

The Return of the *Prodigy* Son: Do Return Migrants make Better Leaders?

Marion Mercier (Paris School of Economics, DIAL)

- Research question: Investigate the impact of political leaders' migration experience on the quality of the institutions of their country during their period in power.
- Political leaders (elites) as one of the channels through which migration may affect development in the origin country.

- Impact of migration on politics:
 - Macro side: positive impact of foreign students on democracy at home (Spilimbergo, AER 2009); positive impact of emigration rate on the quality of institutions (Docquier et al., 2011) and on women political representation (Lodigiani & Salomone, 2012).
 - Micro side: positive impact of migration on the demand for political accountability in Cape Verde (Batista & Vicente, WBER 2012); impact of locality-level intensity of migration on voting behaviours in Mexico (Pfutze, JCE 2012) and Moldova (Omar Mahmoud et al., 2012); positive impact of return migration on turnout and electoral competitiveness in Mali (Chauvet & Mercier, 2013).

- Impact of individual leaders on aggregate outcomes:
 - Literature on firms and central banks (e.g. Bertrand & Schoar, QJE 2003, Gohlmann & Vaubel, EER 2007).
 - Literature on political leaders:
 - Individual leaders affect growth (Jones & Olken, QJE 2005)...
 - ... Differently depending on their level of education (Besley, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, EJ 2011).
 - Leaders' profession affect their propensity to implement reforms (Dreher et al., JCE 2009).
 - Leaders' gender affect local policy choices in India (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, Econometrica 2004)
 - Leaders' career background affect local democracy in China (Persson & Zhuravskaya, 2011).

- Collection of information on the personal characteristics of 932 individuals who have been leaders of the executive power in their country, in all the developing world over the 1960-2004 period (1,042 leadership periods).
- Identification of the leaders: *Archigos* database (University of Rochester).
- Sources for data collection: all possible web sources, uppermost *Encyclopedia Universalis* and *Cidob* (Barcelona Center for International Affairs).

Coded characteristics:

- Migration experiences: dates/duration, destination, objective (exile, studies, diplomacy, military reasons).
- Personal background: education, occupation, military experience, familial characteristics.

Descriptive statistics

	Average	Standard Deviation	Observations
Woman	0.03	0.16	932
Age at arrival	51	11	926 ^a
Tenure Duration (days)	2012	2687	932
High Education	0.51	0.50	775
Military	0.28	0.45	792
Law	0.19	0.39	792
Eco	0.08	0.27	792
Health	0.05	0.22	792
Admin	0.09	0.28	792
Academics	0.14	0.34	792
Worker	0.03	0.18	792
Religious	0.01	0.12	792
Scientist	0.09	0.28	792
Business	0.04	0.21	792
Migration	0.68	0.47	786
Mig - Diplomacy	0.13	0.33	786
Mig - Study	0.41	0.49	786
Mig - Exile	0.14	0.34	786
Mig - Military	0.18	0.38	786
Migration Duration (years)	7	8	373

^aThe date of birth of six leaders of the sample are not available.

Restriction of the sample in two dimensions:

- Leaders who stayed in power at least one year.
- Available information on migration.

Finally, 610 leaders for 668 different leadership periods.

→ Test the significance of the differences between short-term leaders and long-term leaders. [▶ Test - Short-term vs long-term](#)

→ Test the significance of the differences between leaders with and without available migration data. [▶ Test - Attrition](#)

→ Run the benchmark estimations considering the leaders for whom we do not have information on migration as non-migrants.

[▶ Estimations - Attrition](#)

$$PolityScore_{i,j,t} = \alpha + \delta Migration_j + \gamma X_j + \tau_t + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- $PolityScore_{i,j,t}$: average Polity IV (index of democracy, between -10 to 10) in country i during the tenure of leader j , who reached power in year t .
- $Migration_j$: Dummy equaling 1 if leader j had a migration experience before reaching power.
- X_j : vector of leader-level control variables.
- τ_t : year dummies.
- η_i : country fixed effects.
- $\varepsilon_{i,j,t}$: error term.

Leader-level control variables:

- Duration of the tenure of leader j (in days),
- Dummy equaling one if j is a women,
- Education level of j (dummy equaling one if high education).

