

The role of regional multilateral banks in relation to the World Bank. Why is it different in Africa?

Matthieu BOUSSICHAS, Clara PUGNET

➞ Matthieu BOUSSICHAS, Programme Manager, FERDI

➞ Clara PUGNET, Research Assistant, FERDI

The African Development Fund (ADF) is much less active than the World Bank's IDA in Africa. This predominance of the IDA is only found in Africa. In fact, disbursements by other major regional banks exceed those of the World Bank in their respective regions (Central America and the Caribbean, South America, Asia, Oceania). This shortfall in concessional resources in Africa is not offset by non-concessional or slightly concessional funds. Why is there such a shortfall? Why is it specific to Africa? The document seeks to identify the reasons for this situation, whether institutional, political, or technical. The document begins with a descriptive statistical analysis of the relative weight of each major regional development bank compared to the World Bank in each major region, and its evolution over the last 20 years, distinguishing between concessional and non-concessional resources. To interpret these figures, it then examines three hypotheses already put forward by Nancy Birdsall in a 2018 article.

► The relative weight of the World Bank and each development regional bank in each region

In Africa, the World Bank is much more important than the AfDB

Unlike other developing regions, Africa stands out in terms of the weight of the World Bank (WB) in multilateral public financing. In 2023¹, World Bank disbursements in Africa were 3.6 times greater than those of the AfDB (African Development Bank), taking into account all flows recorded by OECD DAC data, i.e., the sum of official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF²). This finding is exclusively due to the World Bank's ODA being nearly ten times higher than that of the AfDB in 2023, as the two banks are on a par in terms of OOF (public flows that are not very concessional or not concessional at all).

This situation is not new, but it has become more pronounced. Over the last 20 years, the World Bank has always been the main multilateral donor in Africa in terms of ODA. However, the gap has widened significantly over the last decade. This contrasting trend between the two banks can be explained both by stagnation in the volume of AfDB aid and by a sharp increase in World Bank aid to Africa, which peaked in 2022.

Other multilateral development banks are active in Africa, including the Arab Bank for Development (BADEA), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Islamic Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Although these institu-

tions provide only a very small amount of ODA, their cumulative public flows to Africa, which are largely non-concessional (OOF), have exceeded those of the World Bank and the AfDB since 2021 (see Graph 1).

Elsewhere, the World Bank's influence is lower than or comparable to that of regional banks, except for ODA in Asia, where the World Bank's ODA volume is twice that of the Asian Development Bank

In other regions of the world, the World Bank's influence is comparable to that of regional development banks.

Asia: relative preponderance of World Bank ODA

In Asia, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) have had comparable intervention volumes for 20 years (see Graph 2). However, this similarity masks a notable difference in the terms of intervention. De facto, the World Bank's ODA is 2.5 times higher than that of the AsDB, while the AsDB's public flows, which are little or not at all concessional, are higher than those of the World Bank. The other regional development banks operating in Asia have seen strong growth in their volume of operations since 2019, mainly in the form of OOF, which will equal the World Bank's amount in 2023.

Latin America, the Caribbean and South America: IADB in the lead

On the American continent, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) is more active than the World Bank (except in 2023, when ODA of both banks is comparable in Central America and the Caribbean). The other multilateral development banks have a volume of activity in Latin America and the Caribbean that is similar to that of the World Bank in South America but higher in Central America and the Caribbean (see Graph 3).

This comparative descriptive analysis of trends in ODA and OOF volumes in the world's major

1. These figures will be updated in early 2026 with the data 2024 OECD that will be available at that time.

2. According to the OECD, OOF are "official sector transactions that do not meet official development assistance (ODA) criteria. They include : grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes; bilateral public sector operations aimed at promoting development, but with a grant element of less than 25%; bilateral public sector operations, regardless of their grant element; net purchases; subsidies (grants) to the private sector to enable it to relax the terms of loans it grants to developing countries; and aid for financing private investments." www.oecd.org/fr/data/indicators/other-official-flows-oof.html

developing regions highlights the unique situation of Africa, where the World Bank's volume of activities (ODA and OOF) is significantly higher than that of the AfDB, unlike other regions of the world where the World Bank does not dominate, or even finds itself in a secondary position, as in Latin America, with the slight difference that the World Bank's ODA is more than twice as high as that of the AsDB in Asia.

