

How Do Exporters Adjust to Exchange-Rate Fluctuations? New Evidence from the East African Community

Alan Asprilla, Univerity of Lausanne

Nicolas Berman Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva and CEPR

> Olivier Cadot University of Lausanne, CEPR and FERDI

Marguerite Duponchel International Growth Center, Kampala

> Mélise Jaud The World Bank

Growth Week, London, September 2013



EAC pursuing two-pronged regional integration strategy

- Trade integration
 - Customs union
 - Attempts at cooperating on building a common market through reduction in NTBs
 - MRAs for some types of services
- Monetary integration

Experience suggests that successful monetary integration requires (inter alia)

- Not too many asymmetric shocks
- Macro convergence
- o Integrated regional markets



SO FAR, EXCHANGE-RATE MOVEMENTS AMONG EAC COUNTRIES SHOW LITTLE CONVERGENCE





However a regional EAC market seeems to emerge, breeding a special type of firms – small manufacturers





Our empirical strategy: A detour through the monetary to understand the real

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Our objective: Assess EAC market integration through firm pricing behaviour, using exchange-rate variations as a "laboratory"

In the pass-through literature (see e.g. Feenstra 1989; Marston 1990; Gagnon Knetter 1995, and many others), incomplete ERPT, i.e. pricing to market (PTM) is taken as evidence of

- Variable markups (with constant markups, ERPT would be 100%)
- o <u>Market segmentation</u>

Our strategy: use PTM at the firm level from a large, multi-contry dataset to infer how competitive EAC markets are: $PTM \Rightarrow market$ power.

At the **firm level**, PTM estimates are surpisingly consistent (around 0.1, implying ERPT around -0.9) across countries (Atkeson and Burstein 2008, Berman Martin Mayer 2012, Tang Zhang 2012, Fosse 2012, Chaterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond 2012); but

- More PTM for large firms
- More PTM for core products



Heterogeneous-firms model with distribution costs implies that PTM coefficient decreases with toughness of competition (as measured by σ , the elasticity of substitution):

Additive distribution cost in the importing country, as in Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) or Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2012):

$$p^c = \tau p + \eta$$

Consumer price elasticity to prod. price: $\varepsilon^p = \frac{\tau p}{\tau r + \tau}$

$$\tilde{p}(\varphi) = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right) \left(1 + \frac{\varphi \eta e}{\sigma \tau}\right) \frac{1}{\varphi}$$
New markup
$$\beta^{p} = \frac{d \ln \tilde{p}}{d \ln e} = \frac{\varphi \eta e}{\sigma \tau + \varphi \eta e}.$$



This property not a particular model's artifact: it appears in a different model

Quasi-linear utility function à la Melitz-Ottaviano (2008):

$$U = x_0 + a \int_{\Omega} x(\varphi) d\varphi - \frac{\sigma}{2} \int_{\Omega} x(\varphi)^2 - \frac{X^2}{2}$$
$$x = \frac{a}{1+\sigma} + \frac{1}{\sigma(1+\sigma)} \overline{p}^c - \frac{1}{\sigma} p^c$$

Suppose that $p^c = \tau p$ (iceberg transportation cost, no additive distribution cost)

$$\tilde{p} = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{e(\sigma a + \overline{p}^c)}{\tau(1 + \sigma)} + \frac{1}{\varphi} \right]$$

PTM elasticity

Demand:

$$\beta^{p} = \frac{d\ln \tilde{p}}{d\ln e} = \frac{2\varphi(\sigma a + \overline{p}^{c})}{\varphi(\sigma a + \overline{p}^{c}) + \tau(1 + \sigma)}$$



Export transaction data from customs administrations of 6 countries

Table 1 Cross-country data summary										
	Number of years	Number of transactions	Transactions per year	Number of firms	Number of destinations	Number of products a/				
Bangladesh	7 (2005-2011)	412'000	58'857	13'503	197	2'784				
Kenya	7 (2005-2011)	255'314	36'473	9'373	185	4'660				
Morocco	9 (2002-2010)	463'386	51'487	17'470	179	4'391				
Tanzania	7 (2005-2010)	44'408	6'344	4'517	178	3'267				
Uganda	8 (2004-2011)	36'919	4'615	2'874	164	2'940				
Rwanda	7 (2005-2011)	8'186	1'169	1'991	135	1'415				

Notes

a/ Products have been aggregated to the common HS6 classification.

