skill shares to countries in the lowest quartile of the income distribution reduces the income ratio by 60%, and by even more if technological externalities are factored in. A large fraction of this change is due to the effect of the national average level of human capital on productivity. In addition, half of this effect is due to disparities in the sectoral allocations of workers, resulting from internal mobility frictions. Compared to the standard, one-sector development accounting model, taking into account within-country disparities in human capital reinforces the role of the geographic allocation of talent. On the contrary, and although migrants are positively selected in terms of educational attainment, international migration has little effects on the world distribution of income.

In line with the results of our development accounting experiments, we show that economic and demographic prospects are strongly governed by educational and internal mobility policies, and less dependent on future migration policies. Attenuating the ongoing convergence process in education costs induces dramatic effects on population growth, urbanization, and the world distribution of income. In the same vein, obstructing internal mobility generates huge misallocation costs.

²¹Docquier and Machado (2016) and Delogu et al. (2015) numerically demonstrate that the latter brain gain mechanism has little impact on the world distribution of income.

And again, future migration policies have little effects on development. In line with the Sustainable Development Agenda, our analysis clearly suggests that policies targeting access to all levels of education, education quality and sustainable urban development are vital to reduce the demographic pressure and global inequality.

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6 Appendix


Table A 1: Geography of talent and income per worker - Development accounting

	15 th (Cambodia)	25 th (Ghana)	50 th (Tunisia)	75 th (Mexico)	85 th (Greece)	Theil Index
I. Observed levels and ratios of income per worker						
Income pw	2,653	5,134	11,218	26,895	62,168	0.698
US/ctry ratio	43.9	22.7	10.4	4.3	1.9	-
II. Counterfactual: Transposing the US skill shares in each sector						
Income pw	20,545	19,968	24,644	44,832	70,761	0.323
US/ctry ratio	5.7	5.8	4.7	2.6	1.6	-
Success	0.871	0.743	0.545	0.400	0.121	0.537
III. Counterfactual II with exogenous TFP (A_r) and exogenous skill bias (R_r^ω)						
Income pw	6,802	8,640	11,338	28,124	47,027	0.452
US/ctry ratio	14.9	11.7	8.9	3.6	2.1	-
Success	0.662	0.485	0.142	0.171	-0.146	0.352
IV. Counterfactual II with full TFP externality (A_r) and full skill bias externality (R_r^ω)						
Income pw	75,371	54,518	61,898	79,288	115,559	0.243
US/ctry ratio	1.9	2.6	2.3	1.8	1.2	-
Success	0.958	0.886	0.781	0.590	0.351	0.652
V. Counterfactual II with exogenous skill bias (R_r^ω)						
Income pw	23,981	22,271	27,570	48,027	74,627	0.310
US/ctry ratio	5.0	5.3	4.3	2.5	1.6	-
Success	0.887	0.765	0.585	0.429	0.150	0.556
VI. Counterfactual II with exogenous TFP (A_r)						
Income pw	5,796	7,664	10,076	26,021	44,538	0.475
US/ctry ratio	17.1	12.9	9.8	3.8	2.2	-
Success	0.611	0.431	0.055	0.123	-0.185	0.319
VII. Counterfactual: Transposing the US urbanization share						
Income pw	6,007	5,867	12,351	26,649	60,877	0.564
US/ctry ratio	19.4	19.9	9.4	4.4	1.9	-
Success	0.558	0.125	0.092	-0.009	-0.021	0.191
VIII. Counterfactual: Repatriation of emigrant workers						
Income pw	3,184	6,066	12,082	29,373	64,522	0.689
US/ctry ratio	36.8	19.3	9.7	4.0	1.8	-
Success	0.162	0.149	0.066	0.079	0.031	0.012


Table A 2: Productivity by sector - Development accounting

	15 th (Cambodia)	25 th (Ghana)	50 th (Tunisia)	75 th (Mexico)	85 th (Greece)	99 th (US)
I. Observed levels and ratios of income per worker						
Income pw (n)	8,338	6,614	15,155	31,822	76,106	141,406
Income pw (a)	1,063	3,247	2,336	6,337	16,907	11,587
US/ctry ratio (n)	17.0	21.4	9.3	4.4	1.9	1.0
US/ctry ratio (a)	10.9	3.6	5.0	1.8	0.7	1.0
College grads in n	0.036	0.030	0.105	0.148	0.297	0.326
II. Counterfactual: Transposing US skill shares in each sector						
Success (n)	0.612	0.622	0.442	0.344	0.059	-
Success (a)	0.738	0.707	0.536	0.449	0.385	-
III. Counterfactual II with exogenous TFP (A_r) and exogenous skill bias (R_r^ω)						
Success (n)	-0.005	0.268	-0.051	0.089	-0.205	-
Success (a)	-0.161	0.079	-0.132	0.026	0.090	-
IV. Counterfactual II with full TFP externality (A_r) and full skill bias externality (R_r^ω)						
Success (n)	0.869	0.821	0.729	0.543	0.294	-
Success (a)	0.941	0.907	0.810	0.688	0.584	-
V. Counterfactual II with exogenous skill bias (R_r^ω)						
Success (n)	0.661	0.653	0.488	0.366	0.094	-
Success (a)	0.738	0.707	0.536	0.449	0.385	-
VI. Counterfactual II with exogenous TFP (A_r)						
Success (n)	-0.152	0.198	-0.150	0.051	-0.251	-
Success (a)	-0.161	0.079	-0.132	0.026	0.090	-
VII. Counterfactual: Transposing the US urbanization share						
Success (n)	-0.252	-0.076	-0.077	-0.042	-0.095	-
Success (a)	0.121	0.141	0.173	0.171	0.305	-
VIII. Counterfactual: Repatriation of emigrant workers						
Success (n)	0.085	0.082	0.017	-0.023	-0.006	-
Success (a)	0.136	0.149	0.108	0.033	0.103	-


Notes: These tables gives the level of income per worker of Cambodia, Ghana, Tunisia, Mexico, and Greece for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. In each table the last column reports the effect on the Theil index. Part I reports the observed level of income per worker and the US-to-country ratio. Part II reports the income levels and ratios obtained if the US shares were observed in each sector. Parts III-VI are variants of Part II, with different assumptions on the technological externalities. Part VII reports the income levels and ratios obtained if the US urbanization share was transposed. Part VIII reports the income levels and ratios obtained if emigration rates were nil. For each simulation, the success rate is the share of the wage ratio explained by the counterfactual, i.e., one minus the counterfactual-to-observed ratio of income differential with the US (in col. 2-6), and one minus the counterfactual-to-observed ratio of Theil index (in col. 7).




(a) Share of developing countries in working population




(b) Share of African countries in working population




(c) GDP per capita in developing countries



(d) GDP per capita in African countries



(e) GDP per capita in developing countries



(f) GDP per capita in African countries

Figure A 1: Sensitivity to future mobility and educational policies for developing countries and Africa

Notes: This figure reports the share of the developing and African countries in the projected working population and the GDP per capita in developing and African countries for the baseline, the scenario "no international" with prohibitively high international migration costs ($x_{an,s,t} = 1$) after 2010, and the scenario "linear convergence" with linearly converging education costs ($\psi_{r,t}$).

“Sur quoi la fondera-t-il l'économie du monde qu'il veut gouverner? Sera-ce sur le caprice de chaque particulier? Quelle confusion! Sera-ce sur la justice? Il l'ignore.”

Pascal



Created in 2003 , the **Fondation pour les études et recherches sur le développement international** aims to promote a fuller understanding of international economic development and the factors that influence it.

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