► How can this African specificity be explained?


Based on the above, one conclusion is clear: Africa is an exception, with the World Bank clearly dominating the regional bank. This imbalance raises a key question: how can this African specificity be explained, when in other regions of the world

regional banks play an equivalent or even dominant role?

Little literature on the subject


Few studies have examined the comparative dynamics of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in Africa, and even fewer have looked at the factors that could explain the relative weakness of the African Development Bank (AfDB) compared to the World Bank in its own region of operation. Nancy Birdsall (2018) explores the effect of governance on the ability of multilateral development banks to mobilize long-term financing. To our knowledge, she is the only one to focus on the specific case of the African Development Bank (AfDB), in comparison with other MDBs such as the World Bank and regional development banks.

Graph 1: Evolution of multilateral public flows to Africa, by type.



Source: CRS (Creditor Reporting System) OECD (data-explorer.oecd.org/).

Graph 2: Evolution of multilateral public flows to Asia, by type.



Source: CRS (Creditor Reporting System) OECD (data-explorer.oecd.org/).

Graph 3: Evolution of multilateral public flows to Central America and the Caribbean, and South America, by type.



Source: CRS (Creditor Reporting System) OECD (data-explorer.oecd.org/).

The author thus highlights a key institutional factor: the AfDB's unique governance structure, which favours borrowers (African countries) who hold a majority of voting rights (greater than or equal to 50%) over other MDB, where non-borrowers (mainly high-income countries) retain a majority. This "borrower-centred" governance is designed to strengthen regional ownership, but it can weaken creditor confidence and limit the AfDB's ability to raise funds on international markets. Similarly, as the African Development Fund (ADF) is much smaller than the World Bank's IDA, this may limit its ability to support the poorest African countries. The paper therefore suggests that the AfDB could benefit from governance reform and move towards a model similar to that of the IADB, where governance is shared 50/50 between borrowers and non-borrowers. Such a reform could maintain a sense of ownership among borrowing countries while balancing creditor confidence and improving the AfDB's ability to raise funds.

Other papers address the impact of development bank governance on their performance and their ability to fulfil their missions, which are expanding over time^{3,4}. However, the conclusions of these papers do not specifically concern the AfDB. This literature does not, as it stands, explain

the relative weakness of the AfDB compared to the World Bank in Africa.

A quick review of three hypotheses

Based on this framework, three main hypotheses can be drawn from Nancy Birdsall's paper to explain the African paradox outlined above.

Hypothesis 1: The distribution of votes within the AfDB is unfavourable to non-regional countries

The distribution of votes within the AfDB is indeed rather unfavourable to non-regional shareholders.

Table 1: Distribution of voting rights (%) between the AfDB⁵ and ADF⁶.

Bank/Fund	Regional countries	Non-regional countries	Total
AfDB	58,7	41,3	100
ADF	50,02	49,98	100

Source: African Development Bank Financial Report 2023 (pp. 98 and 99 for the AfDB and 163 for the ADF).

Regional countries (African countries, all eligible) hold 58.7% of the voting rights at the AfDB, compared with 41.3% for non-regional countries. This distribution of voting rights has remained stable over time; the AfDB's statutes provide for this distribution (60%/40%) between regional (beneficiary) and non-regional (donor) members, but it remains specific to the AfDB, as countries eligible for financing from other MDBs are generally in the minority (with the exception of the Caribbean Bank) or almost equal in number to countries not eligible for financing (IADB) (see tables below).

The distribution of votes in the ADF, on the other hand, is more balanced, although very slightly in favour of African countries (50.02% versus 49.98% for non-African countries). This case is similar to that of the IADB.