Benchmark results

<i>Dependent: Polity score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Tenure duration	-0.000443*** (0.000125)	-0.000446*** (0.000119)	-0.000252 (0.000209)	-0.000192 (0.000225)
Woman	2.660*** (0.767)	1.527** (0.664)	0.897 (0.595)	1.042 (0.877)
High Education	1.729*** (0.453)	0.723 (0.455)	0.202 (0.439)	-0.229 (0.567)
Migration	-0.438 (0.446)			
Mig - Study		0.771* (0.443)	1.365*** (0.489)	1.276** (0.500)
Mig - Exile		0.965** (0.432)	1.049** (0.441)	0.0264 (0.518)
Mig - Diplomacy		-0.840 (0.612)	-0.312 (0.759)	-0.472 (0.746)
Mig - Military		-2.700*** (0.693)	-3.912*** (0.794)	0.122 (1.258)
Constant	1.088 (1.331)	-1.024 (1.369)	3.199 (1.967)	2.535 (2.247)
Observations	577	577	403	377
R-squared	0.510	0.554	0.614	0.643
Number of countries	125	125	110	106
Country level controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Joint t-test (Profession dummies)				0.003

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Benchmark results

<i>Dependent: Polity Score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDP pc growth (tenure)			-0.0768 (0.112)	0.0579 (0.132)
Emig			14.24 (15.03)	14.12 (16.00)
Skilled Emig			4.809 (5.193)	3.838 (5.421)
Population			-8.39e-09 (7.24e-09)	-8.15e-09 (8.11e-09)
Students abroad			-2.599 (7.453)	-6.584 (7.373)
Law				0.745 (0.687)
Eco				0.00816 (0.856)
Health				-0.619 (1.402)
Military				-4.560*** (1.318)
Business				-0.0708 (0.913)
Admin				0.291 (0.903)
Academics				-0.560 (0.632)
Worker				-0.0535 (1.527)
Scientist				0.246 (0.936)
Religious				1.425 (1.638)

- 1 The “democracies’ preference” channel
Democratic countries may prefer to select leaders with a migration background.
- 2 “Coming back when the *tide is turning*”
Migrants (among which future leaders) may come back to their country of origin when it starts democratizing.
- 3 Selection issues
Future leaders who migrate may have specific characteristics that make them more prone to democracy, and that would also have made them more prone to democracy had they not migrated.

- 4 Studies abroad make future leaders more prone to democratize?
Positive correlation between studies abroad and democracy during the tenure may attest to a positive impact of foreign studies on the likelihood that the leader democratizes his country.

Two (not mutually exclusive) mechanisms potentially at play:

- Future leaders who study abroad benefit from a higher quality education and thus develop higher skills which make them more prone to democratize.
- “Preference shock”: future leaders who study abroad develop a higher preference for democracy.

Channel 1: Do democracies prefer return migrants?

- It may be the case that countries have different tastes in the selection of their leaders, depending on their level of democracy.
- E.g. Besley & Reynal-Querol (2011) find that democratic countries tend to select more educated leaders.
- Do democratic countries also tend to prefer leaders who studied abroad?
- Interaction between leader's migration experience and the *Initially Autocratic* dummy.

Do democracies prefer return migrants?

<i>Dependent: Polity score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Initially Autocratic	-9.194*** (0.753)	-9.289*** (0.683)	-9.509*** (0.854)	-9.444*** (0.913)
Migration	-0.470 (0.373)			
Initially Autocratic x Migration	1.337* (0.684)			
Mig - Study		-0.148 (0.339)	0.175 (0.374)	0.325 (0.429)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study		1.932*** (0.634)	2.554*** (0.747)	2.332*** (0.762)
Mig - Exile		-0.245 (0.490)	-0.396 (0.515)	-0.697 (0.603)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile		0.925 (0.847)	2.304** (1.112)	2.510** (1.261)
Mig - Diplomacy		-0.755 (0.628)	-0.392 (0.708)	-0.546 (0.779)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy		0.959 (0.904)	0.406 (1.134)	0.618 (1.356)
Mig - Military		-1.232** (0.597)	-1.351*** (0.475)	-0.546 (0.850)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military		1.109 (0.706)	0.764 (0.852)	0.899 (0.880)
Observations	577	577	403	377
R-squared	0.813	0.822	0.840	0.840
Number of countries	125	125	110	106
Leader level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country level controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Country & Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Channel 2: Do future leaders come back when the tide is turning?

- It may be the case that migrants, among which future leaders, come back to their country of origin when it starts democratizing.
- Would enlighten the positive coefficient for *Exile x Initially Autocratic*.
- Control for the average level of democracy during the previous leader's tenure, *Lagged Polity Score*.

Do future leaders come back when the tide is turning?