- The good: Large sample
- The bad: No firm-level covariates except constructed from the database
- The ugly: very, very noisy data, especially when it comes to unit values





Estimation issues

- 1. Endogeneity (omitted variable) from macro shocks controlled with origin-year and firm-product-destination fixed effects
- 2. Firm size approximated by number of export products



Dependent var.: ln (Unit Value) Estimator: OLS												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Log bilateral RER	0.108*** (0.0316)	0.0853** (0.0332)	1.622*** (0.369)	-0.0812 (0.127)	-0.0908 (0.212)	-0.197*** (0.0692)	0.0873*** (0.0317)	0.137*** (0.0303)	0.0695** (0.0309)	0.0692 (0.390)	-0.559 (0.370)	-0.0225 (0.352)
Interaction terms												
ln (RER) × deval. a/		-0.00217 (0.00143)								0.000232 (0.00136)	0.000670 (0.00136)	0.000608 (0.00136)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dist.)$			-0.182*** (0.0439),	}						-0.0612 (0.0430)	0.0490 (0.0434)	-0.0385 (0.0397)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dest. GDP/cap)$		×.	~{	0.0223* (0.0128)						-0.0141 (0.0252)	-0.000750 (0.0238)	-0.00824 (0.0237)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dest. GDP)$			``		0.00987 (0.00779)		χ.			0.0167 (0.0144)	0.0145 (0.0133)	0.0249* (0.0131)
ln (RER) × manuf. Prod.						0.396***)			0.301***	-0.122**	-0.106*
$\ln (\text{RER}) \times \ln (1 + \text{number prod.})$	b/				`	(0.0777)	0.00848**	*		(0.0707) 0.00588*** (0.00203)	(0.0572)	(0.0568)
							(0.00211)			(0.00203)		
ln (RER) \times ln (lag number prod.) b							0.00570**	*		0.00413**	0.00449**
$\ln (\text{RER}) \times \ln (\text{lag number prod.})$) b							0.00570** (0.00194)	*	0.044.04	0.00413**	0.00449** (0.00192)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (lag number prod.$ $\ln (RER) \times EAC \text{ bilateral trade } c$) b /							0.00570** (0.00194)	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164)	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179)	0.00449** (0.00192)
ln (RER) \times ln (lag number prod. ln (RER) \times EAC bilateral trade c Devaluation (Real)) b /	0.0155***						0.00570** (0.00194)	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104**	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691
ln (RER) \times ln (lag number prod. ln (RER) \times EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real)) b /	0.0155*** (0.00495)		0.100***				0.00570** (0.00194)	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546***	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671 (0.00477) 0.475***	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515***
ln (RER) × ln (lag number prod. ln (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) ln (dest. GDP/cap)) b /	0.0155**** (0.00495)		-0.190*** (0.0480)				0.00570** (0.00194)	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999)	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104)	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103)
In (RER) × In (lag number prod. In (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) In (dest. GDP/cap) In (dest. GDP)) b /	0.0155*** (0.00495)		-0.190*** (0.0480)	-0.323***			0.00570** (0.00194)	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999) -0.648***	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104) -0.505***	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103) -0.539***
In (RER) × In (lag number prod. In (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) In (dest. GDP/cap) In (dest. GDP)) b /	0.0155*** (0.00495)		-0.190*** (0.0480)	-0.323*** (0.0476)			0.00570**	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999) -0.648*** (0.0897)	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104) -0.505*** (0.0921)	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103) -0.539*** (0.0912)