3. Attridge et al. (2021) examine the extent to which the governance of national development banks (NDBs) in Africa affects their financial performance. The authors find that key measures of political influence, particularly political appointments, have a strongly negative impact on financial performance, as well as on banks' risk appetite. Furthermore, they find that this effect is stronger in countries with a weaker enabling environment. They conclude that increasing the institutional distance between public ownership and bank management can have a positive influence on banks' financial performance.

4. Lugaresi (2024) analyses MDB governance in light of new global challenges. For the author, MDB boards of directors differ from those of private companies. MDBs face governance challenges due to geopolitical tensions and global challenges. MDB directors, appointed by shareholder countries, have fewer fiduciary obligations and share management responsibilities with senior management, which can reduce the effectiveness of oversight. MDBs' multicultural boards promote diversity but complicate decision-making. MDBs are crucial for providing global public goods, but this provision is insufficient, particularly due to the "free rider" risk of certain countries. Proposed reforms include professionalizing recruitment, transforming "resident" boards into "non-resident" boards, and appointing an independent director.

5. As of September 30, 2024.

6. As of September 30, 2024; 50% for the AfDB and 0.02% for Angola.

Non-regional countries can more easily control the ADF than the AfDB, but as Birdsall (2018) points out, *“the non-borrowers have more control of the concessional (AfDF) fund, because they are the major contributors; but for the major bilateral donors to Africa (the UK, the US, and France), contributions to the AfDF are far more expensive in cash terms (and less leveraged, and customarily repeated every three years) than new paid-in capital associated with a new recapitalization is.”*

Within the IDA and the IBRD (Table 2), non-eligible countries are in the majority, in proportions inverse to those of the AfDB. The World Bank

therefore has a governance structure that favours large donors, which can facilitate the mobilization of resources.

Within the AsDB⁷ (Table 3), while non-regional countries are in the minority, non-eligible countries are in the vast majority (61.4%).

7. Unlike the AfDB, not necessarily all regional countries of the AsDB, BIAD, and CarDB are eligible countries. The tables here break down the distribution of votes according to the eligibility of countries for financing from these banks (information not directly available in the financial reports of these banks).

Table 2: Distribution of voting power (%) within the World Bank (IDA and IBRD).

World Bank	IDA Countries	Blend Countries	IBRD Countries	Countries not eligible for IDA or IBRD	Total
IBRD*	5,1	2,5	31,3	61,1	100
<i>of which eligible for IBRD financing</i>		33,9			
IDA	11,4	4	22,9	61,7	100
<i>of which eligible for IDA financing</i>	15,4				

Source : Annual and financial reports of the IBRD and IDA.

* Each country has a specific voting percentage, but in most cases is represented by a director acting on behalf of several countries. IBRD beneficiary countries may find themselves in the same country grouping as non-beneficiary countries. Thus, a comparison of the voting percentages between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries does not necessarily reflect the balance of power between the two categories of countries, since the balance of power is determined more by the weight of each grouping.

Table 3: Distribution of voting rights (%) within the Asian Development Bank.

	Regional countries				Non-regional countries (non eligible)	Total
AsDB	65,1				34,9	100
	Revenue*	BLEND	OCR*	non eligible		
	6,4	6,9	25,2	26,5		
	Eligible countries: 38,6			Non eligible countries: 61,4		

Source : Asian Development Bank Financial Report 2023 (page 66).

* Revenue: Concessional assistance only; OCR: Regular Ordinary Capital Resources.

Table 4: Distribution of voting power (%) within the Inter-American Development Bank.

IADB	Regional countries		Non-regional countries	Total
	84,02		15,98	100
	<i>eligible</i>	<i>non-eligible regional</i>		
	50,01	34,01		
Total non-eligible: 49,99				

Source: 2023 Annual Report of the Inter-American Development Bank.

Table 5: Distribution of voting rights (%) within the Caribbean Development Bank.

CarDB	Regional countries		Non-regional countries	Total
	64,8		35,2	100
	<i>eligible</i>	<i>non-eligible regional</i>		
	55,3	9,5		
Total non-eligible: 44,7				


Source : Financial statement of the Caribbean Development Bank (September 2023).

Summary 1: Distribution of voting rights (%) within each institution.

