Women and political change: Evidence from the Egyptian revolution



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Introduction

- Objective

- Analyze the effects of the 2011 Egyptian revolution on the relative labor market conditions of women and men

- Empirical methodology

- Unique measure of the intensity of the revolution (demonstrators who died during the protests)
- Panel data: information before and during political unrest

Introduction (2)

- Results

- 1. Reduction of the gender gap in labor force participation
- 2. Intra-household risk sharing as most likely mechanism
- 3. Women in households at the bottom of the pre-revolution income distribution

Introduction (3)

- Relevance of the results

- Several countries are experiencing in recent years a wave of protests, known as the "Arab Spring"
- Shed light on how these political changes in the Arab World are shaping the gender gap in the labor market
- Egypt is a country with a large segregation by gender (United Nations, 2013; World Economic Forum, 2013)
- Empowering women may benefit economic development (Duflo, 2012; United Nations, 2005)

Introduction (4)


- Relevance of the results (continued)

- Short term relevant temporary shocks to the labor division between women and men can have long term consequences on the role of women in society
- Related literature on labor force participation:
 - Goldin, C. (1991). "The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women's Employment", American Economic Review, vol. 81(4), pp. 741-756.
 - Acemoglu, A., Autor, D. H. and D. Lyle (2004). "Women, War, and Wages: The Effect of Female Labor Supply on the Wage Structure at Midcentury", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112(3), pp. 497-551.
 - Teso, E. (2014) "The Long-Term Effect of Demographic Shocks on the Evolution of Gender Roles: Evidence from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade", mimeo.
 - Grosjean, P. and R. Khattar (2014). "It's Raining Men! Hallelujah?", mimeo.

Data

		All sa	ımple			Fem	ales			Ma	les	
VARIABLES	Initial mean of outcome	Std. Dev.	Mean of change in outcome	Std. Dev.	Initial mean of outcome	Std. Dev.	Mean of change in outcome	Std. Dev.	Initial mean of outcome	Std. Dev.	Mean of change in outcome	Std. Dev.
Labor force participation	0.583	0.493	0.048	0.459	0.293	0.455	0.000	0.498	0.817	0.386	0.086	0.420
Unemployment	0.041	0.198	0.005	0.273	0.051	0.219	0.014	0.306	0.033	0.178	-0.002	0.243
Employment	0.542	0.498	0.043	0.443	0.243	0.429	-0.013	0.428	0.785	0.411	0.088	0.449
Wage work	0.348	0.476	0.070	0.449	0.129	0.335	0.026	0.271	0.525	0.499	0.106	0.551
Employer/ Self-employed	0.134	0.340	-0.004	0.338	0.043	0.203	-0.016	0.229	0.207	0.405	0.005	0.406
Unpaid family work	0.154	0.361	-0.060	0.372	0.273	0.446	-0.101	0.475	0.057	0.233	-0.027	0.256
Formal sector employment	0.221	0.415	0.023	0.317	0.111	0.315	0.016	0.217	0.321	0.467	0.032	0.402
Informal sector employment	0.274	0.446	-0.008	0.399	0.107	0.309	-0.058	0.306	0.427	0.495	0.048	0.478
Public sector employment	0.182	0.386	0.0113	0.287	0.108	0.311	0.014	0.212	0.241	0.428	0.009	0.336
Private sector employment	0.360	0.480	0.031	0.441	0.134	0.341	-0.029	0.385	0.543	0.498	0.079	0.476
Log of real hourly wage	0.829	0.791	0.188	0.896	1.041	1.030	0.012	1.070	0.787	0.727	0.223	0.853
Log of real monthly wage	3.889	2.980	1.111	2.318	3.133	3.021	0.350	1.137	4.078	2.939	1.240	2.440
Hours of work/week	46.640	18.030	-1.370	19.630	30.120	17.750	4.323	18.550	50.790	15.560	-2.290	19.650

Data on demonstrators who died during the protests ("martyrs")



Stylized facts




Figure 1. The numbers of martyrs, injured and arrested from February 2011 to June 2013 Notes: Data source is the Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution.