In (RER) × In (lag number prod. In (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) In (dest. GDP/cap) In (dest. GDP) In (1+number prod.)) b /	0.0155*** (0.00495)		-0.190*** (0.0480)	-0.323*** (0.0476)		0.00230	0.00570** (0.00194)	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999) -0.648*** (0.0897) 0.00749 (0.00672)	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.006/1 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104) -0.505*** (0.0921)	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103) -0.539*** (0.0912)
In (RER) × In (lag number prod. In (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) In (dest. GDP/cap) In (dest. GDP) In (1+number prod.) In (lag number prod.)) b /	0.0155**** (0.00495)		-0.190*** (0.0480)	-0.323*** (0.0476)		0.00230 (0.00677)	0.00570** (0.00194) -0.0103 (0.00646)	* 0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999) -0.648*** (0.0897) 0.00749 (0.00672)	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104) -0.505*** (0.0921) -0.00688 (0.00644)	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103) -0.539*** (0.0912) -0.00746 (0.00644)
In (RER) × In (lag number prod. In (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) In (dest. GDP/cap) In (dest. GDP) In (1+number prod.) In (lag number prod.)) b / 568 275	0.0155*** (0.00495)	569 275	-0.190*** (0.0480)	-0.323*** (0.0476)	568 240	0.00230 (0.00677)	0.00570** (0.00194) -0.0103 (0.00646)	* (0.692*** (0.153)	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999) -0.648*** (0.0897) 0.00749 (0.00672)	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104) -0.505*** (0.0921) -0.00688 (0.00644)	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103) -0.539*** (0.0912) -0.00746 (0.00644)
In (RER) × In (lag number prod. In (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) In (dest. GDP/cap) In (dest. GDP) In (1+number prod.) In (lag number prod.) Observations R-squared) b / 568,275 0.967	0.0155*** (0.00495) 568,275 0.967	568,275 0.967	-0.190*** (0.0480) 567,172 0.967	-0.323*** (0.0476) 567,114 0.967	568,240 0.967	0.00230 (0.00677) 568,275 0.967	0.00570** (0.00194) -0.0103 (0.00646) 431,635 0.969	* 0.692*** (0.153) 568,275 0.967	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999) -0.648*** (0.0897) 0.00749 (0.00672) 5666,990 0.967	0.00413** (0.90192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.00671 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104) -0.505*** (0.0921) -0.00688 (0.00644) 430,556 0.969	0.00449** (0.00192) (0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103) -0.539*** (0.0912) -0.00746 (0.00644) 430,556 0.969
In (RER) × In (lag number prod. In (RER) × EAC bilateral trade of Devaluation (Real) In (dest. GDP/cap) In (dest. GDP) In (1+number prod.) In (lag number prod.) Observations R-squared Firm-product-destination FE	568,275 0.967 Yes	0.0155*** (0.00495) 568,275 0.967 Yes	568,275 0.967 Yes	-0.190*** (0.0480) 567,172 0.967 Yes	-0.323*** (0.0476) 567,114 0.967 Yes	568,240 0.967 Yes	0.00230 (0.00677) 568,275 0.967 Yes	0.00570** (0.00194) -0.0103 (0.00646) 431,635 0.969 Yes	* 0.692*** (0.153) 568,275 0.967 Yes	0.341** (0.164) 0.0104** (0.00491) 0.546*** (0.0999) -0.648*** (0.0897) 0.00749 (0.00672) 5666,990 0.967 Yes	0.00413** (0.00192) 0.525*** (0.179) 0.006/1 (0.00477) 0.476*** (0.104) -0.505*** (0.0921) -0.00688 (0.00644) 430,556 0.969 Yes	0.00449** (0.00192) 0.00691 (0.00477) 0.515*** (0.103) -0.539*** (0.0912) -0.00746 (0.00644) 430,556 0.969 Yes 1()



IGC *…Although EAC exporters don't seem to enjoy market power outside of their regional market*