% of votes	Eligible countries	Non-eligible countries
AfDB	58,7	41,3
ADF	50,02	49,98
IBRD	38,9	61,1
IDA	38,3	61,7
AsDB	38,6	61,4
IADB	50,01	49,99
CarDB	55,3	44,7

Source: Financial or annual reports of regional multilateral banks.

Summary 2: Weight (ODA and OOF) of each institution relative to the World Bank (IDA or IBRD) and voting weight of non-eligible countries within each institution.



Source: ODA and ODA-related data are from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) (data-explorer.oecd.org/); data on voting rights are from the financial or annual reports of the MDBs. The weight of MDBs relative to the IBRD and IDA was calculated based on the sum of ODA and ODA-equivalent flows for the last five years available (2019-2023). The OECD counts almost all IDA disbursements as ODA and all IBRD disbursements as ODA-equivalent. The first graph concerns ODA and compares, in particular, the concessional windows of the AfDB (ADF) and the World Bank (IDA), while the second graph concerns OOF and compares, in particular, the AfDB (excluding ADF) with the IBRD for the World Bank.

As seen in Table 4, countries that are not eligible for IADB financing are in the minority, but only by a small margin. This situation is quite similar to that of the ADF.

Lastly, with Table 5, we can see that countries ineligible for CarDB financing are in the minority. This situation is quite similar to that of the AfDB.

The distribution of votes within the AfDB therefore seems rather unfavourable to non-eligible shareholders, unlike what is observed at the World Bank or the ADB.

Birdsall (2018) points out that “*borrowers have more votes on many operational decisions, and the presidency is held by a borrower; that makes it hard for the non-borrowers to take initiative on operational policies without working together; working together is hard because no single non-borrower or small group of non-borrowers has much skin in the game*”.

However, this must be qualified by the establishment of a qualified majority rule, obtained from Western shareholders in 1998, which stipulates that “*Except as otherwise expressly provided in the Agreement, whenever a formal vote is requested,*

the Board shall, in general, decide the matter by a majority of sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the voting power represented at the meeting, except that in respect of an issue declared by a Member as being of great importance, touching upon a substantial interest of that Member, such important issue shall be decided, at the request of the Member, by a majority of seventy per cent of the total voting power⁸. Thus, non-regional countries have a **blocking minority** that allows them to better control the management of the AfDB.

Birdsall (2018) nevertheless believes that a more balanced distribution of votes between regional and non-regional countries in the AfDB would be a significant incentive for non-regional countries to capitalize more in the AfDB.

Hypothesis 2: Is the AfDB less financially sound than other MDBs?

Several indicators can be used to assess an institution's ability to manage its risks, maintain its solvency, and ensure the confidence of its creditors and investors. At the same time, they may explain the gap between the World Bank and AfDB's non-concessional and low-concessional loans in Africa. However, they do not seem to explain the same gap in concessional financing, which is much more dependent on contributions from non-African countries.

Credit ratings: Credit ratings assigned by agencies such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch provide an independent assessment of an institution's creditworthiness and ability to meet its financial obligations. It is difficult to imagine that the AfDB would be less appreciated by shareholders due to concerns about its financial stability, as it enjoys very high financial ratings from the major international rating agencies, at a level similar to that of other major development banks (notably the IDA and the AsDB).

According to S&P Global Ratings, the AfDB has been assigned a long-term and short-term rating of "AAA/A-1+" with a stable outlook. This rating

reflects the bank's financial strength, prudent risk management, and quality governance. AsDB and IDA have received the same rating from S&P.

Fitch also maintained its "AAA" rating for the AfDB, with a stable outlook. The rating is accompanied by a short-term rating of "F1+", indicating an exceptionally strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. The AsDB and IDA received the same rating from Fitch.

Moody's and the Japanese Rating Agency also assigned high ratings to the AfDB (AAA), reflecting the strong support of its members, good capital adequacy, and its status as a preferred creditor. This level is also that of the IDA, whose rating as of February 21, 2025, is "AAA" with a stable outlook. Moody's notes that "IDA's credit challenges stem from its development mandate, which requires it to lend to riskier sovereigns, some of which have very limited or no access to capital markets" which is also true for other development banks. The AsDB is also rated AAA with a stable outlook by Moody's.