<i>Dependent: Polity score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Lagged Polity IV	0.124*** (0.0322)	0.116*** (0.0322)	0.0892** (0.0357)	0.100** (0.0409)	0.133** (0.0632)
Initially Autocratic	-8.645*** (0.734)	-8.686*** (0.666)	-9.273*** (0.876)	-9.107*** (0.948)	-9.736*** (1.284)
Migration	-0.248 (0.371)				
Initially Autocratic x Migration	1.069 (0.685)				
Mig - Study		-0.234 (0.342)	-0.197 (0.334)	-0.151 (0.367)	-0.137 (0.340)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study		1.898*** (0.710)	2.365*** (0.762)	1.993*** (0.759)	2.413*** (0.669)
Mig - Exile		0.206 (0.427)	0.154 (0.479)	-0.134 (0.545)	0.0373 (0.415)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile		-0.150 (0.737)	0.697 (0.928)	0.705 (1.103)	0.853 (1.206)
Mig - Diplomacy		-0.490 (0.472)	-0.191 (0.562)	-0.431 (0.654)	-0.760 (0.519)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy		0.331 (0.733)	-0.00709 (1.010)	0.547 (1.190)	1.209 (1.514)
Mig - Military		-0.781 (0.598)	-0.999* (0.506)	0.217 (0.866)	0.0665 (1.156)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military		0.949 (0.687)	0.751 (0.857)	0.812 (0.856)	0.0208 (1.261)
Observations	511	511	373	351	222
AR(1) Test					0.020
AR(2) Test					0.591
Sargan Test					0.077 / 0.998
Number of instruments					101

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$



Do future leaders come back when the tide is turning?

- Controlling for the previous tenure's average level of democracy → more confidence over the fact that the coefficient for studies abroad is not driven by future leaders coming back when the *tide is turning*.
- But introduces an asymmetry in the measure of *Lagged Polity Score*.
- Alternatively, to capture migrants' expectations of democratization:
 - Control for the average level of democracy in the five years preceding the arrival in power.
 - Control for the larger delta in the Polity score in the five years preceding the arrival in power.
 - Exclude from the sample leaders who reached power less than 3 years after coming back (potentially, came back precisely to take power).

Do future leaders come back when the tide is turning?

<i>Dependent: Polity score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Initially Autocratic	-9.045*** (0.957)	-9.211*** (1.016)	-9.922*** (0.958)
Mig - Study	-0.135 (0.376)	-0.165 (0.403)	-0.00911 (0.402)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study	1.959** (0.763)	2.036** (0.790)	2.367*** (0.805)
Mig - Exile	-0.118 (0.543)	-0.139 (0.542)	-0.807 (0.629)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile	0.741 (1.108)	0.498 (1.094)	2.866* (1.483)
Mig - Diplomacy	-0.486 (0.669)	-0.338 (0.664)	-0.725 (0.798)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy	0.568 (1.185)	0.554 (1.231)	2.353* (1.382)
Mig - Military	0.258 (0.852)	0.145 (0.840)	-0.842 (1.131)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military	0.832 (0.849)	0.858 (0.883)	1.211 (0.989)
Polity score average - 5 years	0.117*** (0.0415)		
Polity score gap - 5 years		0.0146 (0.0368)	
Observations	351	351	348
R-squared	0.876	0.871	0.860
Number of countries	103	103	105
Leader level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country & Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, *

Channel 3: The selection into migration

- Leaders who studied abroad possibly have specific characteristics, both correlated with their propensity to migrate and with their openness/preference for democracy.
- It may be the case that these leaders who studied abroad would also have been more prone to democracy, had they not migrated.
- Not feasible to control directly for the unobservable characteristics that are simultaneously correlated with the likelihoods to choose to study abroad and to be democrat.

- Simple test aiming at isolating the choice of migration and the consequences of migration: for each migration experience, introduce a dummy indicating whether the leader migrated before being 15 years old → Plausibly did not choose himself to emigrate.
- Controlling for a dummy indicating whether the leader's father had a skilled profession → Aim: capture the leader's unobserved characteristics that may be inherited from his family.

The selection into migration

<i>Dependent: Polity Score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration Early	-1.017 (1.211)			
Mig - Study Early		1.798* (0.917)	2.082* (1.169)	2.012 [†] (1.553)
Mig - Military Early		-1.594 (2.608)	-4.889** (2.048)	-3.664* (2.033)
Mig - Exile Early		-3.117* (1.611)	-4.906*** (1.393)	-3.530* (1.969)
Father profession skilled	0.805* (0.466)	0.529 (0.526)	1.003** (0.472)	0.936 (0.681)
Observations	326	326	235	217
R-squared	0.605	0.679	0.711	0.751
Number of countries	108	108	91	85
Leader level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country level controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Migration variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country & Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. [†] p -val = 0.198.