Dependent var.: ln (Unit Value) Estimator: OLS												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Log bilateral RER	-0.103 (0.106)	-0.127 (0.110)	2.865*** (0.670)	0.134 (0.334)	0.662 (0.596)	-0.568*** (0.142)	-0.131 (0.107)	0.125 (0.0926)	-0.314*** (0.115)	-0.749 (1.340)	-1.534 (1.087)	0.0102 (0.929)
Interaction terms												
ln (RER) \times deval. a/		-0.00571* (0.00327)								-0.000875 (0.00323)	-0.000164 (0.00322)	-0.00106 (0.00320)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dist.)$			-0.378*** (0.0851)							0.197 (0.161)	0.281** (0.140)	-0.0155 (0.0910)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dest. GDP/cap)$				-0.01000 (0.0358)						0.0412 (0.0815)	0.105 (0.0676)	0.102 (0.0676)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dest. GDP)$. ,	-0.0205 (0.0227)					-0.0624 (0.0505)	-0.0621 (0.0420)	-0.0242 (0.0401)
$\ln (RER) \times manuf.$ Prod.					· · ·	0.925*** (0.178)				0.645***	0.124 (0.162)	0.0743 (0.161)
$\ln (\text{RER}) \times \ln (1+\text{number prod.})$	b/						0.0114** (0.00466)			0.00531		
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (\text{lag number prod.})$	b						(0.00532 (0.00361)		(0.00287 (0.00364)	0.00263 (0.00365)
ln (RER) \times EAC bilateral trade c/	,								0.862***	0.725**	0.888***	
Devaluation (Real)		0.0170							(01100)	0.00322	-0.000842	-0.000687
ln (dest. GDP/cap)		(0.0127)		-0.705***						(0.0127) 0.624* (0.261)	(0.0121) 0.0328 (0.200)	(0.0121) 0.0517 (0.200)
ln (dest. GDP)				(0.100)	-0.874***					(0.301) -1.116*** (0.295)	(0.290) -0.574** (0.248)	-0.589** (0.248)
ln (1+number prod.)					(0.148)		0.0181			(0.293) (0.0223) (0.0161)	(0.248)	(0.248)
ln (lag number prod.)							(0.0101)	-0.0134 (0.0132)		(0.0101)	-0.0103 (0.0133)	-0.0106 (0.0133)
Observations	1/15 181	1/15 181	1/15 181	144 872	144 873	1/15 181	145 181	112 501	145 181	144 801	112 180	112 189
R-squared	0.957	0.957	0.957	0.957	0.957	0.957	0.957	0.962	0.957	0.957	0.962	0.962
Firm-product-destination FE Originyear FE	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
												11

Dependent var.: ln (Volume) Estimator: OLS												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Log bilateral RER	0.403*** (0.0655)	0.514*** (0.0710)	0.380 (0.589)	2.220*** (0.276)	3.094*** (0.441)	-0.0612 (0.123)	0.402*** (0.0658)	0.469*** (0.0749)	0.438*** (0.0666)	3.629*** (0.811)	3.035*** (0.866)	2.324*** (0.789)
Interaction terms												
ln (RER) \times deval. a/		-0.00247 (0.00282)								-0.00286 (0.00285)	0.000885 (0.00294)	0.000966 (0.00294)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dist.)$			0.00270 (0.0699)							-0.193** (0.0917)	-0.0344 (0.102)	0.0816 (0.0840)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dest. GDP/cap)$				-0.202*** (0.0274)						0.0192 (0.0530)	0.0317 (0.0550)	0.0416 (0.0549)
$\ln (RER) \times \ln (dest. GDP)$					-0.109*** (0.0163)					-0.0897*** (0.0316)	-0.122*** (0.0327)	-0.136*** (0.0320)
$\ln (RER) \times manuf.$ Prod.						0.601*** (0.133)				0.682*** (0.134)	0.674*** (0.142)	0.652*** (0.141)
$\ln (\text{RER}) \times \ln (1 + \text{number prod.})$	b/						0.00142 (0.00385)			0.00415 (0.00383)		
$\ln (\text{RER}) \times \ln (\text{lag number prod.})$	b							-0.0120***	*		-0.00529	-0.00578
ln (RER) × EAC bilateral trade c/	/							(0.00559)	-0.633*** (0.227)	-0.813*** (0.291)	-0.696* (0.360)	(0.00501)
Devaluation (Real)		-0.0470**	*							-0.0514***	-0.0540***	-0.0543***
ln (dest. GDP/cap)		(0.0106)		1.015***						(0.0107) -0.615***	(0.0108) -0.644**	(0.0108) -0.697***
ln (dest. GDP)				(0.113)	1.024***					(0.230) 1.544*** (0.199)	(0.250) 1.687*** (0.216)	(0.250) 1.733*** (0.215)
ln (1+number prod.)					(0.100)		0.250^{***}			(0.177) 0.244^{***} (0.0128)	(0.210)	(0.213)
ln (lag number prod.)							(0.012))	0.0587*** (0.0122)		(0.0120)	0.0427*** (0.0122)	0.0435*** (0.0122)
Observations R-squared	568,278 0.931	568,278 0.931	568,278 0.931	567,175 0.931	567,117 0.931	568,243 0.932	568,278 0.932	431,637 0.934	568,278 0.931	566,993 0.932	430,558 0.934	430,558 0.934
Firm-product-destination FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Originyear FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes 12