These high ratings reflect investor and creditor confidence in the AfDB's financial strength and ability to meet its obligations, and do not distinguish the AfDB from the IDA and the AsDB.

Leverage ratio: A bank's leverage refers to a financial institution's ability to use borrowed funds to finance its activities and generate profits. The leverage ratio is therefore the ratio between the total assets bank's and its equity capital. International financial institutions such as the AfDB and the World Bank are subject to strict prudential rules, particularly those arising from the Basel III agreements, which generally limit the leverage ratio to a minimum of 3%⁹ (i.e. a maximum leverage ratio of approximately 33:1), but in practice, large international institutions often maintain much lower ratios to preserve their financial stability. The AfDB and IADB have the lowest ratio, at 4.1 each, indicating that their assets are approximately four times greater than

8. www.afdb.org/fr/documents/compendium-des-reglements-generaux-et-autres-instruments-de-la-banque-africaine-de-developpement-edition-2018

9. This ratio is 4% in the United States.

their equity capital¹⁰. The AsDB is in the middle, with an average ratio of 5.4. The IBRD, on the other hand, has the highest ratio, at 6.2, indicating intensive use of debt to increase the size of its balance sheet¹¹, which may reflect an ambitious strategy supported by a solid and homogeneous shareholder base. In other words, for every dollar of capital, the IBRD manages to mobilize one and a half times more resources than the AfDB. In September 2025, the new president of the AfDB, Sidi Ould Tah, mentioned the goal of using leverage to transform *“every dollar of capital into ten dollars of financing,”* suggesting a target ratio of approximately 10:1 for the bank’s financing operations.

The difference between the AfDB and the IBRD reflects not only the IBRD’s more aggressive financial management strategy, but also the latter’s capital base, the quality of its shareholders, and the exceptional confidence it inspires in the markets. This partly explains why the World Bank has a much greater non-concessional financing capacity than the AfDB on the African continent. Indeed, if the AfDB adopts a more conservative policy, this can be explained by the fact that it is adapting to a shareholder base composed in part of African countries with more heterogeneous ratings.

Debt ratio: the debt ratio measures the ratio of debt to equity. It expresses how much debt a bank uses in relation to its capital to finance its assets. Thus, the higher the ratio, the more the institution depends on debt to finance its activities. The IBRD has a debt ratio of 5.2 average¹², or more than five dollars of debt for every dollar of capital, reflecting a structural dependence

on debt and a willingness to exploit investor confidence to the maximum. The IADB (3.1) and the AfDB (2.9) occupy an intermediate position, while the AsDB stands out for its prudence with a ratio of 2.5. In this area too, the AfDB differs significantly from the IBRD: with a debt of less than 3, it deliberately limits its exposure to market risk while maintaining a substantial financing capacity. The IBRD, on the other hand, pushes debt to much higher levels, giving it unrivalled financial power but making it more dependent on market conditions. This difference reflects an adaptation to their respective institutional contexts: the IBRD, supported by a very solid and homogeneous shareholder base, can adopt a strategy of maximum expansion, while the AfDB chooses a more balanced position, reconciling financing ambition with financial prudence.

Ultimately, the assumption that the AfDB’s financial strength is weaker than that of other multilateral development banks is not confirmed by the available indicators. The credit ratings assigned by the major international agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, JCR) place the AfDB on a par with the IDA and the AsDB, all rated AAA with a stable outlook, reflecting investor confidence in its ability to meet its financial commitments. From this perspective, the AfDB does not appear to be weaker than its counterparts. However, an examination of leverage and debt ratios shows that the AfDB adopts a more conservative strategy than the IBRD. Its leverage (4.1) and debt (2.9) are significantly lower than those of the IBRD (6.2 and 5.2), reflecting a lower dependence on debt and a desire to limit exposure to market risks. This caution can be explained by a more heterogeneous shareholder structure, which includes a significant proportion of African countries with weaker credit ratings, whereas the IBRD benefits from an extremely solid base of AAA shareholders. The difference between the AfDB and the IBRD is therefore not due to intrinsic financial fragility, but to a divergence in models: the IBRD maximizes the use of its capital thanks to the markets’ total confidence in its shareholders, while the AfDB maintains a balance between its financing ambitions and the preservation of its solvency. This strategic