- Are we measuring the effective level of democracy during the leader's tenure or rather capturing a larger trend of democratization?
- In initially autocratic countries, studies abroad remain positively and significantly correlated with:
 - The difference between the highest and lowest Polity scores recorded during the tenure (*Polity Gap*);
- The Polity Score measured the year of departure of the leader (*Polity Last*).

▶ Alternative - Gap

▶ Alternative - Last

- No significant correlation between studies abroad and the average Polity Score during the previous leader's tenure (*Lagged Polity score*).

▶ Falsification test

- Nepotism: decision of migration taken while future leaders already know that they have a high probability to reach power.
→ Control for the dummy *Family link*.

▸ Family link

- Geopolitics: if a third country intervenes in the determination of the leader, it may favor the candidate who studied there.
→ Control for the dummy *Foreign imposition*.

▸ Foreign imposition

- By construction, in the data set, each line is a *country*leader* observation.
→ Giving the same weight to each leader, regardless of the time he spent in power.
- Alternative design of the data: each line is a *country*year* observation.
→ Observing each leader as many times as the number of years he spent in power.

Year-level panel

<i>Dependent: Polity Score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration	-0.223 (0.479)			
Mig - Study		0.923** (0.448)	1.347** (0.560)	1.195** (0.601)
Mig - Exile		0.590 (0.527)	1.274** (0.493)	0.471 (0.590)
Mig - Diplomacy		-0.503 (0.664)	-0.0982 (0.827)	-0.175 (0.713)
Mig - Military		-2.608*** (0.632)	-3.853*** (0.678)	-0.821 (1.062)
Observations	4,386	4,386	2,596	2,400
R-squared	0.431	0.471	0.567	0.585
Number of countries	125	125	115	111
Leader level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country level controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Country & Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

- New data on the characteristics of political leaders in the developing world over the 1960-2004 period.
- Positive correlation between the leader having studied abroad and the level of democracy during his leadership.
 - Not due to democracies preferring leaders with a migration experience...
 - ...Nor to future leaders coming back when their country starts democratizing...
 - ...Nor to individual characteristics affecting both the choice of migrating and the likelihood to be democrat.
- Main result confirmed by a range of robustness checks.

→ The emergence of political elites as a new channel through which emigration may affect politics in developing countries.

Thank you!

Differences between leaders who stayed more or less than one year in power

	Difference	(t statistics)	Observations
Woman	-0.0123	(1.06)	932
Age at arrival	-2.224***	(2.74)	926 ^a
Tenure Duration	2590.7***	(-14.63)	932
High Education	-0.0728*	(1.73)	775
Military	-0.0821**	(2.24)	792
Law	-0.00819	(0.25)	792
Eco	-0.00450	(0.20)	792
Health	-0.00700	(0.40)	792
Admin	0.0106	(-0.46)	792
Academics	0.0302	(-1.08)	792
Worker	0.0325**	(-2.20)	792
Religious	-0.00129	(0.14)	792
Scientist	0.00893	(-0.39)	792
Business	0.0211	(-1.24)	792
Migration	0.0437	(-1.11)	786
Mig - Diplomacy	-0.0544*	(1.93)	786
Mig - Study	0.0359	(-0.86)	786
Mig - Exile	0.0484*	(-1.67)	786
Mig - Military	-0.00582	(0.18)	786
Migration Duration	0.747	(-0.65)	373

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

^aThe date of birth of six leaders of the sample are not available.

▸ Sample

Test - Attrition

	Difference	(t statistics)	Observations
Leader-level variables			
Woman	-0.0246	(1.32)	679
Year of arrival	-1.510	(0.77)	679
Tenure Duration	-1759.5***	(4.93)	679
Age at arrival	-0.572	(0.42)	678
Country-level variables			
Africa	-0.116**	(2.05)	679
Asia	0.00297	(-0.05)	679
South America	0.0541	(-0.92)	679
Europe	0.0510	(-1.20)	679
Polity score average	-1.556*	(-1.80)	627
Polity gap	-1.014**	(-2.01)	627
Polity score at arrival	-1.610*	(-1.82)	615

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

▶ Sample

Estimations - Attrition

Treating the 69 leaders for whom we have no information as non-migrants (more plausible that missing values equal 0: we rarely can directly read in a leader's biography that "he never migrated").