Whole sample

- PTM coefficient around 0.1 without all the interaction terms
 - Like in the rest of the literature no difference between industrial and developing countries?
 - More ERPT at the firm level (0.9) than aggregate/sector-level ERPT (0.3 on average)
- Volume elasticities very high for the whole sample, although plausible when doing the algebra, assuming 20% transportation (τ) cost and 100% retail margin (η), estimates imply elasticity of substitution (σ) between 4 and 8

EAC exporters

- In general, no PTM for EAC exporters, implying no market power
- But very strong PTM ($0.7 < \beta^p < 0.9$) on EAC markets (bilateral trade), suggesting substantial market power
- Weak supply response, suggesting binding capacity constraints



Dependent var.:	En	ıtry	Exit			
Sample Estimator: RE Probit	EAC bilateral (1)	All Sample (2)	EAC bilateral (3)	All Sample (4)		
RER volatility a/	4.088***	5.199***	-0.619	-0.511**		
	(1.320)	(0.536)	(0.522)	(0.211)		
Financial dependence b/	-0.186*	-0.191***	-0.0482	0.0240		
	(0.0984)	(0.0551)	(0.0370)	(0.0195)		
Volatility × Financial dependence	-1.710	1.618*	1.096	-0.543		
	(1.831)	(0.858)	(0.813)	(0.372)		
ln (distance)	-2.147***	-0.436***	-0.0784**	0.0981***		
	(0.174)	(0.0215)	(0.0357)	(0.00493)		
ln (dest. GDP/cap)	0.194	-0.360***	0.201*	0.0402***		
	(0.469)	(0.0198)	(0.112)	(0.00472)		
ln (dest. GDP)	0.289***	0.301***	-0.0316*	-0.0185***		
	(0.0784)	(0.0131)	(0.0179)	(0.00295)		
Firm scope c/	-0.530***	-0.401***	-0.00408	0.00231		
	(0.0215)	(0.0117)	(0.00377)	(0.00218)		
Fixed effects						
Firm-product-destination	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Origin-year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	42,751	122,735	89,217	243,155		
Number of Firm-Destination-Product cells	29,072	81,699	47,101	138,453		



Pricing to market behavior of exporters suggests strong evidence of market power on EAC markets:

- Markets still segmented, protected by tariffs (25% band), NTBs
- Difficult arbitrage between infant-industry protection and need to discipline abuses of market power

Entry and exit behaviour does not provide strong evidence of damage from exchange-rate volatility:

- Exit rates go *down* with exchange rate volatility
- Not higher for credit-constrained firms

Policy implications

- Focus on pursuing regional trade integration (good compromise between infant-industry protection and liberalization
- Still looking for a compelling case to launch process of monetary integration (given tremendous costs in terms of macro constraints)