

“International labor mobility and inequality across nations”  
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# Immigration, Search Frictions and Redistribution

## A Quantitative Welfare Analysis

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# The Economic Effects of Immigration on Natives

## Welfare and distribution effects of exogenous labour mobility

- **Wage effects**

Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012, ...

*No labour market frictions or redistribution*

- **Employment effects**

Felbermayr et al., 2010; Chassamboulli and Palivos, 2014

*Reduced form, no fiscal redistribution*

- **Fiscal effects**

Razin et al. 2011; Dustmann and Frattini, 2013

*No complementarity effects, no interaction between labour market effects and redistribution.*

# Outline and Findings

- 1 **Data**: cross-country heterogeneity in labour market outcomes and relevant institutions
- 2 **Flexible unified G.E. framework** : search frictions, factor complementarity, redistribution
  - ⇒ Immigrants can grease the wheels of labour market
  - ⇒ Negative fiscal effects can be compensated by beneficial effects on labour market
- 3 **Quantitative analysis for 20 OECD countries**, capturing strong cross-country heterogeneity
  - ⇒ Highly heterogeneous effects for natives
  - ⇒ Labour market frictions are important
  - ⇒ Positive migration effects despite redistribution


# Our Data

We use data from 20 OECD countries: 16 EU countries, plus the US, Canada, Australia and Switzerland. On average:

- (Legal) immigrants are 17 percent of the labour force
- The immigrant wage gap is 18 percent
- Large **heterogeneity**

# Heterogeneity in Migrant Share


Share of foreign born in the labour force



Data sources: Eurostat, Canadian and US Census, HILDA.


# Heterogeneity in Skill Composition

Share of high skilled workers



High-skilled are ISCED 5+6; shares in labour force. Sources: LFSs, US Census, HILDA.


# Heterogeneity in Wage Gaps



2005-2011 averages. Sources: EU-SILC, US and Canadian Census, HILDA

# Heterogeneity in Unemployment Rates

## Low skilled workers




2005-2011 averages. Sources: LFSs, US Census, HILDA.



# Heterogeneity in Unemployment Rates

## High skilled workers



2005-2011 averages. Sources: LFSs, US Census, HILDA.

# Making sense of this heterogeneity

## Conventional wisdom

- Immigration into 'sclerotic' labour markets drives up unemployment
  - Nowhere wages are really fully rigid
  - In imperfect labour markets, immigrants may actually 'grease the wheels' of the labour market
- High-skilled immigration is always preferable
  - Notion derived from a purely fiscal view of immigration
  - 'Diversity effect' and 'fiscal burden' effects should both been taken into account
- Existence of native welfare gain implies existence of losers
  - Notion derived from a pure production side view
  - Pareto gains possible in presence of distortions

# Our Model: Production

Production similar to Acemoglu 2001 and others

Perfect competition in **production**.

- Cobb Douglas production function between capital  $K$  and input  $Z$ :

$$Y = AK^\alpha Z^{1-\alpha}, \alpha \in (0, 1)$$

- Input  $Z$ : CES production function of intermediate inputs

$$Z = [xY_L^\rho + (1-x)Y_H^\rho]^{1/\rho}, \rho \in (0, 1), x \in (0, 1)$$

- Linear production of intermediate inputs

$$Y_i = \sum_j (1 - u_{ij}) Q_{ij}, i = \{H, L\}, j = \{N, I\},$$

# Our Model: Labour

Random matching à la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)

$N$  and  $I$  equally productive, but with different flow value of leisure  $b_{ij} + h_{ij}$ , with  $h_{iN} = 0$ ,  $h_{iI} \leq 0$  and split rates  $s_{ij}$

▶ Asset equations

**Free entry condition** For each skill  $i \in \{H, L\}$

$$\underbrace{\frac{c_i}{q(\theta_i)}}_{[1]} - \sum_{j \in \{N, I\}} \underbrace{\phi_{ij}}_{[2]} \underbrace{\frac{p_i - w_{ij}}{r + s_{ij}}}_{[3]} = 0$$

[1] Expected hiring costs, increasing in  $\theta_i$

[2] Probability that the match is with either  $N$  or  $I$

[3] Expected job rent from the match.