<i>Dependent: Polity Score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration	-0.442 (0.425)			
Mig - Study		0.827** (0.411)	1.325*** (0.480)	1.184** (0.506)
Mig - Exile		0.957** (0.440)	1.153*** (0.429)	0.251 (0.531)
Mig - Diplomacy		-0.790 (0.618)	-0.195 (0.698)	-0.363 (0.696)
Mig - Military		-2.788*** (0.681)	-3.873*** (0.759)	0.00578 (1.143)
Constant	1.181 (1.334)	-1.055 (1.352)	-8.459*** (1.985)	2.852 (2.203)
Observations	604	604	417	390
R-squared	0.493	0.539	0.606	0.635
Number of countries	125	125	110	106
Leader level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country level controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Country & Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

<i>Dependent: Polity Gap</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Polity Gap	-0.105** (0.0409)	-0.0959** (0.0408)	-0.105* (0.0546)	-0.131** (0.0585)
Initially Autocratic	1.003 (0.852)	0.574 (0.761)	0.794 (1.273)	0.0501 (1.274)
Migration	0.0619 (0.430)			
Initially Autocratic x Migration	0.377 (0.901)			
Mig - Study		-0.155 (0.475)	-0.391 (0.499)	-0.526 (0.461)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study		1.898** (0.931)	2.155* (1.240)	1.968 [†] (1.306)
Mig - Exile		0.189 (0.667)	0.247 (0.877)	0.738 (0.934)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile		-0.0656 (1.037)	-0.646 (1.349)	0.393 (1.457)
Mig - Diplomacy		0.649 (0.942)	-0.145 (0.873)	-0.0621 (0.822)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy		-0.303 (1.216)	2.135 (1.658)	2.416 (1.686)
Mig - Military		0.355 (0.880)	-0.390 (0.766)	-1.546 (1.491)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military		0.142 (1.301)	1.603 (1.420)	2.124 (1.351)
Observations	511	511	373	351
R-squared	0.280	0.294	0.436	0.495
Number of countries	115	115	105	102

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

[†] p -val = 0.141.

<i>Dependent: Polity last</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Polity Gap	0.0526 (0.0567)	0.0626 (0.0588)	0.0758 (0.0498)	0.0850 (0.0591)
Initially Autocratic	-7.238*** (1.329)	-7.619*** (1.206)	-6.814*** (1.701)	-6.678*** (1.835)
Migration	-0.656 (0.606)			
Initially Autocratic x Migration	1.818 (1.149)			
Mig - Study		-0.825 (0.521)	-0.901* (0.532)	-0.855 (0.569)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study		3.368*** (1.127)	4.077*** (1.384)	3.829*** (1.385)
Mig - Exile		0.0638 (0.807)	0.838 (0.747)	0.635 (0.771)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile		-0.891 (1.257)	-1.075 (1.447)	-1.098 (1.562)
Mig - Diplomacy		-1.341 (1.021)	-0.910 (1.041)	-1.133 (1.120)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy		1.826 (1.436)	0.665 (1.639)	1.612 (1.957)
Mig - Military		-0.755 (0.806)	-0.882 (0.755)	-0.394 (1.552)
Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military		1.536 (1.062)	1.600 (1.338)	2.008 (1.349)
Observations	511	511	373	351
R-squared	0.589	0.604	0.615	0.639
Number of countries	115	115	105	102

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

<i>Dependent: Polity Score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration	-0.443 (0.445)			
Mig - Study		0.764* (0.440)	1.370*** (0.492)	1.273** (0.501)
Mig - Exile		0.952** (0.431)	1.050** (0.445)	0.0394 (0.522)
Mig - Diplomacy		-0.801 (0.618)	-0.351 (0.779)	-0.523 (0.759)
Mig - Military		-2.714*** (0.690)	-3.937*** (0.780)	0.0860 (1.227)
Family Link	0.493 (0.473)	0.423 (0.534)	-0.307 (0.661)	-0.441 (0.672)
Observations	577	577	403	377
R-squared	0.511	0.554	0.614	0.644
Number of countries	125	125	110	106
Leader level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country & Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

<i>Dependent: Polity Score</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migration	-0.441 (0.449)			
Mig - Study		0.771* (0.443)	1.365*** (0.490)	1.277** (0.500)
Mig - Exile		0.998** (0.429)	1.021** (0.442)	-0.0165 (0.505)
Mig - Diplomacy		-0.843 (0.612)	-0.309 (0.759)	-0.476 (0.750)
Mig - Military		-2.716*** (0.695)	-3.900*** (0.803)	0.116 (1.263)
Foreign Imposition	0.240 (1.519)	-0.779 (1.561)	0.681 (2.179)	1.117 (2.146)
Observations	577	577	403	377
R-squared	0.510	0.554	0.614	0.644
Number of countries	125	125	110	106
Leader level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Profession dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country & Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust SE in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.