10. However, it should be noted that while the IADB and the AfDB have similar leverage indicators, their institutional and regional differences explain their distinct management choices, with the former operating in a context where shareholder guarantees are more transparent, while the latter must continually adjust its financial policy to a more diverse and sometimes more vulnerable membership base. Indeed, the IADB benefits from a regional environment characterized by longer-standing financial integration and stronger support from the United States and Latin American powers, which enhances its credibility with the markets.

11. 5-year average (2020-2024).

12. 5-year average (2020-2024).

choice automatically limits its relative capacity for non-concessional financing in Africa compared to the World Bank, but does not undermine investor confidence or the stability of its financial model.

Hypothesis 3: Would shareholders be discouraged from financing the AfDB on the grounds that it is less effective than the IDA?

Since it is not possible to make a meaningful ex post comparison of the rates of return of the various MDBs and, above all, their concessional subsidiaries, it is conceivable to examine the respective capacity of the institutions to disburse the loans at their disposal quickly. The hypothesis would be that the AfDB has more difficulty than the World Bank in disbursing loans in Africa. But here again, we need to be able to rely on a relevant indicator. Let us quickly consider two ratios that are often used as an illustration.

Commitment ratio (loans not yet disbursed), defined as the ratio of signed loans to approved loans. This ratio would be useful for assessing an institution's operational performance and ability to fulfil its financial commitments. A high ratio (close to 100%) reflects good operational efficiency, effective management of lending processes, and strong demand from borrowers (however, too high a ratio could also signal excessive risk-taking if loans are signed without sufficient due diligence). A low ratio suggests administrative barriers, overly strict lending conditions, or a lack of interest from potential borrowers. It may also indicate inefficiencies in the lending process or implementation issues.

In 2023, the ADF has a high ratio (92%), which has remained stable over time (94% in 2020), while the AfDB's ratio has fallen significantly (from 85% in 2020 to 74% in 2023). This decline indicates a decrease in the bank's capacity to transform its commitments into actual loans. If this trend continues, it means that fewer projects are actually being financed. By comparison, the ratio is very high for the IDA (93% in 2023), excellent for the ADB (≈95%), and lower for the IADB (64% in 2022). These figures suggest that the AfDB's performance is not exceptional, but that the explanation for the African paradox cannot be

based solely on this criterion, since other regional institutions (such as the IADB) have lower ratios without being marginalized by the World Bank in their region.

The disbursement ratio measures the proportion of funds committed by the bank that are actually disbursed. A high ratio would indicate that the allocated funds are being used quickly and that projects are progressing as planned. Several factors can affect this ratio, some of which depend on the recipient countries, such as administrative procedures, economic and political conditions, and project management capacities in the recipient countries, and therefore should not differ between ADF and IDA aid to Africa, while others depend on the operational capacity of the two institutions and are therefore reflected in the ratio.

However, interpreting the ratio of disbursements to commitments calculated on a macroeconomic scale is difficult. To be relevant, the disbursements considered in the numerator must correspond to the commitments in the denominator. A simple aggregate comparison of disbursements and commitments over a year does not ensure this correspondence, due to potential time lags between commitments and disbursements. For a given year, this correspondence is stronger for budget support than for project aid, for which there may be sometimes long disbursement delays. This is why it is difficult to measure this ratio in a relevant and accurate manner based on the simple annual data available.

As an exploratory exercise, the following statistics show, in a simple way, the ratio of ODA disbursements to ODA commitments (according to OECD data) over a three-year period.

Table 6: Ratio of ODA disbursements to ODA commitments over a three-year period.