⇒ Migration may affect expected job rents and hence incentives for job creation

# Our Model: Wages

- Share of  $\beta$  of surplus going to the workers
- Wage a weighted average of gross surplus  $p_i$  and outside option  $(b_{ij} + h_{ij})$

$$w_{ij} = \beta \tilde{D}_{ij}(\theta_i) p_i + (1 - \beta) D_{ij}(\theta_i) (b_{ij} + h_{ij})$$

where

$$D_{ij}(\theta_i) \equiv \frac{r + s_{ij}}{(r + s_{ij})(1 - t + t\beta) + \beta \theta_i q(\theta_i)}$$

$$\tilde{D}_{ij}(\theta_i) \equiv D_{ij}(\theta_i) \left( 1 + \frac{\theta_i q(\theta_i)}{r + s_{ij}} \right)$$

with  $D'_{ij}(\theta_i) < 0$ , and  $\tilde{D}'_{ij}(\theta_i) > 0$  since  $[\theta_i q(\theta_i)]' > 0$

# Our Model: Government and Welfare

- Proportional tax on labour income to finance unemployment benefits and public good provision:

$$t \left( \sum_i \sum_j (1 - u_{ij}) Q_{ij} w_{ij} \right) \geq \sum_i \sum_j b_{ij} u_{ij} Q_{ij} + G$$

where  $G \equiv g \sum_i \sum_j Q_{ij}$

- Average welfare of native workers

$$\mathcal{W}_N = \underbrace{y_N}_{[1]} + \underbrace{R_N}_{[2]} + \underbrace{\tilde{g}}_{[3]}$$

where

[1]  $y_N$  is net employment and unemployment income

[2]  $R_N$  is capital income

[3]  $\tilde{g} = g + v(\bar{G})$  with  $v(\bar{G})$  normalized to zero

# Equilibrium

Our model has ten equilibrium conditions

- two free entry conditions
- two market clearing conditions
- one condition for capital returns
- four wage equations
- one government budget constraint

pinning down ten endogenous variables

- two prices  $p_i$
- two market tightness parameters  $\theta_i$
- the level of the capital stock
- four wages  $w_{ij}$
- one tax rate  $t$

# How immigrants affect natives?

- 1 **Complementarity Channel** (Borjas 2003): Immigrants increases native real income since marginal productivity is lower than their average contribution.
- 2 **Job Creation Channel** (Chassamboulli and Palivos 2014): Immigrants and natives have different wages and unemployment rates. Migration affects vacancy creation.
- 3 **Fiscal Channel** (Dustmann and Frattini 2013): Immigrants pay taxes, receive transfers and public goods.



# Quantitative Exercises

## Parameterisation:

- Parameters from data and literature ▶ Parameters
- 11 Matched Moments for each country ▶ Matched Moments
- 11 country-specific Parameters ▶ Calibrated Parameters

## Counterfactual Scenarios:

- 1 **Ex ante scenario:** Incremental immigration. What if the stock of migrants increased by 1 percentage point?
- 2 **Ex post scenario:** Gains from immigration. What if the existing stock of migrants were zero?
- 3 **Actual flows:** Effects of 2000-2011 flows (see draft)

# Ex ante Scenario

## Adding 1 percentage point

After calibrating the model, we increase the stock of immigrants by one percentage point, for different models. We look at welfare effects of natives (and immigrants)

	US			France		
	$\mathcal{W}_N$	$\mathcal{W}_{LN}$	$\mathcal{W}_{HN}$	$\mathcal{W}_N$	$\mathcal{W}_{LN}$	$\mathcal{W}_{HN}$
<b>Model 1:</b> complementarity	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	0.09
<b>Model 2:</b> + wage gaps	0.04	0.08	0.00	0.07	0.04	0.12
<b>Model 3:</b> + unempl. gaps	0.04	0.08	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.08
<b>Model 4:</b> + $b_{ij}$	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.10
<b>Model 5:</b> + $g$	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.05