Specification and methodology

• Difference-in-Differences specification

1.
$$Y_{igt} = \alpha_1 martyrs_g \ x \ 2012_t \ x \ female_i + \alpha_2 martyrs_g \ x \ 2012_t + \alpha_3 martyrs_g \ x \ female_i + \alpha_4 2012_t \ x \ female_i + \alpha_5 X_{it} + \beta_i + \beta_g + 2012_t + \varepsilon_{igt}$$

- First-differenced parsimonious specification
- 2. $\Delta Y_{ig} = \alpha_1 martyrs_g \ x \ female_i + \alpha_2 martyrs_g + \alpha_4 female_i + \alpha_5 \Delta X_i + \beta_0 + u_{ig}$

Identification strategy

- Econometric challenges

- Measurement error in the number of "martyrs" variable
- Unobserved time-varying labor market shocks at the governorate level
- Inverse causality

- IV approach

- Distance to Cairo City as instrument for the number of "martyrs"
- Political participation is spatially or geographically clustered (Mutz, 2002; McClurg, 2003; Cho and Rudolph, 2008)

Evidence on the relevance of the instrumental variable




Figure 5. Participation in the presidential elections and the distance to the Capital Cairo.

Threats to identification (2)

- **Pre-revolution governorate controls** (interacted with the female dummy):
 - 1. share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006
 - 2. number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants
 - 3. the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006
 - 4. natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006
 - 5. dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said)

Results: labor market outcomes

	-	Table 5: Labo	or Force P	articipation	, Unemployı	nent and En	nployment					
	I	abor Force Pa	articipation	<u> </u>		Unemp	loyment			Employr	nent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
VARIABLES	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Martyrs × female	0.018***	0.094***	0.005	0.121***	0.002	0.021***	0.012	0.063***	0.016***	0.073***	-0.007	0.058*
	[0.006]	[0.022]	[0.011]	[0.038]	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.017]	[0.005]	[0.021]	[0.009]	[0.034]
Martyrs	-0.010***	-0.018***	-0.002	-0.026*	-0.004**	-0.003	-0.008**	-0.011	-0.006**	-0.015**	0.007	-0.014
	[0.002]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.015]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.017]
Observations	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434
R-squared	0.161	0.130	0.170	0.156	0.053	0.045	0.055	0.045	0.149	0.132	0.158	0.154
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution governorate controls			YES	YES			YES	YES			YES	YES
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.127	0.000	0.775	0.005	0.482	0.004	0.541	0.000	0.013	0.002	0.914	0.138
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		26.283		50.642		26.283		50.642		26.283		50.642
Robust standard errors in brackets												
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	_											

Results: labor market outcomes (2)

	Table A3: Publ	ic and private	sectors em	ployment				
	·	Private sector e	employment			Public sector	employment	t
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
VARIABLES	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Martyrs × female	0.013**	0.066***	-0.011	0.056*	0.003	0.008	0.004	0.004
N	[0.006]	[0.020]	[0.010]	[0.033]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.017]
Martyrs	-0.002	-0.002	0.013*	0.003	-0.005	-0.013**	-0.006	-0.017
	[0.005]	[800.0]	[0.007]	[0.017]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.014]
Observations	12,399	12,399	12,399	12,399	12,399	12,399	12,399	12,399
R-squared	0.069	0.048	0.079	0.073	0.091	0.089	0.093	0.092
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution governorate controls			YES	YES			YES	YES
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.009	0.000	0.843	0.035	0.393	0.124	0.606	0.234
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		26.352		50.600		26.352		50.600

Robust standard errors in brackets

^{***} p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robustness checks

- Robustness checks:
 - Number of injured as alternative measure of revolution intensity
 - Number of arrested as alternative measure of revolution intensity
 - Placebo regressions
 - Eliminating the capital Cairo (where there are most public sector employment opportunities) → larger increase in women's employment

Results: Robustness Checks

Table 11: Ro	bustness checks usi	ng other meas	ures of the rev	olution		
Pane	l A: Using the numb	er of injured b	y governorate			
		or Force				
	Parti	cipation	Unempl	loyment	Emple	yment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Injured × female	0.000	0.008***	0.000*	0.004***	-0.000	0.005**
	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.002]
Injured	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000***	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Observations	11,913	11,913	11,913	11,913	11,913	11,913
R-squared	0.169	0.115	0.055	0.028	0.159	0.138
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.927	0.002	0.785	0.000	0.921	0.043
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		12.997		12.997		12.997

Panel	B: Using the numbe		by governorate	ė	•	•
		r Force cipation	Unomn	loyment	Emple	yment
		•		•		
VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Arrested × female	-0.001	0.044**	0.002	0.023***	-0.003*	0.021
	[0.002]	[0.018]	[0.001]	[0.008]	[0.002]	[0.015]
Arrested	0.000	-0.010	-0.001*	-0.005	0.002**	-0.006
	[0.001]	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Observations	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434
R-squared	0.170	0.113	0.055	0.014	0.158	0.142
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.807	0.024	0.543	0.003	0.444	0.183
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		6.169		6.169		6.169

Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results: Robustness Checks (2)

