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The Climate and WTO Regimes: Reforms to avoid collision

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GATT/WTO is a negative contract

Countries are free to choose their environment policies so long as they do not undo the exchange of market access negotiated at GATT

- What can WTO members wishing to avert climate change do?
 - Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) likely to be invoked because of slow convergence of carbon prices (<u>here</u>) and high leakage rates (<u>here</u>). BTAs allowed but only safe if invoked under art. XX(g) with chapeau to avoid 'likeness' challenge under tariffs
- What WTO members cannot do.
 - Green subsidies cannot be used (they are actionable as art. 31 of SCM was not renewed in 2000)
 - Tariffs to discourage free-riding in a carbon-club.
- What is uncertain under WTO law
 - Labelling: Uncertain under case law (see recent US-Tuna II (Mexico)) where likeness was decided by consumers.

Shift WTO to a positive contract (I)

Obligation to address environmental damage. To this end:

- Reverse AB case law relying on consumer-based decisionmaking on likeness should be a question of policy not market-likeness as perceived by consumers.
- Reform HS system at WCO to reflect environmental concerns.
- Allow for 'green' subsidies (re-instate art. 31 SCM) to re-establish distinction "good"-"bad" subsidies.
- <u>Fossil fuels</u>. Compulsory monitoring of subsidies for fossil

fuels. A voluntary supply of similar information is disincentivizing so need to agree that reporting be compulsory. This would be equivalent to currently compulsory TPRM

<u>Legalize environmental labelling</u> via recourse to ISO standards (now outcome is uncertain under case law). Using an ISO std. guarantees immunization from challenges at the WTO.

Shift WTO to a positive contract (II)

- □ Variable geometry will be key for WTS to progress on SDGs.
- <u>Country-based plurilaterals</u> under art. XXIV on RTAs include some environment provisions but these are weak--see e.g. TPP critique (<u>here</u>)
- <u>Issue-based plurilaterals</u> to liberalize environment-friendly trade (like the Environment Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations) at WTO. Offers possibility to be multilateralized.

 Punishment for non-participation in a carbon-club. Nordhaus
(2015): Take a carbon-club (for OECD) with a social cost of carbon in the \$10-50\$ range. Punish free-riding with an across-the-board tariff on imports for shirkers. This punishment is incentive compatible.

⇒ Requires a change in WTO law as currently, a club of countries cannot raise their bound tariffs —even in non-discriminatory manner against non-members (under PTAs you cannot raise tariffs against nonmembers). See Mavroidis and Melo (2015)

References

Barrett, Scott, Carlo Carraro, Jaime de Melo eds. *Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime* CEPR and FERDI <u>http://www.ferdi.fr/en/publication/ouv-towards-workable-and-effective-climate-regime</u>


Fischer, Carolyn « Options for Avoiding Carbon Leakage » in Barrett et al. eds.

Mavroidis, Petros and Jaime de Melo « Climate Change Policies and the WTO: Greening the GATT, Revisited », in Barrett et al. eds.

Nordhaus, W. (2015) « Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free riding in international Climate Policy », *American Economic Review*, 105(4), 1339-70

Extra slides

Carbon Pricing on the rise but convergence will take time...



Existing, emerging, and potential regional, national and subnational carbon pricing

ETS= Emissions Trading system

Average worldwide CO2 price per ton ≈\$15 (Sweden ≈\$130)

(back)

Carbon leakage rates (light blue with BCA) from OECD coalition to reduce emissions by 20% from BAU