## Ex post Scenario: Total Gains from migration

Here we compare status quo with a hypothetical autarky scenario, for our 20 countries (model 5):

Countries	$\mathcal{W}_N$	$\mathcal{W}_{LN}$	$\mathcal{W}_{HN}$
Australia	0.24	1.26	-1.72
Canada	1.19	1.79	-0.57
France	0.77	0.52	1.27
Germany	0.31	-0.07	1.23
Italy	1.87	1.64	2.97
Spain	1.90	0.96	3.43
United Kingdom	0.35	-0.22	1.10
United States	0.80	0.97	0.53
Average	1.08	1.00	1.25
Median	0.99	1.10	1.19

# Lessons from our Quantitative Exercises

- Incremental immigration benefits natives on average in most countries
- In the majority of countries, Pareto gains
- Total gains are positive, 1.1 percent on average
- 'Greasing' effect is quantitatively important, can outweigh negative 'fiscal burden' effect

# Monte Carlo-type Simulations

- Create 10,000 artificial economies, i.i.d. drawing from (truncated)  $\mathcal{N}(\mu^k, \sigma^k)$  where  $k$  denotes a given moment  $X_k$  and  $\mu^k, \sigma^k$  are sample statistics
- Calibrate our model for each economy to match the moments, outcome for ex ante scenario
- Run 'moment' regressions

$$W_{iN} = \sum_k \beta_k \ln X_{ik} + u_i$$

## Native Welfare Gains: Moment regression

Dependent variable: Welfare Gains of Natives from one 1% point increase in immigrant stock			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Low skilled	High skilled
Low Skilled Immigrant Wage Gap	0.062*** [6.50]	0.057*** [6.04]	0.062*** [7.38]
High Skilled Immigrant Wage Gap	0.024** [2.52]	0.019** [2.03]	0.034*** [3.98]
Unemployment Rate: Low Skilled Natives	0.166*** [17.24]	0.128*** [13.70]	0.227*** [26.91]
Unemployment Rate: Low Skilled Immigrants	-0.100*** [-10.41]	-0.067*** [-7.13]	-0.172*** [-20.34]
Unemployment Rate: High Skilled Natives	0.055*** [5.74]	0.039*** [4.21]	0.082*** [9.70]
Unemployment Rate: High Skilled Immigrants	-0.030*** [-3.14]	-0.027*** [-2.86]	-0.027*** [-3.17]
Share of immigrants	-0.108*** [-11.30]	-0.089*** [-9.53]	-0.139*** [-16.44]
Share of Low Skilled among immigrants	-0.098*** [-10.24]	-0.244*** [-26.01]	0.362*** [42.81]
Share of Low Skilled among natives	0.076*** [7.89]	0.161*** [17.19]	-0.186*** [-21.94]
Replacement Rate	0.042*** [4.34]	0.028*** [3.04]	0.065*** [7.72]
Government Expenditures	-0.034*** [-3.56]	-0.030*** [-3.18]	-0.026*** [-3.10]
Per capita GDP	0.064*** [6.68]	0.062*** [6.59]	0.055*** [6.48]
Observations	10,000	10,000	10,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.082	0.126	0.288

All regressors are in natural logarithms.

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in brackets; \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Artificial economies obtained with i.i.d. sampling.

# Moment Regression

- Positive effects of higher replacement rates
- Native unemployment makes immigration more beneficial, immigrant unemployment the opposite
- Generous public goods provision lowers advantages from immigration, but effects are small
- Non-linearity: negative marginal returns (Collier 2013)

▶ Parameter Regression

▶ Joint sampling

## Native Welfare Gains: Variance Decomposition

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Natives	Low skilled	High skilled
Wage Gaps	4.83%	2.42%	1.63%
Unemployment Rates	52.46%	19.21%	31.39%
Migrant Share and Skills	34.21%	74.28%	63.80%
Public Policy	3.38%	1.16%	1.85%
GDP, premia, cap.share	5.21%	2.92%	1.32%

$R^2$  is set to one in each of the columns, so that rows add up to one.

Artificial economies obtained with i.i.d. sampling.