Panel A: Using the nu	Labor Fore			volution								
		Panel A: Using the number of martyrs during first 18 days of revolution Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment										
	(1)	e Participation	Unemp	loyment	Emplo	yment						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)						
VARIABLES	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV						
Martyrs (periodl) × female	0.016	0.173***	0.020*	0.090***	-0.004	0.083*						
	[0.017]	[0.052]	[0.011]	[0.024]	[0.013]	[0.048]						
Martyrs (periodl)	-0.001	-0.036*	-0.011*	-0.016	0.010	-0.020						
	[0.007]	[0.021]	[0.006]	[0.015]	[0.008]	[0.024]						
Observations	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434						
R-squared	0.170	0.158	0.055	0.046	0.158	0.155						
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.288	0.004	0.296	0.000	0.550	0.132						
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		38.213		38.213		38.213						
Panel B: Using the nu	mber of mart	yrs from Febru:	ary 2011 to J	une 2012								
Martyrs (period2) × female	-0.028	0.406***	0.021	0.211***	-0.049*	0.195						
	[0.033]	[0.138]	[0.022]	[0.062]	[0.027]	[0.120]						
Martyrs (period2)	-0.011	-0.088*	-0.026**	-0.039	0.016	-0.049						
	[0.014]	[0.050]	[0.012]	[0.036]	[0.016]	[0.057]						
Observations	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434	12,434						
R-squared	0.170	0.147	0.055	0.039	0.158	0.151						
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.182	0.010	0.768	0.001	0.115	0.154						
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		24.993		24.993		24.993						
	Panel C: Elin	minating Cairo										
Martyrs × female	0.054	0.263***	0.012	0.120***	0.042	0.143**						
	[0.040]	[0.080]	[0.015]	[0.041]	[0.036]	[0.070]						
Martyrs	-0.003	-0.048	0.000	-0.009	-0.003	-0.038						
	[0.015]	[0.030]	[800.0]	[0.021]	[0.015]	[0.034]						
Observations	11,428	11,428	11,428	11,428	11,428	11,428						
R-squared	0.155	0.149	0.050	0.043	0.150	0.149						
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.131	0.003	0.357	0.002	0.186	0.096						
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		16.206		16.206		16.206						
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES						
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES						
Pre-revolution governorate controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES						
Robust standard errors in brackets												
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1												

Falsification Test: Placebo Regressions

Table A4: Placebo regression-The impact of future revolution on individuals' labor market outcomes in 1998-2006

	Labor Force participation	Unemploy- ment	Employ- ment	Wage work	Employer/ Self- employed	Unpaid family work	Formal sector emp.	Informal sector emp.	Public sector emp.	Private sector emp.	Log of monthly wage	Log of hourly wage	Hours worked/ week
VARIABLES	(1) IV	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4) IV	(5) IV	(6) IV	(7) IV	(8) IV	(9) IV	(10) IV	(11) IV	(12) IV	(13) IV
Martyrs × female	-0.024	-0.065**	0.041	-0.020	0.036	0.120	0.017	-0.045	0.031	0.024	-0.193	-0.137	-2.747
	[0.064]	[0.029]	[0.069]	[0.036]	[0.031]	[0.094]	[0.044]	[0.043]	[0.034]	[0.069]	[0.148]	[0.132]	[1.930]
Martyrs	0.021	0.028	-0.006	0.015	-0.015	-0.009	-0.026	0.055	-0.040	0.018	0.004	-0.036	1.468
	[0.023]	[0.017]	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.033]	[0.041]	[0.028]	[0.036]	[0.085]	[0.053]	[1.502]
Observations	5,355	5,355	5,355	5,355	5,355	5,355	3,855	3,855	5,339	5,339	1,517	1,517	1,517
R-squared	0.241	0.109	0.171	0.207	0.079	0.018	0.162	0.061	0.125	0.081	0.144	0.106	0.046
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution gov. controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.966	0.089	0.560	0.815	0.285	0.200	0.575	0.436	0.583	0.454	0.188	0.204	0.407
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat.	14.648	14.648	14.648	14.648	14.648	14.648	14.968	14.968	14.464	14.464	20.754	20.754	20.754

Robust standard errors in brackets

^{***} p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Results: Heterogeneity of the effects