		Period		
		2019-2021	2020-2022	2021-2023
ODA	ADF	122 %	114 %	103 %
	IDA	64 %	57 %	61 %
ODA (loans)	ADF	128 %	114 %	117 %
	IDA	73 %	62 %	63 %

Source: CRS (Creditor Reporting System) OECD (data-explorer.oecd.org/).

However, the fact that IDA ratios are lower than those of the ADF cannot be interpreted as a sign of lower effectiveness (in Africa)! The explanation lies mainly in the fact that IDA commitments are growing, unlike those of the ADF: because the funds committed are sometimes disbursed one or more years later, if commitments in year N increase, it is normal for payments in year N, which potentially correspond to previous years N-x when commitments were lower, to be lower themselves. Another indicator should be used, involving longer statistical series. The higher ADF ratios calculated here probably only reflect the low growth in its commitments, and therefore, in a way, the lack of confidence of shareholders, which brings us back to the other hypotheses examined.

Criticism of operational efficiency and governance. Beyond analyses of financial efficiency, criticism of the operational efficiency and governance of the outgoing presidency has grown in recent months. Among other things, administrative costs are considered high in relation to the amounts actually transferred to member countries; furthermore, with the concentration of power is considered excessive, the AfDB president combining executive functions with those of chairman of the board of directors, which limits the independence of the directors¹³. If these prove persistent, they are likely to fuel a form of mistrust criticisms shareholder.

► Conclusion

The most well-supported hypothesis to explain the AfDB's specific situation in terms of its relatively low weight compared to the World Bank in Africa is that of the relative weight of shareholders representing donors in the distribution of votes, but the others should be subject to further research. Added to this is what could be called a fourth hypothesis, which is in fact simply the observation that the proportion of African countries among those eligible for IDA has continued to increase, due to the emergence of non-African countries falling outside the eligibility criteria... thus freeing up resources for African countries.

The new AfDB presidency has announced its intention to *"increase the amounts committed by AfDB tenfold and build the institution in such a way as to restructure it to become the leading African financial player"*¹⁴.

However, this ambition faces an initial obstacle with the announcement that the US administration US, its primary financial supporter, is withdrawing.

This makes it all the more urgent to reflect on the evolution of the AfDB model and the substantial expansion of its volume of commitment.

13. www.theafricareport.com/381890/african-development-bank-why-presidents-power-must-be-curbed

14. www.rfi.fr/fr/vid%C3%A9o/20250505-la-bad-doit-multiplier-par-10-ses-financements-en-afrique-sidi-ould-tah

► Bibliography

- **Attridge S., Chen Y. and Mbate M.** (2021), *Financial performance and corporate governance: evidence from national development banks in Africa*, ODI Report, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.
- **ADB** (2024), *Annual Report 2023: Accelerating Climate Action for Sustainable Development*. En ligne : dx.doi.org/10.22617/FLS240103
- **BAD** (2024), *Financial Report 2023*.
Online: www.afdb.org/fr/documents/rapport-financier-2023
- **Birdsall N.** (2018), "The Dilemma of the African Development Bank: Does Governance Matter for the Long-Run Financing of the MDBs?", CGD Working Paper 498. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Online: www.cgdev.org/publication/dilemma-afdb-does-governance-matter-long-run-financing-mdbs
- **IDA** (2024), *IDA Financial Statements June 2024*, World Bank Group. Online: thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/306d5e3f952ffc4cefb5dc-dccebobb31-0040012024/original/IDA-Financial-Statements-June-2024.pdf
- **Lugaresi S.** (2024), *Multilateral Development Banks' Governance and the New Global Challenges*, *Development Cooperation Review*, Vol. 7, N° 1, January-March 2024. Online : <https://ris.org.in/newsletter/dcr/2024/arr-2.pdf>



Créée en 2003, la **Fondation pour les études et recherches sur le développement international** vise à favoriser la compréhension du développement économique international et des politiques qui l'influencent.



Contact

www.ferdi.fr

contact@ferdi.fr

+33 (0)4 43 97 64 60

n° ISSN : 2275-5055

Directeur de la publication : Patrick Guillaumont

Chargée des publications : Morgane Dumazel