- Heterogeneity in unemployment rates and skill composition are very important
- Crucial to consider labour market frictions and public policy when analysing effects of migration



Thank you very much  
for your attention

# Our Model: Asset Equations

Along steady state

- Filled and vacant jobs ( $J_{ij}^F$  and  $J_i^V$ , respectively)

$$rJ_i^V = -c_i + q(\theta_i) \left[ \sum_j \phi_{ij} J_{ij}^F - J_i^V \right]$$

$$rJ_{ij}^F = p_i - w_{ij} - s_{ij} [J_{ij}^F - J_i^V]$$

with  $\phi_{ij} \equiv \frac{U_{ij}}{\sum_k U_{ik}}$

- Employment ( $J_{ij}^E$ ) and unemployment ( $J_{ij}^U$ )

$$rJ_{ij}^U = b_{ij} + h_{ij} + m(\theta_i) [J_{ij}^E - J_{ij}^U]$$

$$rJ_{ij}^E = w_{ij} (1 - t) - s_{ij} [J_{ij}^E - J_{ij}^U]$$

## Parameters taken from available data or the literature

	Description	Mean	s.d.	Source
<i>Parameters without country variation</i>				
$\beta$	worker bargaining power	0.5	n.a.	Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
$\varepsilon$	matching elasticity	0.5	n.a.	Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
$\rho$	substitution elasticity	0.5	n.a.	Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
$r$	interest rate	0.004	n.a.	Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
$\delta$	depreciation rate	0.006	n.a.	Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
$c_L$	cost of low-skilled vacancy	0.421	n.a.	Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
<i>Parameters varying across countries</i>				
$\varrho$	replacement rate	0.39	0.13	OECD Benefits and Wages
$\alpha$	capital share	0.35	0.05	OECD Unit Labor Cost Indicators
$Q_{LN}$	share of low skilled natives	0.72	0.07	Eurostat, Census, HILDA
$Q_{HN}$	share of high skilled natives	0.28	0.07	Eurostat, Census, HILDA
$Q_{LI}$	share of low skilled immig.	0.15	0.08	Eurostat, Census, HILDA
$Q_{HI}$	share of high skilled immig.	0.06	0.05	Eurostat, Census, HILDA

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# Matched moments

Moment	Source	Mean	S.d.
Native wage premium, low-skilled	EU-SILC, Censuses, HILDA	1.18	0.11
Native wage premium, high-skilled	EU-SILC, Censuses, HILDA	1.18	0.15
Return to skill, native workers	EU-SILC, Censuses, HILDA	1.54	0.23
Unempl. rate low-skilled natives	LSFs, CPS, HILDA	0.08	0.04
Unempl. rate low-skilled immigrants	LSFs, CPS, HILDA	0.12	0.05
Unempl. rate high-skilled natives	LSFs, CPS, HILDA	0.04	0.02
Unempl. rate high-skilled immigrants	LSFs, CPS, HILDA	0.08	0.03
Avg. job dur., low-skilled (quarters)	CP (2014)	29.4	n.a.
Avg. job dur., high-skilled (quarters)	CP (2014)	52.6	n.a.
Government Expenditures	IMF	0.45	0.06
Real GDP, US=1 (PPP)	World Bank WDI	0.82	0.29

All shares refer to working age population, aged 15-64.

All the moments above are constructed for each of our 20 countries.

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# Calibrated Model Parameters

## Country-specific parameters

Parameter	Description	Mean	S.d.
$\xi$	Match Efficiency Parameter	0.42	0.18
$A$	Total Factor Productivity	0.57	0.11
$x$	Low Skill Share in Production of Intermediates	0.51	0.05
$c_H$	Cost of high skill vacancy	0.72	0.55
$G$	Public expenditures	0.36	0.12
$s_{LN}$	Break-up rate, low skilled natives	0.03	0.00
$s_{LI}$	Break-up rate, low skilled immigrants	0.05	0.01
$s_{HN}$	Break-up rate, high skilled natives	0.02	0.00
$s_{HI}$	Break-up rate, high skilled immigrants	0.03	0.01
$h_{LI}$	Value of Leisure Discount for low-skilled Immigrants	-0.97	1.09
$h_{HI}$	Value of Leisure Discount for high-skilled Immigrants	-1.60	1.25

Calibrated from moments of the data of our 20 countries, full model.