- Results: Heterogeneity of the effects
 - Income
 - Education
 - Religion

Results: Heterogeneity of the effects

Table 8: Labor Force Participation decision Panel A: By sample distribution of per capita household income										
Panel A: By sample di		capita househol								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)						
VARIABLES	lst quartile	2nd quartile	3rd quartile	4th quartile						
Martyrs × female	0.118**	0.238**	0.058	0.024						
	[0.058]	[0.099]	[0.058]	[0.040]						
Martyrs	-0.029	-0.025	0.014	-0.034*						
	[0.027]	[0.046]	[0.024]	[0.020]						
Observations	4,486	2,623	2,624	2,701						
R-squared	0.158	0.111	0.148	0.292						
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES						
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES						
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES						
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.092	0.014	0.158	0.761						
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	24.518	13.698	37.143	27.820						
•	•	•		•						
Panel B	: By educational a									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)						
VARIABLES	No educ.	Prim/Prep	Secondary	Above sec.						
Martyrs × female	0.125	0.098*	0.177***	0.045						
Martyrs ~ lemale	[0.080]	[0.052]	[0.053]	[0.050]						
Martine	-0.023	-0.038	-0.037	-0.008						
Martyrs	[0.026]	[0.039]	[0.027]	[0.015]						
	[0.026]	[0.039]	[0.027]	[0.013]						
Observations	3,868	2,404	4,201	1,961						
R-squared	0.104	0.230	0.182	0.183						
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES						
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES						
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES						
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.145	0.107	0.001	0.440						
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	17.282	39.142	31.823	30.664						
The state of the s										
Robust standard errors in brackets										

Results: Heterogeneity of the effects

Panel A: By sample d	istribution of per	capita househol	d income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	lst quartile	2nd quartile	3rd quartile	4th quartile
Montan v Comple	0.082***	0 145***	0.029	0.030
Martyrs × female	0.002	0.2.0	[0.029	[0.026]
Marken	[0.029] -0.018	[0.055] -0.000	-0.007	-0.016
Martyrs	0.010	0.000		0.020
	[0.019]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.015]
Observations	4,486	2,623	2,624	2,701
R-squared	0.054	-0.010	0.075	0.068
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
TT . 0 (D 1)	0.007	0.003	0.281	0.553
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.007	0.003	0.201	0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	24.518 3: By educational a	13.698	37.143	27.820
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	24.518	13.698	0.202	
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B	24.518 By educational a	13.698	37.143	27.820
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES	24.518 By educational a (1) No educ.	13.698 attainment (2) Prim/Prep	37.143 (3) Sec.	27.820 (4) Above Sec
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES	24.518 By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015	13.698 attainment (2) Prim/Prep 0.045*	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133***	(4) Above Sec 0.074*
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES Martyrs × female	24.518 By educational a (1) No educ.	13.698 attainment (2) Prim/Prep 0.045* [0.027]	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133*** [0.038]	(4) Above Sec 0.074* [0.040]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES Martyrs × female	24.518 3: By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015 [0.014]	13.698 attainment (2) Prim/Prep 0.045*	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133***	(4) Above Sec 0.074*
VARIABLES Martyrs × female Martyrs	24.518 3: By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015 [0.014] -0.008 [0.012]	13.698 (2) Prim/Prep 0.045* [0.027] -0.016 [0.021]	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133*** [0.038] -0.010 [0.022]	(4) Above Sec 0.074* [0.040] -0.002 [0.017]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES Martyrs × female Martyrs Observations	24.518 3: By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015 [0.014] -0.008 [0.012] 3,868	13.698 Attainment (2) Prim/Prep 0.045* [0.027] -0.016 [0.021] 2,404	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133*** [0.038] -0.010 [0.022] 4,201	27.820 (4) Above Sec 0.074* [0.040] -0.002 [0.017] 1,961
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES Martyrs × female Martyrs Observations R-squared	24.518 3: By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015 [0.014] -0.008 [0.012] 3,868 0.020	13.698 **Containment** (2) Prim/Prep 0.045* [0.027] -0.016 [0.021] 2,404 0.107	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133*** [0.038] -0.010 [0.022] 4,201 0.033	27.820 (4) Above Sec 0.074* [0.040] -0.002 [0.017] 1,961 0.045
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES Martyrs × female Martyrs Observations R-squared Individual Controls	24.518 3: By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015 [0.014] -0.008 [0.012] 3,868 0.020 YES	13.698 Attainment (2) Prim/Prep 0.045* [0.027] -0.016 [0.021] 2,404 0.107 YES	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133*** [0.038] -0.010 [0.022] 4,201 0.033 YES	(4) Above Sec 0.074* [0.040] -0.002 [0.017] 1,961 0.045 YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES Martyrs × female Martyrs Observations R-squared Individual Controls Household Controls	24.518 3: By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015 [0.014] -0.008 [0.012] 3,868 0.020 YES YES	13.698 Attainment (2) Prim/Prep 0.045* [0.027] -0.016 [0.021] 2,404 0.107 YES YES	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133*** [0.038] -0.010 [0.022] 4,201 0.033 YES YES	27.820 (4) Above Sec 0.074* [0.040] -0.002 [0.017] 1,961 0.045 YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic Panel B VARIABLES Martyrs × female	24.518 3: By educational a (1) No educ. 0.015 [0.014] -0.008 [0.012] 3,868 0.020 YES	13.698 Attainment (2) Prim/Prep 0.045* [0.027] -0.016 [0.021] 2,404 0.107 YES	37.143 (3) Sec. 0.133*** [0.038] -0.010 [0.022] 4,201 0.033 YES	(4) Above Sec 0.074* [0.040] -0.002 [0.017] 1,961 0.045 YES