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## Ex Ante Scenario

Countries	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5		
	N	LN	HN	N	LN	HN	N	LN	HN	N	LN	HN	N	LN	HN
Australia	0.01	0.08	-0.13	0.01	0.09	-0.12	0.00	0.08	-0.13	0.00	0.08	-0.13	0.01	0.06	-0.08
Austria	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Belgium	0.00	-0.04	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.12	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.07	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
Canada	0.01	0.09	-0.20	0.04	0.11	-0.13	0.03	0.10	-0.14	0.03	0.10	-0.14	0.04	0.08	-0.08
Denmark	0.01	0.14	-0.22	0.09	0.21	-0.13	0.05	0.17	-0.17	0.07	0.19	-0.16	0.06	0.11	-0.05
Estonia	0.00	0.04	-0.06	0.09	0.12	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.03	0.08	0.11	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.02
France	0.00	-0.05	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.12	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.04	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.05
Germany	0.00	-0.05	0.11	0.07	0.03	0.17	0.02	-0.03	0.12	0.02	-0.02	0.12	-0.01	-0.03	0.04
Greece	0.01	-0.09	0.19	0.15	0.07	0.31	0.13	0.05	0.29	0.15	0.06	0.31	0.07	0.02	0.18
Ireland	0.01	0.11	-0.13	0.07	0.15	-0.04	0.04	0.13	-0.07	0.05	0.15	-0.08	0.05	0.10	-0.03
Italy	0.00	-0.02	0.10	0.14	0.12	0.25	0.13	0.10	0.23	0.13	0.11	0.24	0.07	0.05	0.14
Luxembourg	0.00	-0.02	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.05	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
Netherlands	0.00	-0.04	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.03	0.00	0.09	-0.01	-0.03	0.02
Portugal	0.00	0.02	-0.06	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.08	0.09	0.07
Slovenia	0.01	-0.11	0.27	0.07	-0.04	0.30	0.06	-0.05	0.29	0.06	-0.05	0.30	0.02	-0.04	0.17
Spain	0.01	-0.09	0.13	0.13	0.04	0.25	0.08	-0.01	0.19	0.09	0.01	0.21	0.04	-0.01	0.12
Sweden	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.08	0.10	0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04
Switzerland	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04
UK	0.00	-0.06	0.07	0.05	-0.02	0.12	0.03	-0.04	0.11	0.03	-0.03	0.11	0.00	-0.03	0.05
United States	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.08	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.03
Average	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.03
Median	0.00	-0.02	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.02

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Countries	$\mathcal{W}_N$	$\mathcal{W}_{LN}$	$\mathcal{W}_{HN}$
Australia	0.24	1.26	-1.72
Austria	1.77	1.74	1.94
Belgium	1.70	1.37	2.30
Canada	1.19	1.79	-0.57
Denmark	1.90	2.39	0.86
Estonia	1.47	1.47	1.46
France	0.77	0.52	1.27
Germany	0.31	-0.07	1.23
Greece	2.02	1.40	3.51
Ireland	1.77	2.30	0.95
Italy	1.87	1.64	2.97
Luxembourg	0.72	0.45	1.15
Netherlands	0.48	0.23	0.98
Portugal	1.27	1.23	1.41
Slovenia	0.52	-0.20	2.30
Spain	1.90	0.96	3.43
Sweden	0.63	0.77	0.34
Switzerland	-0.14	0.04	-0.46
United Kingdom	0.35	-0.22	1.10
United States	0.80	0.97	0.53
Average	1.08	1.00	1.25
Median	0.99	1.10	1.19

## Parameter Regression, i.i.d. sampling

Dependent variable: Welfare Gains of Natives (linear)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$h_{LI}$	0.129*** [12.94]	0.072*** [6.58]	0.068*** [5.95]	0.057*** [9.59]
$h_{HI}$	0.041*** [4.15]	0.028*** [2.62]	0.025** [2.26]	0.016*** [2.75]
$\xi$		-0.004 [-0.37]	0.000 [0.00]	0.029*** [4.28]
$s_{LN}$		0.109*** [8.03]	0.109*** [8.05]	0.114*** [16.26]
$s_{LI}$		-0.076*** [-5.23]	-0.079*** [-5.34]	-0.093*** [-12.22]
$s_{HN}$		0.025** [2.09]	0.024** [2.01]	0.033*** [5.37]
$s_{HI}$		-0.032** [-2.55]	-0.033*** [-2.67]	-0.048*** [-7.43]
$g$			0.013 [1.11]	-0.028** [-2.34]
$A$				0.006 [0.73]
$x$				0.840*** [164.34]
$K$				-0.015 [-1.44]
Observations	10000	10000	10000	10000
$R^2$	0.020	0.048	0.049	0.748

All regressors are in natural logarithms.

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in brackets

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



## Moment Regression, Joint Sampling

	(1) All	(2) Low skilled	(3) High skilled
Low Skilled Immigrant Wage Gap	0.151*** [12.57]	0.132*** [12.12]	0.107*** [14.30]
High Skilled Immigrant Wage Gap	0.076*** [6.86]	0.044*** [4.33]	0.087*** [12.58]
Unemployment Rate: Low Skilled Natives	0.347*** [17.12]	0.280*** [15.21]	0.283*** [22.27]
Unemployment Rate: Low Skilled Immigrants	-0.364*** [-19.65]	-0.258*** [-15.33]	-0.356*** [-30.61]
Unemployment Rate: High Skilled Natives	0.057*** [3.55]	0.042*** [2.89]	0.055*** [5.42]
Unemployment Rate: High Skilled Immigrants	0.009 [0.44]	-0.030 [-1.53]	0.079*** [5.87]
Share of Immigrants	-0.236*** [-12.55]	-0.161*** [-9.40]	-0.231*** [-19.57]
Share of Low Skilled among Immigrants	-0.229*** [-17.29]	-0.673*** [-55.88]	0.725*** [87.14]
Share of Low Skilled among Natives	0.113*** [8.20]	0.384*** [30.62]	-0.436*** [-50.26]
Raplacement Rate	0.148*** [15.25]	0.110*** [12.45]	0.129*** [21.24]
Government Expenditures	-0.007 [-0.48]	0.003 [0.19]	-0.026*** [-2.82]
Per capita GDP	-0.124*** [-7.36]	-0.112*** [-7.32]	-0.068*** [-6.44]
Observations	10000	10000	10000
$R^2$	0.349	0.463	0.744

All regressors are in natural logarithms.

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in brackets. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Artificial economies obtained with sampling from joint normal.

## Parameter regression, Joint Sampling

	(1) All	(2) Low skilled	(3) High skilled
$h_{LI}$	0.079*** [6.97]	-0.046*** [-4.02]	0.273*** [29.34]
$h_{HI}$	0.070*** [7.13]	0.088*** [9.04]	-0.009 [-1.13]
$\xi$	-0.085*** [-7.84]	0.082*** [7.63]	-0.349*** [-39.60]
$s_{LN}$	0.311*** [19.30]	0.408*** [25.32]	-0.075*** [-5.70]
$s_{LI}$	0.035* [1.96]	0.187*** [10.37]	-0.295*** [-19.98]
$s_{HN}$	-0.069*** [-5.36]	-0.191*** [-14.79]	0.213*** [20.22]
$s_{HI}$	-0.250*** [-17.39]	-0.309*** [-21.60]	0.028** [2.41]
$g$	0.190*** [7.12]	0.446*** [16.77]	-0.357*** [-16.43]
$A$	-0.192*** [-12.14]	-0.413*** [-26.19]	0.314*** [24.37]
$x$	-0.013 [-1.49]	-0.015* [-1.76]	-0.002 [-0.33]
$K$	-0.430*** [-18.57]	-0.318*** [-13.76]	-0.433*** [-22.91]
Observations	10000	10000	10000
$R^2$	0.282	0.286	0.522

All regressors are in natural logarithms.

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in brackets

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$