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Results:
Labor Market Outcomes by religious groups

Table A1: Labor Force	Participation, unen	nployment and	l employmei	nt by religious	groups	
	Labor Force	Participation	Unemp	oloyment	Empl	oyment
	(1) IV	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4) IV	(5) IV	(6) IV
VARIABLES	Muslims	Christians	Muslims	Christians	Muslims	Christians
Martyrs × female	0.186*** [0.062]	-0.336 [0.298]	0.067**	0.019 [0.130]	0.119** [0.056]	-0.355 [0.308]
Martyrs	0.004 [0.021]	0.216 [0.211]	0.017 [0.013]	0.106 [0.102]	-0.013 [0.022]	0.110 [0.183]
Observations	5,977	429	5,977	429	5,977	429
R-squared	0.050	0.076	0.027	0.028	0.125	0.123
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.002	0.528	0.003	0.282	0.037	0.209
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	27.822	2.038	27.822	2.038	27.822	2.038

Robust standard errors in brackets

^{***} p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results: mechanisms (1)

• The revolution has negatively affected men's remuneration and increased its volatility

• Intra-household risk sharing mechanism



Increase in women's labor force participation

Results: mechanisms (2)

Table	9: Monthly, Hourly wa	ages and hours	worked per v	veek		
	Log of m	onthly wage	Log of h	ourly wage	Hours we	orked/week
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Martyrs × female	-0.035	0.169**	0.011	0.150	-0.044	3.343**
-	[0.029]	[0.085]	[0.043]	[0.111]	[0.785]	[1.638]
Martyrs	0.004	-0.118**	-0.002	-0.149**	-0.883**	-3.444***
	[0.016]	[0.055]	[0.021]	[0.069]	[0.436]	[1.274]
Observations	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409
R-squared	0.152	0.125	0.105	0.088	0.048	0.034
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pre-revolution governorate controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
H_0 : $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.213	0.462	0.826	0.987	0.168	0.938
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		46.190		46.190		46.190

Robust standard errors in brackets

^{***} p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results: mechanisms (3)

Ta	able 10: Variano	e of monthly wa	nge				
	monthl	nce of log y wage oation)	Log varian monthly (occupation &	wage .	Log variance of log monthly wage (occupation & gender)		
VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	
Martyrs × female	0.013***	-0.032** [0.015]	0.010 [0.014]	-0.069* [0.038]	-0.048*** [0.018]	-0.011 [0.047]	
Martyrs	0.008***	0.019** [0.007]	0.026***	0.041** [0.018]	0.005** [0.002]	0.017** [0.007]	
Observations	5,774	5,774	5,774	5,774	5,774	5,774	
R-squared	0.228	0.208	0.120	0.110	0.703	0.699	
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Pre-revolution governorate controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
$H_0: \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$ (P-value)	0.000	0.384	0.009	0.491	0.014	0.900	
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		50.829		50.829		50.829	

Robust standard errors in brackets

^{***} p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results: mechanisms (4)

Online Appendix Table 6: Female labor force participation				
	Labor I	or Force participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
VARIABLES	OLS	OLS	OLS	
Husband's monthly wage	-0.022***		-0.022***	
	[0.005]		[0.005]	
The variance of husband's monthly wage		0.010	0.002	
		[0.010]	[0.010]	
Observations	3,708	3,708	3,708	
R-squared	0.037	0.031	0.037	
Individual Controls	YES	YES	YES	
Household Controls	YES	YES	YES	
Pre-revolution governorate controls	YES	YES	YES	
Robust standard errors in brackets				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

Concluding remarks

- The Egyptian revolution has reduced the gender gap in labor force participation mainly through:
 - An increase in women's private sector employment
 - An increase in women's unemployment
- Intra-household risk sharing as most likely mechanism: The revolution has negatively affected men's remuneration and increased its volatility
- Short-term effect, but a relevant temporary shock to the labor division between women and men can have long run consequences on the role of women in society